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Worthlessness, Debt-Equity, and
Related Problems
By WILLMm NATBONY*t

It is a maxim of business that an investment is never made
with the expectation of loss; few investments are made with even a
suspicion that less than the original outlay will be returned. This
perhaps explains the frequency of tax litigation on the issue of loss
allowance: with little belief in downside risk, many investors are
unprepared to document the context of a loss, having eschewed the
legal counseling necessary to plan properly for all contingencies.
Financial disaster thus often leaves investors unable to establish a
current loss deduction.
Recognizing that capital formation and economic growth require speculation, Congress enacted tax provisions to mitigate investor loss.1 The provisions relevant to this discussion concern two
investment loss categories: securities2 and debts.3 Preferential
treatment is accorded losses of either kind sustained in a business
context, especially in the area of intercorporate investment, in
which the stakes often are highest.'
* J.D., 1975, New York University School of Law; L.L.M., 1976, New York University
School of Law.
t This paper was prepared while the author was on the faculty of St. Louis University
School of Law. The author extends his grateful appreciation to his friend and colleague,
Sandy Sarasohn, for his continuous support and guidance, and to Kim Sindel for her valuable assistance in the preparation of this Article. Copyright 0 1981, William Natbony. All
rights reserved.
1. See Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1979, at 40, col 1 (discussing the 1978 Revenue
Act's effect on venture capital).
2. I.R.C. § 165. All references and citations to sections in this Article are to sections of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication, unless otherwise
indicated. All references and citations to regulations are to Treasury Regulations under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication, unless otherwise
indicated.
3. Id. § 166.
4. See Dm. OF COMERCE, U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrED STATES § 18 (1979).
[1407]
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Generally, a loss deduction is allowed when "sustained." 5 Most
often a loss is sustained when the loss property is sold or is otherwise disposed of.6 When there is no sale or other disposition of
stock or indebtedness, however, planning and ascertaining the timing of a loss deduction is more complex, with the stakes higher and
the tax benefits more significant. Deductibility hinges on whether
the stock or debt in issue is "worthless," a factual determination
turning on administrative and judicial reaction to corroborative
facts and to the degree of insolvency. An awareness of the judicial
yardsticks for determining worthlessness is essential to defining
the issues and to planning for the deduction.
Even an allowable deduction for worthlessness may not be
beneficial, however, if characterized unfavorably.7 An allowable
loss is either capital or ordinary.8 Ordinary losses are fully deductible by both individuals and corporations. 9 Corporate capital losses,
on the other hand, are deductible only against capital gains. 10 As
corporate taxpayers rarely engage in capital gain transactions,""
12
corporate capital losses are often useless.
Loss deductions are also affected by events occurring after the
apparent date of worthlessness. A seemingly allowable loss, deductible against ordinary income, may be dissipated by subsequent
conduct that is either inconsistent with worthlessness or counterproductive to peripheral tax benefits. Awareness of and attention
to postworthlessness conduct is thus fundamental to planning the
loss deduction.
Moreover, the tax distinctions between debt and equity play
an important role in that they may affect both the timing and the
allowability of a worthlessness deduction. A debt obligation
recharacterized as an equity interest may lose priority and become
worthless at a date earlier than that expected by the taxpayer, thus
possibly allowing the statute of limitations on deductibility to run.
On the other hand, junior debt that is treated as debt for tax pur5. I.R.C. § 165(a). See notes 15-18, 32-43 & accompanying text infra.
6. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d).
7. See notes 69-76 & accompanying text infra.
8. See I.R.C. §§ 65, 1222(2), (4).
9. See id. §§ 65, 1222. See also id. § 1231.
10. Id. § 1211(a). Individuals' capital losses may be deducted only to the extent allowed by I.R.C. § 1211(b).
11. But see id. § 1231.
12. But see id. § 1212(a) (corporate capital losses may be of some use because of the
eight-year period of carryback and carryover).
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poses may become worthless at a date later than that expected by
the taxpayer if senior debt is recharacterized as equity.13
The development of a loss deduction, from the initial warning
of financial deterioration to the date of worthlessness and eventual
liquidation of the investment, proceeds through an integrated series of transactions studded with opportunity, yet fraught with
danger. This Article sets forth the opportunities and the dangers of
developing a loss deduction by tracing the requirements for establishing the amount, character, and timing of deductions for worthless securities and bad debt losses. The focus throughout is on affiliated corporation 14 problems, although the discussion has broader
application. The Article reviews the relevant statutes and voluminous case law, examines current standards for determining worthlessness, and explores planning opportunities. When judicial construction proves confusing, the Article attempts to synthesize a
rule of law consistent with the statutes and with legislative intent.
Statutory Overview: Worthless Securities and Bad
Debts
Allowance
Section 165(a) provides that "[tihere shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." 15 A deductible loss is
"sustained" when there is a closed and completed transaction, as
in a sale or other disposition, or when the loss has been fixed by
one or more identifiable events, as in a determination of worthlessness. 16 Section 165(b) limits the amount of deduction to the prop17
erty's adjusted basis for loss.
13.
14.
infra.

See text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
For the definition of affiliated corporation, see notes 48-50 & accompanying text

15. Also deductible are net operating loss carrybacks and carryovers, I.R.C.

§ 172, and

capital loss carrybacks and carryovers, id. § 1212(a). With respect to the year in which the
deduction is allowed, see Rev. Rul. 74-80, 1974-1 C.B. 117 (when stocks purchased on deferred payment under negotiable note, deduction in year of payment, not year of
worthlessness).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d). It is necessary to ascertain worthlessness in order to obtain a deduction under LR.C. §§ 165(g), 166, and 832(c)(6). See also id. 99 80, 172(h), 582,
593(c), 595(a), 1212(a)(2), 1351, 6511(d). Cf. LR.C: § 1244 (loss on small business stock
treated as ordinary loss, but only when held continuously by taxpayer since issuance).
17. Adjusted basis is determined in accordance with I.R.C. § 1011. See Charles H.
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If a loss arises from indebtedness, the requirement that the
loss be "sustained" is relaxed under section 166. Indeed, bad debts
may be deducted even if worthless only in part."8 While section
166(a)(1) repeats the general rule that business debts becoming
wholly worthless within the taxable year will be allowed, section
166(a)(2) allows a deduction, at the Secretary's discretion,19 for
partially worthless business debts charged ofi 0 by the taxpayer
during the taxable year.2 A taxpayer is not required, however, to
make a charge-off in the year in which a business debt becomes
partially worthless. If partial worthlessness continues, the chargeoff and deduction may be taken in any subsequent tax year,2 but
Allen v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. 493 (1967) (taxpayer was denied a worthlessness deduction for failure to establish his basis in the stock).
18. I.R.C. § 166(a)(2).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3(a)(2)(iii) provides: "Before a taxpayer may deduct a debt in
part, he must be able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the district director the amount
thereof which is worthless and the part thereof which has been charged off." See Wilson
Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 606, 609-610 (9th Cir. 1941); Sika Chem. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 856, 863 (1975) ("[I]t is the taxpayer's burden to introduce evidence
which establishes that in the year the partial worthlessness was claimed, the amount of such
worthlessness could be predicted with 'reasonable certainty.' "); Trinco Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 959, 965 (1954); First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles v. Commissioner, 6
B.T.A. 850, 859-60 (1927).
20. The charge-off requirement is satisfied by accounting entries on the taxpayer's
books and records. See Findley v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 311 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 236
F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1956); Houghton & Dutton Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 52 (1932);
Meyer v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1239, 1241 (1929). The actual charge-off entries for partially worthless business debts may be made after the close of the taxable year, but must
occur prior to the filing of the return. See Hamlen v. Welch, 166 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1940). Cf.
Colorado County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1167 (1961), aff'd per
curiam, 309 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1962) (entries to reserve for bad debts must be made prior to
filing return).
21. See Ardela, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 470, 473 (1969) (that petitioners received less than the face amount of the indebtedness did not necessarily prove that the
balance was uncollectible). Cf. Bullard v. United States, 146 F.2d 386, 388 (2d Cir. 1944)
(taxpayer not entitled to a deduction of part of purchase price of shares when no identifiable event occurred during taxable year to establish worthlessness, and corporation remained in business); Walter H. Goodrich & Co. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 960, 963 (1939)
(disallowance of deduction of part of a reserve for bad debts, consisting of loans to an affiliate, held not arbitrary when during the taxable year the taxpayer continued to make advances and affiliate had large and growing sales). See also I.R.C. § 1038 (reacquisition of real
property, as in the foreclosure of a purchase money mortgage, will preclude a finding of
complete or partial worthlessness).
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3(a). This affords the taxpayer some opportunity to select
the year in which to claim a bad debt deduction. Furthermore, in lieu of the specific deduction charge-off method allowed under I.R.C. § 166(a), a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business can elect to deduct a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts pursuant to I.R.C. §
166(c). The issue of what constitutes a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts is a
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no deduction is allowed after the tax year in which complete
worthlessness occurs. 23 The Secretary's disallowance of a deduction

for partial worthlessness will not be disturbed by the courts unless
it is plainly arbitrary or unreasonable.2 ' If a deduction is properly
disallowed in the year in which part of the debt is charged off, a
deduction still may be allowed in a later year.25
The amount of deduction for worthless indebtedness is limited6
to the adjusted basis for loss determined under section 1011.2

Hence, the debt must arise from the debtor's capital. Thus, worthless debts arising from unpaid wages, fees, interest, rents, and similar items cannot be deducted unless previously included in
income.
A worthless debt that is evidenced by a "security" will not be
deductible under section 166, but may be deductible under section
165(a). 28 "Securities" are defined in section 165(g)(2) as corporate

stock and the right to receive corporate stock, and corporate debt
evidenced by a note with interest coupons or in registered form.
Moreover, indebtedness, even though not evidenced by a security,
will still fall outside of section 166 if it is not "bona fide." The
Treasury Regulations provide that "[a] bona fide debt is a debt
which arises from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid
and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of
question of fact to be determined in the light of circumstances existing at the close of the
taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-4(b)(1). See Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A.
300 (1940), aff'd, 125 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1942). If the Commissioner disapproves an addition,
the taxpayer has the burden of establishing reasonableness. See Dixie Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1968).
23. See Tress. Reg. § 1.166-3(b).
24. In Austin Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 955 (1979) (acq.), the Tax Court
stated: "[The Commissioner] may not ignore the soundly exercised business judgment of a
taxpayer's officers in determining partial worthlessness. Such judgment is relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of [the Commissioner's] exercise of discretion granted him by section 166(a)(2). Thus, if management's business judgment is supported by facts establishing
partial worthlessness, [the Commissioner's] exercise of discretion will be overturned." Id. at
971-72 (citation omitted). See also Wilson Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 606, 609
(9th Cir. 1941); Portland Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 58, 73 (1971), aff'd, 75-1
U.S.T.C. 1 9449 (9th Cir. 1975) (a deduction cannot be denied when the facts clearly show
the extent of partial worthlessness); Findley v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 311, 318 (1955), afl'd
per curiam, 236 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1956); Estate of Harris Fahnestock v. Commissioner, 2
T.C. 756, 759 (1943).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3(a). See also id. § 1.166-3(b).
26. I.R.C. § 166(b); Tress. Reg. § 1.166-1(d).
27. Tress. Reg. § 1.166-1(e).
28. I.R.C. § 166(e); Tress. Reg. § 1.166-1(g).
29. I.R.C. § 165(g).
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money. A gift or contribution to capital shall not be considered a
debt for purposes of section 166. " 30 The validity of a purported
debt will turn on whether the
rights of the taxpayer are those of a
31
shareholder or a creditor.
An exception to the "sustained" language of section 165 that
allows a deduction only for "wholly worthless" losses may be argued for partially worthless securities. 2 To uphold this argument,
it is necessary to equate partially worthless business debt losses33
with partially worthless- business security losses. 3 ' Although "a
bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness . . . with interest coupons or in registered form"35 does not,
for most tax purposes, differ from indebtedness without interest
coupons or in nonregistered form, the latter are deductible as partial bad debt losses within the meaning of section 166, while the
former are deductible only when "sustained" within the meaning
of section 165(a).
Historically, except in the case of a disposition, a loss has been
deemed sustained when complete worthlessness occurs.36 This rule,
however, does not strictly follow from the tax concept of loss realization. "Sustained" is a hybrid accounting term. It does not mean
"accrued," because all the events need not occur to fix the date of
loss. 37 Similarly, it does not mean "paid," because there need not
be a disposition. Sustained may be reasonably defined as "some
identifiable event [which] fixes the actual... loss and the amount
thereof." 8 This definition permits a loss deduction for a business
security that has become "wholly worthless in part," that is, that
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c).
31. A significant and comprehensive analysis of this area is found in Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26
TAX L. Rav. 369 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Plumb]. The debt-equity classification issue is
discussed at notes 259-702 & accompanying text infra.
32. Two other exceptions are statutory. Section 166(a)(2) allows a deduction for partially worthless debts. Section 166(c) allows a deduction for a reserve for bad debts.
33. See I.R.C. § 166(a)(2).
34. Some business security losses are treated as ordinary losses under the Corn Products doctrine. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). See notes 52-61
& accompanying text infra.
35. I.R.C. § 165(g)(2)(C).
36. See notes 93-258 & accompanying text infra.
37. Cf. Amend v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178 (1949) (acq.) (doctrine of constructive
receipt).
38. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(c) (1977) (until sale or other disposition of property
occurs, there remains the possibility that the taxpayer may recoup the adjusted basis of the
property).
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has had a permanent decline in value.
Treating a loss as sustained when fixed by reasonably ascertainable events would also be consistent with the policy underlying
the loss deduction provisions. Assume. that stock or registered debentures held by an affiliated parent-"business securities"
-decline in value so that only a measurable maximum can be recovered and that the decline is irreversible because the subsidiary
has a limited life. If the parent charges off the ascertainably worthless portion of the security, then a loss has been sustained.39 Conversely, if General Motors stock declines fifty percent in value, the
corporation has experienced only a decline in value that may reverse itself, and no shareholder has yet "sustained" a deductible
loss even if the shareholder contracts to sell the stock in the next
year.40
Allowing a business taxpayer the earlier deduction mirrors the
business versus nonbusiness distinction of section 166. Under section 166(d), a nonbusiness investment loss is deductible when
there occurs either final recovery of a portion or complete worthlessness. A business bad debt loss is deductible under the theory of
matching business income and deduction when the indebtedness is
not reasonably recoverable. 1
The suggested definition of "sustained," while reasonable, is
not supported by legislative history or judicial precedent. Although
Congress has never defined "sustained," it has interpreted section
165(a) to provide that "no deduction whatever is allowable with
respect to any loss from partial worthlessness (whether or not
charged off within the taxable year) of any security as defined in
[section 165(g)(2)]. ''42 This section could be interpreted merely to
proscribe deductions for a decline in value. No court, however, has
so held.43 Moreover, it is unlikely that a court would find the argument sufficiently overwhelming to reverse over sixty years of tax
39.

Cf. Sterling Morton v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1270 (1938), aff'd, 112 F.2d 320

(7th Cir. 1940) (loss deductible only in year stock becomes worthless).
40. See 875 Park Ave Co. v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1954); Treas. Reg. §
1.165-4(a), -5(f).
41. See Amend v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178 (1949) (acq.).

42. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 728, 741 (discussing the predecessor of I.R.C. § 165(g)(1)). See note 47 infra.
43. See Byerlyte Corp. v. Williams, 170 F. Supp. 48, 59-60 (N.D. Ohio 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1961) (taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that a partial

worthlessness loss from affiliate securities should be characterized under LR.C. § 23(g)(4)
(1942) (current version of LR.C. § 165(g)(3)).
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practice. The solution thus appears to lie with Congress.
Characterization
Worthlessness losses for which deductions are allowed under
sections 165(a) and 166(a) and (c) are characterized as ordinary
losses because there is no "sale or exchange."" There are two statutory exceptions, however, within sections 165 and 166.""
The first exception is for nonbusiness bad debts, which are
characterized under section 166(d) as short-term capital losses subject to the same rules for deductibility as wholly worthless business
debts.46 The second exception is for worthless capital asset securities. Section 165(g)(1) provides: "If any security which is a capital
asset becomes worthless during the taxable year, the loss resulting
therefrom shall.. . be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange
. . . of a capital asset." This artificial sale or exchange converts
worthless security losses from ordinary to capital losses. 7
There is, however, an exception to this exception. Section
165(g)(3) provides that, for purposes of section 165(g)(1), securities
44. See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1941). For a
more complete discussion of the sale or exchange requirement, see Bittker, Capital Gains
and Losses-The "Sale or Exchange" Requirement, 32 HASTNGS L.J. 743 (1981).
45. There are two other relevant LR.C. sections. Section 1244 characterizes a loss as
ordinary up to a maximum of $100,000 if (1) the shareholder is an individual, and (2) the
loss involves "section 1244 stock" as defined in § 1244(c). Section 1374 allows net operating
losses of a "small business corporation" to flow through to the shareholders of the corporation. A corporation cannot qualify as a "small business corporation" if it has a corporate
shareholder. I.R.C. § 1371(a)(2). See also I.R.C. §§ 1373, 1375, 1376.
46. The reserve method may not be used with respect to nonbusiness bad debts. Id.
§ 166(d)(1)(A).
The distinctions between business and nonbusiness bad debts, which determine
whether ordinary loss or short-term capital loss treatment will be accorded, are beyond the
scope of this Article. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see O'Neill, What Constitutes "Trade or Business" for Bad Debt Purposes; Stockholder, Employee, Promoter; Investment vs. Loan, 30 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 283 (1972); Williams, Business v. Non-business Bad Debts, 22 TUL. TAX INsT. 333 (1973); Note, Characterizationof ShareholderCreditor Bad Debt: United States v. Generes Sounds the Knell for Deductions from Ordinary Income, 26 VANI. L. Rsv. 105 (1973).
47. The predecessor of I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) entered the Code as part of the Revenue Act
of 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 23(g)(2), 52 Stat. 447 (codified at I.R.C. § 23(g)(2) (1939)). Its
purpose was to equate losses resulting from a worthlessness event with those arising from a
sale or exchange; the former were not capital losses, even though the assets involved were
"capital assets." Before 1938, they had been deductible in full from gross income as ordinary
losses under the Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 23(e)(2), (f), 49 Stat. 1648, the
predecessor of I.R.C. § 165(a), (c)(2), because the worthlessness event was concededly not a
"sale or exchange." See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1941).
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in an affiliated domestic corporation will not be treated as capital
assets; a loss on the complete worthlessness of affiliate securities
will be ordinary. A corporation is treated as "affiliated" if at least
eighty percent' of each class of stock is owned directly"9 by the
taxpayer, and more than ninety percent of the aggregate of its
gross receipts for all taxable years has been from active sourcesY'
If the worthless security is a noncapital asset, section 165(g)
will not apply.51 As ordinary loss characterization is preferable, the
taxpayer's task is to qualify under section 165(g)(3) or to fall
outside the section 165(g)(1) exception by failing to meet the definition of capital asset.
Although "capital asset" is defined in section 1221,52 the stat48. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-687, 84 Stat. 2071 (applicable to taxable years
beginning on or after January 1, 1970), reduced from 95% to 80% the amount of stock the
parent company must own. See I.R.C. § 1504(a). See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-0 to
-52A. See also Road Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 728 (1971) (taxpayer must
have legal right to ownership for I.R.C. § 165(g)(3)(A) to apply). The taxpayer may not
acquire the controlling 80% after the date of worthlessness solely for the purpose of converting a capital loss into an ordinary loss. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.165-5(d)(2)(ii)-5(i) (Example 2)
(1972); Hunter Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 424 (1953). But cf. George L. Riggs, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 474 (1975) (acq.) (different rule for liquidation of subsidiary under
I.R.C. § 332).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i)(Example (1)) (LR.C. § 165(g)(3) does not recognize constructive ownership). Note that, if purported debt is subsequently found to be equity, the
"equity" will be treated as a separate class of stock in the nature of a preferred interest.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.385-4(c)(1)(i). See Gussow, Kahn & Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 580 (1949)
(acq.). See notes 444-48 & accompanying text infra.
50. LR.C. § 165(g)(3) provides that a corporation will be treated as affiliated if: "(B)
more than 90% of the aggregate of its gross receipts for all taxable years has been from
sources other than royalties, rents (except rents derived from rental of properties to employees of the corporation in the ordinary course of its operating business), dividends, interest
(except interest received on deferred purchase price of operating assets sold), annuities, and
gains from sales or exchanges of stocks and securities." In Rev.Rul. 75-186, 1975-1 C.B. 72,
the Service held that the 90% test is met by considering the total gross receipts of the
subsidiary for all taxable years of existence.
51. Tress. Reg. § 1.165-5(b) (1972). In order for an individual to deduct losses under
§ 165(a), the loss must be sustained in a business or for profit transaction, see, e.g., Shea v.
Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 798 (1931)(abandonment loss), or arise from a casualty. For a discussion of what constitutes a casualty within the meaning of § 165(a), see Rev. Rul. 63-232,
1963-2 C.B. 97 (termite damage).
52. I.R.C. § 1221 provides: "For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'capital asset'
means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business),
but does not include-(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business; (2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or business; (3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition,
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ute is not exclusive. In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commis-

sioner,5 3 the Supreme Court held that property integrally related
to the taxpayer's trade or business is not a capital asset." Subsequent cases have treated stock in a corporation as integrally related to the taxpayer's trade or business when held to assure a
source of supply,5 5 to generate business, 56 to expand into a related
line of business, 57 or to obtain the services of a research scientist.5 8
The rationale of Corn Products and its progeny is that property held as an integral, operating component of the taxpayer's
business is not a capital asset.59 This reasoning has been extended
beyond "traditional" Corn Products assets to include corporate
stock purchased to acquire a vertically or horizontally integrated
subsidiary.6 0 In reaching a Corn Products result, the courts have
explicitly looked through the corporate shell to discern the integrated operations of a single enterprise. Raising substance over
form, the courts have held that the representative stock was a noncapital asset in light of the business nature and the parent's use of

a letter or memorandum, or similar property, [produced by or for a taxpayer]; (4) accounts
or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business or services rendered
or from the sale of property described in paragraph (1); (5) [certain United States government publications]."
53. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
54. Id. at 51.
55. See, e.g., Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916
(Ct. Cl. 1962). But see W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed on jurisdictionalgrounds, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966
(1977). For the Service's view of what constitutes an integral part of a taxpayer's trade or
business in the source of supply situation, see Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B. 58 (adopting the
Windle substantial investment intent test). See generally Natbony, Whither Windle?, 24
ST. Louis U.L.J. 67 (1979).
56. See Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
869 (1970).
57. See Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.
1971).
58. See Chemplast, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 623 (1973), afl'd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d
Cir. 1974).
59. See 350 U.S. at 50-51. See generally Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains and
Losses-The Corn Products Doctrine, 52 TAXES 770 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Javaras].
60. See John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964); Union Pac.
R.R. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1343 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 377 (1968). See also Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1971); International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 232 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 524 F.2d 357 (2d
Cir. 1975); Chemplast, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 623 (1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d
Cir. 1974); Javaras, supra note 59.
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the underlying operating assets."1
To the extent a security is a Corn Products asset, section
165(g) will not apply. Accordingly, losses, whether arising from
worthlessness or from disposition, will be ordinary. The "integrality" argument, however, has been taken one step further. One commentator has advocated that "section 165(g)(3) and the Code as an
'organic whole' reflect a policy that business enterprises, regardless
of their form of corporate organization, and whether or not they
file consolidated returns, be treated alike with respect to investments in subsidiary businesses. 6 2 Affiliated corporations should be
" 'considered closely enough related, in effect, to treat them as one
operating business.'"63 Support for this argument was extracted
from the legislative history of section 165(g)(3), which equates the
tax treatment of worthless affiliate securities with that of a consolidated group." The result of this proposal would be to ignore corporate entities that are eighty percent or more owned by a parent
corporation or related group.5
This proposal, if given effect, would mean that a parent would
no longer need to argue that common stock in a subsidiary is a
Corn Products asset. Assets, including securities, held by the subsidiary would be section 1231 property, inasmuch as the corporate
entity of the subsidiary would be ignored. 6 Section 165(g)(3)
would thus be surplusage because property losses, whether partial
or complete, would fall within section 1231.67 Moreover, the consol61. See John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1964); Union
Pac. R.R. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1343, 1357-59 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827
(1976); Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 377, 379 (1968). See also
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1971);
Chemplast, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 623, 630-33 (1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir.
1974).
62. Comment, Double Deductions in the Context of Affiliated Corporations:Textron
Inc. v. United States, 91 HARV. L. REv. 692, 698 (1978) (footnote omitted).
63. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1530, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6108, 6109).
64. S. REP. No. 1530, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) ("[T]he bill generally conforms the
ownership requirement under the worthless securities provision to that which applies in the
case of consolidated returns."); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 543.
65. Cf. Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead
Dummy Should Live, 34 TAx L. REv. 213 (1979) (distinguishing between the disregard and
nominee corporation theories).
66. Cf. Javaras, supra note 59 (controlled corporate subsidiaries carrying on part of
group's business should produce ordinary loss when their securities sell at a loss).
67. In enacting the predecessor of I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) (I.R.C. § 23(g)(2) (1939)), the
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idated return and dividends received deduction provisions would
be unnecessary, because the related group of corporations would be
treated as one taxpayer.
Although Congress to some extent intended to equate affiliate
with consolidated securities losses, section 165(g)(3) does so only
when there
is complete worthlessness and when the business is not
"passive. 68 The consolidated return provisions contain no such restrictions.6 9 Section 165(g)(3) allows an ordinary loss for affiliate
securities only if they are wholly worthless. Although the result advocated above may be an equitable simplification of the tax law, a
simplification of such magnitude is a matter for legislative, not ju70
dicial, relief.
Attention to the language used by Congress, however, reveals a
view of consolidated returns that has been overlooked. "[A] parent
and subsidiary corporation may file consolidated returns and to
this extent the corporate entity is ignored. 71 "In the case where
the securities of the [consolidated] subsidiary company become
worthless. . . the loss, in effect, is regarded as a loss of part of the
Senate Finance Committee included an exception for securities held by a corporation: "If
any securities. . become worthless during the taxable year and are capital assets, the loss
resulting therefrom shall, in the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation,. . . be considered as a loss from the sale or exchange. . . of capital assets." (Emphasis added). The
Senate Finance Committee stated that losses from worthless securities incurred by corporations "are customarily a part of their ordinary business expense and should be treated as
such." S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 13-14 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2)
779, 789. The House Ways and Means Committee did not consider this amendment, see
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 18-19 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 728,
740-41, and the Conference Committee deleted it without explanation. H.R. REP. No. 2330,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 817, 819. It is not clear from
the legislative history whether Congress deleted the exception because it believed that affiliate "securities" might not be I.R.C. § 165(g)(2) securities.
68. See I.R.C. § 165(g)(3)(B). See note 50 supra.
69. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1501-0 to -52A.
70. The argument against the sanctity of the corporate form was rejected by the Supreme Court in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943) (citations omitted): "Whether the purpose [of incorporating] be to gain an advantage under the
law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or
to serve the creat6r's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the
equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity." See generally B. BITrTKR & J.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 1.05 (4th ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as BirrKER & EUsTIcE]; Barr, A Threat to the Lifeless Corporate
Skeleton: Disregardingthe Corporate Entity, 51 TAxEs 555 (1973); Miller, The Nominee
Cohundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy Should Live, 34 TAX L. REV.
213 (1979).
71. S.REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942), reprintedin 1942-2 C.B. 504, 543.
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business of the parent corporation rather than as a loss on an investment." 2 The congressional belief apparently is that, whether a
loss is partial or complete, a consolidated parent would be entitled
to characterize the loss according to the underlying assets, normally section 1221(1) or section 1231(b) property.
The belief is theoretically justified. The underlying principle
of the consolidated return provisions is that the affiliated group is
taxed on its consolidated taxable income, representing the results
of its dealings with the outside world after elimination of intragroup gain and loss. Congress enacted the consolidated group provisions in an effort to provide electing corporate groups with the
same benefits allowed single corporations with multiple operating
divisions. The Treasury Regulations under section 1502 attempt to
78
achieve this result.

An operating subsidiary within an affiliated group filing consolidated returns is, by definition, part of the parent's trade or
business. In effect, the subsidiary's gains, losses, deductions, depreciation, and characterizations are those of the parent. 4 This is "in
keeping with the theory that the consolidated group is a single taxable enterprise and that only its dealings with outsiders have genuine significance. ' 5 As such, the stock of an operating subsidiary
is akin to any other asset of an operating division, and gain or loss
ought to be characterized by reference to the underlying business
assets. 6
72. S.REP. No. 1530, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CobE
AD. NEws 6108, 6109.
73. See generally BrrrKER & EusTicE, supra note 70, 1 15.01-.24. Cf. Williams v. Mc-

CONG. &

Gowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) (gain or loss from sale of going business by individual is
determined by character of gain or loss from sale of separate assets of the business).
74. But see, e.g., I.R.C. § 542(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13.
75. BrrrsR & EUSTICE, supra note 70, %15.23, at 15-67.
76. Unfortunately, the section 1502 regulations generally do not carry the corporatedivision rationale to this logical conclusion. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(b) (for accumulated earnings tax purposes, the business of an 80 percent subsidiary is the business of its
parent). Only one lower court has considered this issue. See United States v. Manor Care,
Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355, 358 (D. Md. 1980) (court refused to disregard the corporate entity).
Cf. Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 C.B. 475 (setting forth the Service's position on the effect of
Libson Shops v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957), on carrybacks and carryovers under the 1939
Code); In re Chrome Plate, Inc., 614 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1980) (corporate entity not automatically disregarded in context of § 334(b)(2) when consolidated returns were filed). Nevertheless, the result follows because consolidated subsidiaries are by definition an integral part of
a single corporate enterprise. See Javaras, supra note 59, at 790-92; note 707 infra.
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Securities and Debts: Differences and Similarities
Both section 165(a) and section 166 allow a deduction for
worthlessness, use section 1011 basis for determining loss, and differentiate between investment and business losses. There are, however, two major distinctions, aside from the obvious one between
security and debt, that warrant comment.
One difference has already been discussed. Section 166 permits a deduction for partially worthless business debts, while section 165(a) requires that a security become wholly worthless.7 A
second difference involves the timing of the worthlessness deduction. Section 165(g)(1) provides that the loss resulting from a capital asset that becomes worthless during the taxable year will be
treated as a loss from a sale or exchange "on the last day of the
taxable year." This will sometimes convert, to the taxpayer's detriment, short-term into long-term capital loss7 8 Moreover, if the
taxpayer is a corporation, the computation of earnings and profits
may be affected.79 Section 165(g)(1) has no application, however, to
noncapital assets and affiliate securities. These losses are recognized on the date of worthlessness.
Section 166 has no artificial provision for determining the date
of loss. No timing provision is necessary because the holding period is irrelevant to debt loss characterization. If the loss arises
from a business bad debt, the loss will be ordinary because it did
not derive from a sale or exchange. If the loss arises from a nonbusiness bad debt, section 166(d) prescribes artificial short-term
capital loss treatment regardless of the holding period. 0
Section 165(a) and (g) and section 166 require that the prop77. See notes 15-25 & accompanying text supra.
78. See I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1211, 1212, 1222.
79. See Tress. Reg. § 1.312-7(b)(1) (earnings and profits include the excess of capital
losses over capital gains, nondeductible by virtue of I.R.C. § 1211), Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(b)
(last sentence) and Rev. Rul. 74-164, 1974-1 C.B. 74, 75 (situation 4). It is not clear whether
an I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) loss is "realized" on the date of worthlessness or on the last day of the
taxable year for purposes of earmarking earnings and profits on midyear distributions. The
proper answer should be that the date of worthlessness, if provable, is the date the loss is
realized; earnings and profits computations are not governed by artificial "recognition" provisions. If the last day of the taxable year were the correct computation date, the result
would be an earnings and profits computation different from that under an I.R.C. § 165(a)Corn Productsloss. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.See I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) ("treated
as" language). This issue may be further complicated by a change in the effective tax rate.
See I.R.C. § 21.
80. There are no estimated tax issues. See I.R.C. §§ 6015, 6154.
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erty "become worthless" within"' the taxable year. It is unclear
whether "worthless" means the same thing for purposes of security
losses and debt losses. A basic tenet of statutory construction is
that, absent explicit contrary congressional intent, words mean the
same in one section of a statute as they mean in another.82 Congress expressed no intent to ascribe different meanings to "worthless" in the securities and debt contexts. Moreover, commentators
addressing this question have either assumed" or affirmatively
represented 4 congruity. Courts have imposed the same test for
worthlessness under section 165 as under section 166.85
"Worthlessness" means destitute of worth, of no value or
use. 8 A loss for tax purposes therefore should occur when a security or a debt ceases to be an asset of the taxpayer, that is, when
there is a "constructive disposition" sufficient to achieve the status
of a "realization" event, 7 or when the loss becomes "closed and
completed" in the annual accounting sense. 8 Such a definition
would include losses from both securities and indebtedness.
The inquiry does not end here, however, for there are obvious
problems in equating the worthlessness of the extremes, common
stock and secured debentures. The quantum, though not the quality, of proof will differ. Worthlessness of a corporation's common
stock may precede that of its preferred stock; worthlessness of its
preferred stock may precede that of its subordinated debentures;
worthlessness of its subordinated debentures may precede that of
81. Sections 165(g) and 166(a) contain another difference worth comment-a drafting
inconsistency. Section 165(g)(1) provides: "If any security ... becomes worthless during the
taxable year. . . ." Section 166(a) states: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt
which becomes worthless within the taxable year." (Emphasis added.) The author can discern no reason, save carelessness, for this drafting distinction.
82. See generally C. NUTrING & R. DICKERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION,
ch. 5 (5th ed. 1978).
83. See, e.g., B. BirrrnR & L. STONE, FEDERAL INcOmE, ESTATE AND GIr TAXATION 377
(5th ed. 1980).
84. See SURREY, WARREN, MCDANIEL & AULT, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 387 (1972)
("The standard in section 166, 'becomes worthless,' is the same as in section 165(g) respecting securities, and hence the cases thereunder as to when a security becomes worthless are
applicable to bad debt situations. .. ").
85. See, e.g., United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927) (decided under § 234 of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1077, 1078); Singer v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 337 (1975), af'd, 560 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1977); Dallmeyer v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1282, 1291-92 (1950).
86. See Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 186 (1934).
87. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b).
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its senior debt; and worthlessness of its senior debt may precede
that of its secured obligations.89 At each level of worthlessness,
"insolvency" and "potential value" have different meanings.90 As
indebtedness has priority over equity capital, 91 the worthlessness
of corporate stock will normally precede that of corporate debt.92
Ascertaining Worthlessness
Over the years, the courts have addressed numerous taxpayer
claims for loss deductions arising from imprudent investments.
Frequently, the contested issue concerned the validity of the
claim, that is, whether a loss was actually suffered. More often,
however, the contest centered on the timing of the loss deduction.
Resolving the latter issue has posed the thornier problem for the
courts because, while the question of whether a loss was suffered
depends upon the taxpayer's proof of adjusted basis and amount
realized, the question of when a loss deduction may be allowed depends upon when the loss was "sustained."
In the worthlessness context, whether a loss was sustained is a
question of fact. Although yardsticks for measuring value exist, a
judge's reaction to corroborative evidence and to the degree of insolvency will be determinative in all cases but those of dissolution
and continued profitability.
Early cases indicate a de novo approach to most fact patterns,
89. See Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
660 (1941); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 416, 444-45 (1960) (in order
for senior debt to become worthless, there must be no value remaining in the corporation);
Jones v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 928 (1934) (common stock may become worthless even
while there remains a chance of some recovery on the debt or on preferred stock). See generally D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRAcTIcE 302-07 (2d ed. 1978).
90. See notes 135-243 & accompanying text infra.
91. See note 89 supra.
92. -In the following discussion of worthlessness, the tests for worthless securities and
bad debts are equated. Reference to one assumes reference to the other, with one proviso:
the quantum of proof for bad debts is invariably higher than that for worthless securities.
Even when a corporation is "insolvent" and its stock worthless, debt will often retain some
value.
"Insolvency"-that is, a situation in which claims with a priority over the taxpayer's
claims exceed the corporation's assets properly valued-applies to indebtedness as well as to
stock. See note 97 & accompanying text infra. Determining whether potential value exists is
also a question of degree. The indebtedness at issue may possess potential value even
though the equity securities do not, because the corporation is more "insolvent" with respect to its equity securities than with respbct to its debts. See notes 135-243 & accompanying text infra. These distinctions are implicit in the cited cases.
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with different courts reaching disparate holdings on the same facts.
For example, in a series of cases emanating from the business failure of the Middle West Utilities Company, the Second Circuit held
that preferred stock became worthless in 1934," s the Board of Tax
Appeals in two separate cases held that the common and preferred
stock did not become worthless 94 and did become worthless 5 in
1932, and the Tax Court held that the common stock did not become worthless until 1938.96
In contrast,- recent cases have achieved a high degree of
theoretical and actual consistency. This consistency is partially a result
of experience. It is also the result of the development, over the
years, of a yardstick against which courts can measure the evidence
supporting a taxpayer's claim.
Perhaps the most important case in the evolution of judicial
reaction to worthlessness is Sterling Morton v. Commissioner,7 a
1938 decision involving a deduction for worthless stock. The taxpayer in Morton had deducted his common stock as worthless in
1932. In support of his claim, the taxpayer relied on the 1932 dissolution and liquidation of the corporation and maintained that
those events identifiably signalled the end to any hope that his investment might recover value.9 8 The Commissioner determined
that the stock had become worthless sometime prior to 1932, contending that on December 31, 1931, the preferred stock liability of
$609,000 exceeded both the corporation's book value of $144,896
and its market value of $42,000. As a result, the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's loss was reasonably ascertainable in 1931
and that the taxpayer had failed to carry his burden of proving
that the stock had a potential value prior to the 1932 events. 9
From an examination of the leading circuit court cases, the
Morton court extracted the threshold requirement that "a loss by
reason of the worthlessness of stock must be deducted in the year
in which the stock becomes worthless and the loss is sustained
93. Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660 (1941).
94. Horning v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 897 (1937).
95. Peabody v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1086 (1938).
96. Fearey v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. 237 (1943). Compare Livingston v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 538 (1941) with Lambert v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1939).
97. 38 B.T.A. 1270 (1938), af'd, 112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1940).
98. Id. at 1275-78.
99. Id. at 1275-80.
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"loo If there is any reasonable hope that the stock retains
some potential for regaining its value through the foreseeable operation of the corporation, then it may not be considered worthless.
That hope can be foreclosed by the occurrence of one or more
"identifiable events," which are likely to be known immediately by
anyone having an interest in the affairs of the corporation. Identifiable events "are important for tax purposes because they limit or
destroy the potential value of stock." 10 1
"If the assets of the corporation exceed its liabilities, the stock
has a liquidating value." Even when assets do not exceed liabilities,
the stock, "while having no liquidating value, has a potential value
and cannot be said to be worthless," if there is "a reasonable hope
and expectation" that the situation will reverse sometime in the
future.102 In these situations, the occurrence of an identifiable
event will put an end to the hope and expectation of recovery.
Moreover, there are "exceptional cases" in which there can be
"no reasonable hope and expectation that a continuation of the
business will result in any profit to its stockholders" because the
corporation's liabilities greatly exceed its assets, and the nature of
its assets and operations make any future turnabout unlikely.103 In
these cases, "the stock, obviously, has no liquidating value, and
since the limits of the corporation's future are fixed, the stock,
likewise, can presently be said to have no potential value."'"
Hence, when present value and future value both have been extinguished, the prior worthlessness will not be disturbed, even if there
occurs in a later year some "identifiable event," such as liquidation
or receivership. The subsequent event would not affect the worthlessness of the stock, "for already 'its value had become finally
extinct.' "1105
The Morton court found that the facts fell within the "excep-

100.

Id. at 1278.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 1278-79.
103. Id. at 1279. Although the court labeled such situations "exceptional," perhaps
this is a misnomer; such cases are not rare at all.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing De Loss v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1928)). Cf. Squier
v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1933) (no deduction for loss when stock had been
worthless for several years prior to year in which claimed as loss); Monmouth Plumbing
Supply Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 349 (S.D. Fla. 1933) (loss need not be evidenced by
a closed transaction in the case of losses that are so reasonably certain in fact and ascertainable in amount as to justify their deduction before they are absolutely realized).
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tional" situation. It summarized the taxpayer's burden:
In cases where the stock has concededly lost any liquidating value
in a certain year, but an event occurs in a subsequent year which
the taxpayer claims is 'identifiable,' and where the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue has determined that stock became worthless
in the year in which it lost its liquidating value, then the taxpayer, in order to be entitled to the loss deduction in the latter
year, has the burden of proving that, although the stock lost its
liquidating value in the prior year, it continued to have a potential value until the occurrence of the event."' 6

The taxpayer in Morton failed to carry this burden and, as a consequence, was denied a deduction for worthlessness occurring in a
year closed by the statute of limitations.0 7
The Morton case has led other courts to adopt complementary
tests for determining the date on which worthlessness can be said
to have occurred irrevocably. In the usual case, the taxpayer must
show that the corporation is actually insolvent 0 8 and that its stock
has no potential for regaining value because of a lack of existing
goodwill or going concern value. Certain types of identifiable
events, such as bankruptcy, liquidation, and receivership, can serve
as one means of proving the lack of potential value. In these situations, evidence of identifiable events will conclusively determine
the date at which worthlessness can be said to have finally occurred. The taxpayer is then able to mark that date as one at
which a reasonable person, in the exercise of sound business judgment, could look at the investment and recognize its worthlessness.
At this point, there would be no hope that a turnabout could
foreseeably occur.
In the "exceptional" case, however, the taxpayer has a greater
burden of proof. The stock may have become worthless long before
the corporation was willing or able to signal failure by engaging in
activities constituting an identifiable event. In fact, in the exceptional case, there may be no "identifiable event" to signal the occurrence of worthlessness. Consequently, the taxpayer must
demonstrate irrevocable insolvency by establishing a lack of current liquidating value and by making a factual showing that no
foreseeable change would be likely to restore value to the specific
assets. The taxpayer in this situation, as illustrated in Morton,
106.
107.
108.

38 B.T.A. at 1279 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1279-80.
See notes 135-166 & accompanying text infra.
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thus has the burden of making a realistic appraisal of all the facts
and circumstances. It is unlikely that precedent will be helpful in
determining the date on which worthlessness occurred because, as
the Seventh Circuit noted in affirming Morton, "each case must
stand on its own facts.""e The "exceptional" case, therefore, offers
the taxpayer a greater opportunity to document tribulations. It
also creates a greater problem for the taxpayer who eschews accepted standards of record-keeping.
Absent the occurrence of a clear "identifiable event," the taxpayer must exercise care in assessing the existence of potential
value. The taxpayer must walk a fine line, following a "rule of reason, avoiding alike the Scyllian role of the 'incorrigible optimist'
and the Charybdian character of the 'Stygian pessimist.' "n
Burdens of Proof
A taxpayer's initial task is to choose the year in which the
stock or debt should be deducted as worthless. Although it will not
always be clear that an investment has gone sour, the proper procedure is for the taxpayer to report a loss in the earliest year possible. In Young v. Commissioner,"' Augustus Hand, writing for the
court, proposed that "the only safe practice, we think, is to claim a
loss for the earliest year when it may possibly be allowed and to
renew the claim in subsequent years if there is any reasonable
chance of its being applicable to the income for those years."" 2 In
this way, any challenge by the Commissioner may be met by repeating the claim in future years. The taxpayer's deduction is thus
preserved without fear that the year chosen will be foreclosed by
the statute of limitations; a court can thereafter determine the
proper year of worthlessness.11 3
109. 112 F.2d at 321.
110. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. Marie R.R. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 226, 241
(1964) (citations omitted).
111. 123 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1941).
112. Id. at 600. Accord Estate of Fuchs v. Commissioner, 413 F.2d 503, 508 (2d Cir.
1969). But cf. Boehm v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 326
U.S. 287 (1945) (stockholder's derivative action was too speculative to defer worthlessness
event founded on receivership and receiver's reports; loss was deductible in earlier year).
See also De Loss v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 803 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 840 (1928)
(if the statute of limitations has run and the taxpayer's loss deduction is denied because
taken in the wrong year, the stock/debt basis will nevertheless be zero for gain purposes).
113. See I.R.C. § 6511(d)(1) (allowing a seven year statute of limitations for claiming a
worthlessness deduction). For a discussion of administrative provisions, see notes 719-29 &
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A taxpayer nevertheless has the burden of establishing that
(a) the stock became worthless, and (b) the worthlessness occurred
during the year alleged. 114 This burden involves purely factual is-

sues,115 and no single factor is given controlling weight. 11 6 As one
court noted, "worthlessness is not determined by an inflexible
formula or slide rule calculation, but upon the exercise of sound
business judgment.1117 Hence, the courts apply an objective test of

reasonableness in assessing the validity of a taxpayer's judgment of
the year of worthlessness.
18
It might be true, as the court in De Loss v. Commissioner"
stated, that "it was not possible to say beyond imaginable peradventure that these assets might not be snatched at by some impressionable buyer, who did not share their owner's estimate of the
value... . But any such expectation was plainly illusory ... . [S]o
far as human foresight could go, the shares were worthless
...
"119 The phrase that recurs throughout the cases is "incorrigible optimist."120 The courts' position is that no reasonable taxpayer has any business being one.
accompanying text infra. .R.C. § 6511(d)(1) is no longer consistent with I.R.C. § 172 as
amended by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 207(a)(1), which
increased the loss carryover period from 7 to 15 years. A conforming amendment to §
6511(d)(1) would be appropriate.
114. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869,
871 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660 (1941); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
51 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1931); Dustin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491, 501 (1969), aff'd, 467 F.2d
47 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Rule 142(a), RULES oF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, UNITED STATES
TAX COURT (1978) (burden of proof is on petitioner except as otherwise provided by statute
or determined by the court).
115. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945); Genecov v. United States, 412 F.2d
556 (5th Cir. 1969); Morton v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1940); Jones v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1939); Lincoln v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 669, 694 (1955),
aff'd on other grounds, 242 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1957).
As it is a question of fact, a worthlessness determination will not be reversed on appeal
unless clearly erroneous. E.g., Freese v. Jones, 156 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1946); Leicht v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1943); Libby v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1943);
Dunbar v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1941); Foster v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d
109 (1st Cir. 1940); Keeney v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1940); Sacks v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1933); Royal Packing Co. v. Lucas, 38 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1930).
116. See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945); Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1957); Niagara Share Corp. of Md. v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
208 (4th Cir. 1936); Forbes v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1933).
117. Washington Inst. of Tech., Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. 17, 20 (1951).
118. 28 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1928).
119. Id. at 804.
120. See, e.g., United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398, 403 (1927).
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PreliminaryBurdens
Once the taxpayer has confronted the fact that an investment
cannot be recovered and that a tax deduction will be the only solace, the primary task is to support the claim for tax deduction with
persuasive evidence. That task is threefold. The taxpayer must
first establish a cost or other basis, for it is elementary that a deductible loss cannot exceed basis. The taxpayer must then demonstrate that the particular stock or debt had some value at the end
of the prior year or at the beginning of the year in issue. Finally,
the taxpayer must document the stock or debt's loss of all value
during the year in which the deduction is claimed.
Establishing a basis for loss is a threshold requirement, yet
more than one loss has been denied for failure to substantiate cost
or to prove measurable basis. 121 Meticulous record-keeping is necessary to carry this burden of proof. The taxpayer must recognize
that the Commissioner and the courts will scrutinize closely any
assertions of basis in order to differentiate among initial cost, capital expenses properly depreciable, and business expenses properly
deductible. 2 The sloppy bookkeeper, confronted with the burden
of proving the elements of a deduction for worthless stock, is
harshly penalized for a failure to document this fundamental
element.2 3
121. Oates v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1963); Zarnow v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 213, 217 (1967); Allen v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. 493 (1967); Estate of Barnhart v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. 47 (1958); Fawkes v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 977 (1929) (acq.);
Symons v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 886 (1928).
Moreover, there can be no loss deduction arising from contributions by a shareholder to
the capital of a corporation if made when the stock was worthless. Estate of Bogeaus v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 467 (1970); Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. 697 (1950), aff'd per
curiam, 194 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1952). Cf. Barnet S. Milman, Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d
95 (2d Cir. 1940) (stockholders' assumption of corporation's liabilities not "capital contributions" but payment of debts); Shreveport Producing & Ref. Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71
F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1934) (new corporation taking over assets, business, and stock of dissolved corporation may not deduct dissolved corporation's losses). But see Vreeland v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 78, 84 (1958) (taxpayer purchased worthless stock in order to facilitate
the liquidation of the corporation; purchase price was allowed as a loss on the liquidation of
the corporation).
122. See Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 578 F.2d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 1978).
123. Zarnow v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 213 (1967). See also Gemma v. Commissioner,
46 T.C. 821 (1966) (knowing failure to keep adequate records may result in court's surmise
that fraudulent intent is the reason for the laxness).
Of course, the axe cuts both ways. If the Service fails to supply a valid argument or
reasonable authority on its valuation of basis, the court will accept the taxpayer's contention. See Roosevelt Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 440, 454 (1941).

July 1981]

WORTHLESSNESS, DEBT-EQUITY

The taxpayer's second burden of proof is to establish that the
stock had some value in the year prior to, or at the beginning of,
the one in which a deduction is claimed. 124 Failure to carry this
burden will normally result in a total disallowance of the deduction, for, if the taxpayer fails to prove such worth, worthlessness
will be presumed, and the statute of limitations will have run on
worthlessness occurring in a prior year. 2 5 One means of establishing prior value is to show a substantial sale or the existence of a
free and ready market in the stock or debt in a preceding year or
at the beginning of the year in issue.1 26 In general, the sale of stock
or debt at a nominal price prior to the year of worthlessness will be

given effect for tax purposes, 2 7 but will not establish continuing
value. The sale of stock for a nominal consideration in a year subsequent to worthlessness, however, will not be given effect either as
a disposition fixing the date of the loss or as evidence of worthlessness.1 28 Sales at a nominal price in the year of worthlessness will be
129
disregarded.
These two burdens of proof make it incumbent upon the taxIn the absence of adequate records, the court is likely to remark with some asperity on
the frailty of the taxpayer's case: "In this state of the record, with no proof of what the
stock was worth at the time the contract was made to measure the value of the machinery
by, nor of the value of the machinery to measure the value of the stock by, there is no basis
in the record for a deduction allowance on this score; indeed, the reasonable deduction from
all the evidence is that there was no loss." Hunt v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir.
1936).
124. Dustin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491, 501 (1969), aff'd, 467 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.
1972); Livingston v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 538, 547 (1942).
Another threshold requirement is to establish that, whatever the loss, it was not "compensated for by insurance or otherwise." I.R.C. § 165(a) (emphasis added). The "otherwise"
could mean compensation by future consideration or by benefit to a related business. For
example, in Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536 (1968), the Commissioner argued without success that the loss gave rise to goodwill, a nondeductible capital
expenditure. Id. at 548 n.2. This argument is not without substance, but it is difficult to
conceive of an actual transaction resulting in worthlessness to which this § 165(a) interpretation would apply.
125. Morton v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1270 (1938), af'd, 112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir.
1940).
126. G.E. Employees Sec. Corp. v. Manning, 137 F.2d 637, 641 (3d Cir. 1943).
127. See, e.g., Elliott R. Corbett, 28 B.T.A. 46 (1933) (acq.). But compare Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (loss denied when sale made solely to establish tax loss) with
A.R. Glancy, Inc., 31 B.T.A. 236 (1934) (acq.) (sale by corporation respected, despite simultaneous purchase by sole shareholder). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8(a)(4) (abandonment
loss).
128. E.g., De Loss v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
840 (1929); Gilbert H. Pearsall, 10 B.T.A. 467 (1928) (acq.).
129. See text accompanying notes 167-247 infra.
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payer to present persuasive evidence, substantiated by corporate
records, to support the reasonableness of the belief that the stock
retained value until the year in issue. The taxpayer cannot ask
the court merely to assume value. The taxpayer's opinion of the
corporation's financial status is not sufficient to overcome the presumption favoring the Commissioner's determination that the
stock was, in fact, worthless in an earlier year. This is so even
13 " the taxpayer is "the chief
when, as in Eagleton v. Commissioner,
financial backer of the corporation, a director, owner of fifty percent of the preferred stock. . . , a creditor, and in close touch with
those actively conducting the business."1 3' 1 The court ruled that because the taxpayer was in a position to support his contention by
providing evidence within his control, his failure to provide evidence negated any weight that his testimony might otherwise have
13 2
been accorded.
The obverse of this evidentiary burden is the taxpayer's third
burden, establishing that the stock or debt actually became worthless in the year alleged. It is fundamental that a loss may be deducted only in the year "sustained." That requirement is at the
root of the tax benefit conferred by the statute:
A taxpayer should not be permitted to close his eyes to the
obvious, and to carry accounts on his books as good when in fact
they are worthless, and then deduct them in a year subsequent to
the one in which he must be presumed to have ascertained their
worthlessness. To do so would enable him to withhold deductions
in his less prosperous years, when they would have little effect in
reducing his taxes, and then to apply the accumulation at another
time to the detriment of the flsc. This would defeat the intent
1 33
and purpose of the law.
Thus, the taxpayer must find a means of establishing that the
loss actually occurred in the year alleged. Courts have become increasingly receptive to numerous types of corroborative evidence in
an effort to marshal the available facts and to measure the pattern
against an objective standard of reasonableness As more than one
court has noted, however, "[t]he rule is clear, only its application is
difficult."1 3 4
130. 35 B.T.A. 551 (1937), afl'd, 97 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1938).
131. Id. at 556.
132. Id. at 556-57.
133. Avery v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 6, 7-8 (5th Cir. 1927).
134. Livingston v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 538, 547 (1942).
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Insolvency
The court in Morton stated what has become the accepted
standard for ascertaining worthlessness.'3 5 Under the Morton rule,
worthlessness determinations are divided into two categories depending upon the degree of insolvency and the appearance of collapse. In the first category, the taxpayer's investment becomes
worthless when all hope of recoupment is foreclosed by the occurrence of an "identifiable event." In the second, "exceptional" case,
the investor is put on notice, often well before the occurrence of an
identifiable event, that there is no reasonable hope or expectation
that continuation of business will restore value to the corporation.
Each situation presents unique problems in carrying the burden of
proof. Nevertheless, both require a threshold determination of present worthlessness, that is, actual insolvency that eliminates any
current liquidating value.
Demonstrating insolvency is fundamental to proving worthlessness because a shareholder or junior creditor takes a place in
line only after all of the corporation's more senior creditors have
queued up.""6 The mere existence of a discouraging balance sheet,
however, does not establish insolvency. A corporation is "insolvent" or not as to each level of creditor or shareholder. A preferred
stockholder has fewer senior creditors ahead of him or her than
does a common stockholder. Therefore, the corporation may be
135. See notes 97-107 & accompanying text supra.
136. Thus, a corporate balance sheet showing an excess of liabilities over assets, properly valued, must be the first evidentiary step in demonstrating worthlessness.
Assets "properly valued" are those that can be given a "fair market value," see, e.g.,
Nelson v. United States, 131 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1942)), which is "the price at which a willing
buyer and a willing seller would arrive, after negotiation for sale, where neither is acting
under compulsion." United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973). Accord, Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(c)(2), 1.385-3(b)(1), § 20.2031-1(b). See Rev. Rul. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257.
The nature of the individual assets is of utmost importance; certain kinds of assets, such as
unfinished goods in inventory, Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970), or goodwill damaged by unlawful acts, see Byrum v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 731, 734 (1972), will be assessed at lower than book value. See also Austin
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 955, 970 (1979) (acq.) (binding contracts fixed liquidating
value of corporation); Dustin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491, 496-97 (1969), af'd, 467 F.2d 47
(9th Cir. 1972) (value of textbooks given nature of publishing business). Book value is of
only slight relevance because a court must look to the actual value of the assets item by
item. Canaveral International Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 520, 545-46 (1974); Dustin v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491, 496-97 (1969), affd, 467 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1972); Richards v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1709, 1716 (1976). Thus, an authoritative balance sheet showing
no remaining equity for stock is "one form of effective evidence, though [it is] not necessarily conclusive. . . ." Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1941).
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"insolvent" as to the common stockholder without being so as to
the preferred stockholder. The taxpayer, in presenting a claim,
must corroborate the insolvency with extrinsic evidence, for, given
the existence of countervailing facts, a court would be "most reluctant to accord controlling weight to balance sheet figures in estimating what amount of its business debts are worthless at the
close of d. particular year.' 3 7 Nevertheless, courts in several decisions have accorded probative weight to carefully prepared balance
sheets, holding them sufficient to shift to the Commissioner the
burden of going forward with the evidence. 38 Moreover, one court
in a recent case was willing to overlook the complete absence of
records. The court took cognizance of the taxpayer's position "as a
minority shareholder with no firsthand knowledge of the company's business" and, accepting the taxpayer's assessment of insolvency "in the light of as complete information as [was] reasonably
obtainable," shifted the burden of going forward to the
Commisaioner 8l s
As these patterns are the exception, the claimant should
amass extrinsic evidence supporting the existence of present
worthlessness. Extrinsic evidence may consist of outside appraisals 4 0 or accountants' reports.1

41

The Service has outlined the ac-

ceptable procedure for independent appraisal, 142 including methods for valuing closely-held stock 1 48 and intangibles. 44 Although
the Service has not ruled on accountants' reports, numerous courts
have shown a distaste for "tentative, unaudited, and unverified"
assessments, even by professionals. 145 When liquidation will occur
over a substantial period of time, it is proper to discount the assets
137. Sika Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 856, 863 (1975). See also Singer v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 337, 345 n.4 (1975), af'd, 560 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1977).
138. Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1941); Frazier v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 951, 963 (1975); Edwards v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 735, 737-38 (1939).
Cf. Rand v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 233 (1939) (book figures for corporation's assets, giving
substantial value to stock, held of no probative force where other evidence showed stock to
have only nominal value in that year).
139. Byrum v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 731, 734-35 (1972) (acq.).
140. See Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869
(1970); Greenburg v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 937 (1971); Lincoln v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.
669, 695-96 (1955), aff'd on other grounds, 242 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1957).
141. See Borden Mining Co. v. Commissioner, B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1 40,597 (1940).
142. Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1258, § 3.
143. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. See also Rev. Rul. 65-192, 1965-2 C.B. 259.
144. Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327; Rev. Rul. 65-192, 1965-2 C.B. 259.
145. E.g., Borden Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1 40,597 (1940).
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146
by the length and cost of liquidation.
The recent judicial trend, however, has been to accept evidence of insolvency from sources other than the professional appraiser in a realistic effort to credit information that a reasonable
investor might be expected to have or obtain. Hence, evidence of
lack of market value has been found acceptable. 14 7 Similarly, expert testimony concerning general business conditions and the specific condition of the business under scrutiny has been accorded
substantial weight. 148 Although a court is not bound by such expert
testimony, it should be guided by the testimony and may not arbitrarily disregard it unless there is a suspicion of unreliability or
countervailing contrary evidence. Courts have thus held testimony
by the president of a company, 4 9 a company manager,1 50 the last
elected secretary-treasurer, 51 and a court-appointed receiver 52 to
be corroborative of the taxpayer's allegation of insolvency.
Some courts have accepted testimony by the taxpayer alone. 15 8
The weight to be accorded taxpayer testimony, however, depends
upon its reasonableness within the context of established facts and
upon the taxpayer's demeanor. In a recent case, the taxpayer's
"equivocal dealings with the stock"-which included a sale to a
friend for one dollar, the recovery and use of the same stock as
security, the transfer of the identical stock to his father-in-law,
and finally the claim of a $1,200 loss on the same stock that had a
$3,000 basis-led the court to conclude that the taxpayer had
ascribed more value to tax considerations than to the stock

146. See, e.g., Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925, 929 (1st Cir. 1942).
147. See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 928 (1934). See also Thun v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1517, 1522 (1977) (creditors' belief in value of stock, that is, their willingness to accept stock for unpaid interest, is relevant in establishing value). But cf. Ginsburg
v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 814, 830 (1974) ("the fact that the stock had no ready market
does not establish that it had become worthless.")
148. Ansley v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1954); Jones v. Commissioner, 29
B.T.A. 928 (1934).
149. Austin Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 955, 972 (1979) (acq). See also Scifo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 714, 726 (1977) (testimony by officers about events and their appraisal of
survival). But see Sipprell v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. 491, 494 (1962) (opinion of sales
manager about assets, because not expressed in specific amounts and unsupported, was not
reliable criterion of liquidating value).
150. Richards v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. 332, 333 (1959).
151. See Edwards v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 735, 737-38 (1939) (acq.).
152. Jones v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 928, 929-30 (1934).
153. Austin Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 955 (1979) (acq.); Richards v. Commissioner,
18 T.C.M. 332, 333 (1959).
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itself.'"
In looking beyond balance sheet insolvency, one should recognize that a balance sheet is often an inaccurate measure of corporate value because it overlooks contingent assets and Iabilities. 155
For example, the value of a corporation includes the value of rights
of action against third parties as well as those against the corporation, and such rights must be considered when determining insolvency, though neither possibility is normally reflected in a balance
sheet. A court, therefore, will increase the valuation of assets by
the possibility, measured by "fair market value," that a corporation's lawsuits may succeed 56 and will increase the valuation of
liabilities by the ascertainable value of litigation proposed or pending against the corporation. 57 Expert testimony on the possible
outcome of pending litigation is relevant in establishing
insolvency. 15
The probable or possible success of a claim affects potential
value as well as asset valuation. Thus, if a corporation institutes an
action in which a victory would restore solvency and the corporation "ha[s] more than a reasonable prospect of prevailing,"' 15 9 the
corporation is not worthless.1 0 Probabilities are capable of valuation and therefore enter the insolvency equation. If the prospect of
prevailing is only a possibility, however, insolvency is unaffected,
although potential value may remain.' 6 ' The same test applies to
litigation against the corporation. Mere possibilities, being unmeasurable, do not affect present value, 162 but they may provide a
154.
155.
11.03.
156.
157.
based on
158.

Thun v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1517, 1522 n.3 (1977).
See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); BrrrKFR & EUSTICH, supranote 70, at
See Collins v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 125 (1977).
Cf. Ryan v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 52, 58 (1930) (prospective contract losses
future contingencies held "purely speculative").
Collins v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 125 (1977). See Hankey v. Commissioner, 34

T.C.M. 481 (1975).
159. Collins v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 125, 129 (1977).
160. Tress. Reg. § 1.166-2(b).
161. Compare Collins v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 125 (1977) with Ruud v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 1284 (1969). See Tress. Reg. § 1.166-2(b); Rev. Rul. 80-24, 1980-1 C.B. 47.
162. Long v. Glenn, 32 A.F.T.R. 1690 (W.D. Ky. 1943), aff'd, 145 F.2d 234 (6th Cir.
1944); Datamation Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1092, 1104 (1976) ("[T]he discovery of the possibility that the corporation might be successfully sued at some time in the
future does not nearly rise to the level of an identifiable event finally 4ignalling the worthlessness of the corporation's stock"); Richards v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1709, 1717 (1976)
("In establishing the worthlessness of stock, pending litigation with the possibility of insol-

vency in the event of judgment and litigation to recover assets, will not usually be taken into
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clue to the corporation's future.
Establishing that stock has no liquidating value is essential to
a taxpayer's claim. Although the stock of a solvent corporation
necessarily has worth, 163 the stock of an insolvent corporation is
not necessarily worthless.1 ' Insolvency alone is not sufficient to
warrant a finding of worthlessness, for if there is any prospect of a
reversal in the fortunes of the corporation, then the stock has potential value and may not be considered worthless. 1 65 Mere pessimism regarding the recoupment of loss is inadequate.1 6 A court
will measure the objective indicia of potential value prior to agreeing with the taxpayer's assessment of worthlessness. Both factors-current liquidating value and foreseeably re-acquired
value-must be absent for the court to fix the loss.
-Identifiable Event
Under the rule articulated in Morton, the taxpayer must establish (1) that the corporation is insolvent-that is, it has no liquidating value-and (2) that the corporation has no potential
value-that is, some event occurred that destroyed the corporation's future prospects. 1 67 Neither factor alone is sufficient. Insolvency does not preclude the possibility of potential value;1 68 the
account until the year in which such litigation is lost."); Ryan v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A.
52, 58 (1930).
163. See Tress. Reg. § 1.165-4(a). See also Serris v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. -1851-54
(1978) (decline in value of stock, even if not salable because of § 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, does not render stock worthless).
164. E.g., Coleman v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1936); Olds & Whipple,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 1935) ("The fact that the assets were insufficient to meet the operating liabilities may properly be taken as evidence of worthlessness of
stock, but it is not conclusive."); Burnet v. Imperial Elev. Co., 66 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1933);
Singer v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 337 (1975), af'd, 560 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1977); Riss v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 388, 408 (1971), af'd, 478 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1973); Trinco Indus.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 959, 965 (1954).
165. Morton v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1270 (1938), aft'd, 112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir.
1940).
166. Thun v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1517 (1977).
167. 38 B.T.A. 1270, 1282 (1938).
168. An anticipated reorganization may show that the corporation has expectations of
profit. Lehman v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1942); Sipprell v. Commissioner, 21
T.C.M. 491 (1962); Lindabury v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 40,551 (1940), aff'd per
curiam, 121 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1941); Coleman v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 319 (1934), af'd,
81 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1936). The possibility of a sale of the business similarly may show
expectation of profits. Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. 889 (1963), rev'd, 332 F.2d
555 (9th Cir. 1964) (on appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that, although an offer to sell may be
evidence of value, in the instant case the corporation had been of no interest to potential
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occurrence of some "identifiable event, ' 169 without the showing of
does not prove that the stock is without liquidating
insolvency,
0
17

value.

A review of the decisions makes it clear that an "identifiable
event" is rarely a single occurrence in the normal business life of a
corporation.17 1 Rather, it is a series of events culminating in a final
determination that there is no reasonable hope that the stock or
debt retains potential value. 17 2 Such a determination of worthlessness is based on a consideration of all relevant evidence. The taxpayer's conduct and attitude towards the investment are relevant,
as is such purely formal evidence as properly kept books, normal
business loan procedures, regular board of directors' minutes documenting finances and business reversals, and arm's length dealings
with the corporation and third parties.173 Evidence presented of
adverse business conditions, 4 deficit operating history, 7 5 and failbuyers and the offering price did not represent a true estimate of potential sale price).

169. The Morton court oversimplified the concept of identifiable event by singling out,
as examples of identifiable events, the events of "bankruptcy, cessation from doing business,
or liquidation, or the appointment of a receiver." 38 B.T.A. 1270, 1278 (1938).
170. The appointment of a receiver and the beginning of corporate liquidation is insufficient unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that nothing will be left for the stockholders.
Burnett v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 605 (1939) (nonacq.), affd on othergrounds, 118 F.2d

659 (5th Cir. 1941). Similarly, a mere cessation of business does not in and of itself indicate
worthlessness. Rosing v. Corwin, 88 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1937).
171. Exceptions to this rule exist, however, and include catastrophe, Sika Chem. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 856, 866 (1975) ("Where one makes an advance of funds and subsequently the debtor is forced to drastically curtail its operations due to some disaster, there
has been that 'event or ... change in the financial obligation of the debtor, subsequent to
the time when the obligation was created, which adversely affects the debtor's ability to
make repayment.'); H.W. Findley, 25 T.C. [311, 319 (1955), af'd per curiam, 236 F.2d 959
(3d Cir. 1956)]."; Moffat v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 961 (1965) (permanent flooding of coal
mines), seizure of assets, United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927),
disappearance of the debtor, Sims v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. 608 (1951), appointment of a
receiver, see, e.g., Jamieson Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 92 (1938), aff'd and
rev'd on different issues, 105 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 618 (1939), and
resignation or death of a key employee, LeLandais v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1580 (1976).
172. Cf. Olds & Whipple v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1935) (insufficient assets to meet operating liabilities evidential but not conclusive of worthlessness).
173. Compare Scifo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 726 (1977) (petitioners worked hard and
diligently building a business, then lost all their money in improvident investments in other
businesses; court was sympathetic and held in petitioners' favor-record-keeping was excellent) with Dustin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491 (1969) (poor record; court held against
taxpayers).
174. See, e.g., Trowbridge v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 852, 856 (D. Conn. 1938), in
which the court stated: "Human nature shrinks from accepting as final the drastic losses
inherent in an economic depression believed to be of temporary duration. This is not necessarily the quality of incorrigible optimism sometimes seen. [Citations omitted.] It may
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6 provide additional support
ure to obtain continued financing"
for
17 7
worthlessness.
a finding of

Bankruptcy and Receivership
Although bankruptcy and receivership are two of the events
enumerated by the Morton court as signalling the end of potential
value, a corporation may be worthless long before a bankruptcy
petition is filed or a receiver is appointed. Conversely, potential
value may exist even though a corporation's liabilities exceed its
assets.1" 8 The majority of courts have treated bankruptcy adjudications and the appointment of receivers as mere indications of
worthlessness not sufficient in themselves to extinguish potential
value. 179 The practice has been to evaluate circumstances surrounding the petition or appointment in order to ascertain whether
the event precludes potential corporate recovery. Insolvency is either explicitly found 8 0 or implicitly assumed. 181

The burden of presenting corroborative evidence is on the taxpayer. Facts that courts have found corroborative include seizure
of operating assets,'182 loss of a principal client, 88 expiration of a
rather be a reasonable optimism. .. "
175. See, e.g., Royal Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1927); Yeager
v. United States, 58-1 U.S.T.C. 9,174 (W.D. Ky. 1957); Richards v. Commissioner, 18
T.C.M. 332 (1959); Camp v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. 908 (1953); H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 787 (1931) (nonacq.); Mayer v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1239 (1929)
(acq.).
176. Kirby v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 115, 116-17 (5th Cir. 1939); Gwynne v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 164, 169-70 (1931) (acq.); Pearsall v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 467, 469,
(acq.).
177. None of these factors, standing alone, rise to the level of an identifiable event.
Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 729, 747 (1946), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 164 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 861 (1948) ("It has frequently been
held that such factors as deficits, operating losses, lack of working funds, poor business conditions, and similar circumstances are insufficient in themselves to establish the worthlessness of stock.").
178. Jarvis v. Heiner, 39 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1930); Lyon v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 138
(Ct. Cl. 1933); Peter Doelger Brewing Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1176 (1931)
(acq.).
179. E.g., Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660
(1941); A.R. Jones Oil & Operating Co. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir. 1940).
See note 178 supra.
180. E.g., Jeffery v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1933).
181. E.g., Coosa Land Co. v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1939); Ruud v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 1284 (1969).
182. United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927); Scifo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 714, 726-27 (1977).
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refinancing offer,""' abandonment of attempts to raise needed equity,18 5 absence of a market, 8 6 and inability to obtain shareholder
loans.1 87 In each of these cases, the subsequent bankruptcy or re-

ceivership led to a determination of worthlessness. Each of the corroborative facts was insufficient, in itself, to destroy value identifiably. These facts, in combination with bankruptcy or receivership,
however, manifested an end to potential value. 18
The degree of insolvency is often determinative when a petition for involuntary bankruptcy or for the appointment of a receiver is contested. Thus, one court found that shareholder resistance to the appointment of a receiver was inconsequential when
others "were prepared to throw in the sponge." '8 9 The threatened
receivership was sufficient to signal the end of reasonable hope of
corporate worth. In another case, a corporation's contest of a petition for involuntary bankruptcy manifested a belief in the existence of potential value, which the court could not find unreasonable in light of the corporation's financial condition. 190
A petition in bankruptcy or the appointment of a receiver is a
portentous event in a corporation's existence. Although the significance of the event must be measured in the context of its occurrence, a substantial body of case law supports the position that
insolvency plus bankruptcy or receivership signals the destruction
of corporate value. Therefore, a taxpayer, following the Young admonition of claiming a loss deduction in the earliest year possible, 191 would be foolish not to rely on an event that portends
trouble, if not disaster, and that may have identifiably destroyed
all potential value as well.
Reorganization and Foreclosure
The attitude of a shareholder or creditor towards an ailing
183. Perkins v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 1225, 1230-31 (1940), af'd, 125 F.2d 150 (6th
Cir. 1942).
184. Lambert v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 624, 625 (10th Cir. 1939).
185. Jones v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 928, 930 (1934).
186. Id.
187. Pearsall v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 467, 469 (1928).
188. In the absence of countervailing evidence of value, bankruptcy and receivership
should be prima facie indications of worthlessness. Coosa Land Co. v. Commissioner, 103
F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1939).
189. Camp v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. 908, 911 (1953).
190. See White v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 588, 597 (1970).
191. See notes 111-13 & accompanying text supra.
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business is often indicative of its value. A creditor's willingness to
defer a claim or to accept reissued indebtedness or equity in lieu of
repayment is strong evidence of prospective profits. Hence, courts
have held that indebtedness retains value when a creditor accepts
192
stock in lieu of interest, or as security for new indebtedness.
Conversely, an unwillingness to accept a composition evinces
substantial creditor doubt concerning the existence of potential
value. If a creditor refuses a compromise and forecloses on essential assets, the corporation will cease to function and no further
profits or cash flow can be expected to relieve existing insolvency.
In such circumstances, foreclosure is an event that identifiably destroys future value. 193 That event, when coupled with insolvency,
renders the stock, and usually part of the junior debt, worthless.
Reorganization efforts, which in themselves often demonstrate
continued belief in a corporation's ultimate ability to repay obligations, may be of little significance to unsecured creditors or shareholders. Senior creditors, on the other hand, in order to salvage
their investments, may agree to a composition arrangement that
destroys the value of junior obligations and stock."9 While reorganization may confirm the worthlessness of stock that occurred no
later than, and perhaps prior to, the year in which the plan was
consummated, however, it will not destroy the value of indebtedness. To the contrary, reorganization may demonstrate the existence of potential value.
Reorganization and foreclosure, therefore, while indicators of
worthlessness, do not qualify as identifiable events unless they unequivocally signal the end of taxpayer hope and expectation of future profit.19 5 Neither reorganization nor foreclosure alone is suffi192.
193.

E.g., Thun v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1517, 1522 (1977).
Rev. Rul. IT 1697, 11-11-942, 1923, updated and restated,Rev. Rul. 72-470, 1972-

2 C.B. 100.
194. Thus, stock has been held to be worthless when a shareholder surrendered his
stock and received nothing in return. Summit Drilling Corp. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 703
(10th Cir. 1947). Similarly, stock has been held to be worthless when a stockholder exchanged his shares for valueless stock and notes. Stearns v. Kavanagh, 41-2 U.S.T.C. 9,750
(E.D. Mich. 1941); Heiss v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 833 (1937) (acq.). But see Coleman v.
Commissioner, 81 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1936) (potential value remained). Cf. Brumder v.
United States, 60 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Wis. 1944) (stock became worthless prior to the
exchange).
195.

See Mahler v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.

660 (1941) ("[T]he mere fact of a receivership or reorganization proceeding is not alone
sufficient to fix the date of worthlessness."); Joyce v. Gentsch, 141 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1944);
Miami Beach Bay Shore Co. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1943); Leicht v. Coin-
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cient to support a claim of worthlessness. On the other hand,
either event, when viewed in the context of the business's devolution, may be persuasive of the reasonableness of the taxpayer's
conclusion that he or she has suffered irreparable loss."'
Revocation of Corporate Charter
A corporation has legal existence only if it conforms to statutory requirements. Logically, the revocation, forfeiture, or surrender of a corporate charter is a significant event, for, if the charter
is revoked, a corporation is legally dead. Legal death, however, like
other events in a corporation's life, does not, in itself, establish
worthlessness-insolvency is a prerequisite. Moreover, some courts
have found that, even when worthlessness was inevitable, loss of
the corporate charter was not the event that signalled its
197
occurrence.

Whether revocation of the corporate charter is an "identifiable" event establishing an end to potential value depends upon
the context. In one case, the stockholders resolved to surrender the
corporate charter and franchises and to liquidate. The court found
that the resolution itself was the event that ended the hope of future success. That finding, coupled with a finding of insolvency, led
the court to hold that the stock became worthless on the date of
the resolution. 198 Similarly, revocation of a charter for delinquent
taxes constituted an "identifiable event" when, despite financial
setbacks, it was not until revocation that "[it] became known definitely, and for the first time, that the stockholders were to suffer a
complete loss."' 9 ' The critical finding was that of knowledge of the
company's condition, which identified the revocation as the final
extinguishing of value.
In contrast, if state law requires that the disposition of assets
after forfeiture be placed under the control of the board of directors, then "the stockholders [do] not become entitled to possession,
missioner, 137 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1943); Forbes v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1933);
Altschuler v. Commissioner, B.T.A.M. (P-H) 84,368 (1938).
196. Leicht v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 433, 437 (8th Cir. 1943); Christensen v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 594 (1969); Kentucky Farm and Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
1355, 1373 (1958).
197. See Wolf v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1121, 1124-25 (1927).
198. Gahagen v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 828 (1931).
199. Dunbar v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1941). This conclusion was
apparently the result of the taxpayer's failure to provide sufficient evidence.
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use and control of their pro rata share of the assets.. . until they
[are] distributed by the directors in liquidation."2 0 0 The stockholders therefore can not know of their loss or claim for deduction until
valuation and actual distribution subsequent to revocation of the
corporate charter.
Even legal death, therefore, does not reach the level of an
identifiable event absent proven insolvency. Moreover, legal death
may merely confirm a demise that could reasonably have been
identified at an earlier date. Thus, revocation, like bankruptcy, receivership, and foreclosure, is an indication of worthlessness insufficient in itself to establish worthlessness.
Continuation versus Cessation of Business, Liquidation,and Sale
of Assets
The continuation of business frequently indicates that the corporate stock and debt retain value. Continuation, however, is not
conclusive. 0 1 Conversely, cessation of business is evidence, but not
proof, of worthlessness. 20 2 A number of early decisions, however,
held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the continuation of
business activities assumes the existence of potential value, and
the cessation of business activities affirms the death of corporate
20 3

value.

The test of whether the continuation of business is evidence of
continuing value was well stated by Judge Learned Hand in Bullard v. United States20
The corporation did not go out of business, on the contrary it
tried to go on ....
[O]bviously the corporation was not yet prepared to throw in the sponge. No liquidation was proposed; no
200. Wolf v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1121, 1125 (1927).
201. A.R. Jones Oil & Operating Co. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir.
1940) ("It has been said that continuation in business is evidence of worth and that discontinuance of business indicates worthlessness."); Ruud v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 1284
(1969); Lincoln v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 669 (1955), af'd, 242 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1957).
202. Eaton v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1944); Jones v. Commissioner, 103
F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1939); Eagleton v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1938); Rosing v.
Corwin, 88 F.2d 415, 416 (2d Cir. 1937); Royal Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 536
(9th Cir. 1927); Bancroft v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 225 (Ct. Cl. 1940).
203. Ryan v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. 886, 887 (1956). See Benjamin v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 719, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1934); Dalton v. Bowers, 56 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir.), aff'd,
287 U.S. 404 (1932); Deeds v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 695, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1931); In re Hoffman, 16 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Pa. 1936), aff'd sub nom. Yocum v. Rothensies, 87 F.2d 200 (3d
Cir. 1936) (per curiam); H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 787 (1931) (nonacq.).
204. 146 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1944).
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declaration of insolvency made; no receiver appointed; no such

"identifiable event" occurred as was necessary to establish the
worthlessness of the property .... It would be unsafe to say
that until a corporate business has been abandoned, there cannot
be that "identifiable event" which is necessary in such situations;
but at least we can say that, when the business does continue, the
circumstances must be exceptional which will induce us to hold
that the shares have as yet become worthless. 05
If the continued business is a mere shadow of the corporation's "normal" business activities, there has been an identifiable
change in potential value cognizable by both shareholders and
creditors. 206 Conversely, value has not been destroyed if a corporation "took steps designed to preserve its viability and chances of
success. Aggressive bidding policies [for contracts] were followed
. . .in the hope of a market upswing. Merger... was undertaken
. . .to form the basis for future success. 211 7 These measures would

not have been undertaken without a reasonable prospect of restoring value to the corporation.
Between the extremes of business contraction and business expansion, a line can be found beyond which a court would probably
find worthlessness. That line divides a bona fide contraction from
business as usual.
The most common bona fide contraction requires, at the least,
a plan to sell the assets confirmed by either a contract of sale, 20 8 a
report showing a lack of potential value and detailing a plan for
liquidating the business, 209 or a lengthy period of losses. 210 When a
decision has been made to liquidate the corporation or to sell its
assets pursuant to a bona fide contraction or dissolution, a common paradox occurs. As the corporation by definition is insolvent,
worthlessness will be confirmed by the offering plan if the assets
are offered at their fair market values. An offering at fair market
value, however, will give prospective purchasers a distinct advantage in price negotiations. Yet a court may use an asking price ex205. Id. at 388.
206. See Frazier v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 951, 963 (1975).
207.

Thun .v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1517, 1521-22 (1977).

208. See Austin Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 955, 970-71 (1979) (acq.).
209.

Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660

(1941).
210. See Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1964); Industrial
Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 383, 384 (6th Cir. 1938); Squier v. Commissioner, 68

F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1933).
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ceeding the assets' fair market value to refute insolvency or impute
a higher value. Although the courts have reasoned that an asking
price does not affect actual value,"' given the inherently factual
nature of the inquiry, only an exceptional court would not be influenced by an asking price.
Beyond the clear case of a business continuing with a plan of
dissolution adopted with formally executed contracts lie those situations in which a corporation adopts a plan of liquidation but does
little more during the year of purported worthlessness. If a corporation adopts a plan of liquidation primarily to accelerate the
shareholders' loss deductions, the plan will be ignored by the
courts. 2 Actual liquidation will normally be sufficient,'" although
it is not necessary. "1 4 A plan of liquidation or the commencement
of liquidation usually carries substantial weight with a court when
insolvency has been proven. 1 5
Similarly, with regard to a sale of assets or of the business, if
the corporation is reduced to a shell possessing liabilities in excess
of cash, the stock and some or all of the indebtedness are worthless. 216 If the board of directors or an authorized officer agrees to a
sale of a substantial amount of operating assets, the agreement to
terminate operations generally will be an "identifiable event"
fixing the year of worthlessness, even if a binding contract is not
signed until a subsequent year.
When there is no actual liquidation, dissolution, or sale of as211. The price for which property was offered "could not have represented even a real
hope of what they might get, or anything more than a figure at which haggling over a price
might begin." Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1964).
212. "[The] resolution [to liquidate] appears to us to represent no more than a transparent attempt to concoct an identifiable event for tax purposes, and we accordingly disregard it." Greenberg v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 937, 941 (1971).
213. Glenn v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 127 F.2d 820, 823 (6th Cir. 1942); Nelson v. United States, 131 F.2d 301, 302-04 (8th Cir. 1942); Benjamin v. Commissioner, 70
F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1934); Burnet v. Imperial Elevator Co., 66 F.2d 643, 644-45 (8th Cir. 1933).
214. Barnet S. Milman, Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 95, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1940).
215. Connelly v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1941); Hobby v. Commissioner,
97 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1938); Gowen v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 687 (1933); Forbes v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1933); De Loss v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 840 (1929).
216. See A. R. Jones Oil & Operating Co. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 642, 646 (10th
Cir. 1940); Burnet v. Imperial Elevator Co., 66 F.2d 643, 645 (8th Cir. 1933); Dalton v. Bowers, 56 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 287 U.S. 404 (1932).
217. Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1964), revog 22
T.C.M. 889 (1963) (steps taken consistent with definite decision to go out of business, including offer to sell corporate assets, were "identifiable events").
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sets, or often even if one of these events occurs, the taxpayer's intent is the test of deductibility. A court must search the objective
record in an effort to discern present value, and then test future
value by the existence of the taxpayer's reasonable""' belief in the
viability of the business. If the taxpayer is an "incorrigible optimist," I worthlessness will be held to have occurred in a prior
year.21 0 Conversely, if the taxpayer attempts to accelerate a loss
deduction,22 1 worthlessness will be held to occur in a subsequent
year.2 2 2 Thus, the rule favoring clear and correct record-keeping
must be kept in mind, for a taxpayer's veracity is usually measured
against the factual record.
Absence of a Market for Stock
An identifiable event manifests the worthlessness of goodwill,
the extinction of going concern value, and the destruction of prospects for future profitability. Coupled with insolvency, an identifiable event freezes present worthlessness.
In the absence of an identifiable event, the only means of establishing the worthlessness of common stock is to prove that the
corporation was so insolvent that no reasonable purchaser would
have discerned the existence of going-concern value. The hypothetical reasonable purchaser must have believed that it would have
been easier, and perhaps more profitable, to start anew than to assume the burdens of revitalizing an existing but floundering enterprise. 12 3 As creditors may eschew foreclosure and shareholder liquidation to preserve the business as a salable entity, however, there
may be no suitable event to identify the worthlessness of stock. In
218. "The unsupported [unreasonable] opinion of the taxpayer alone that the debt is
worthless will not usually be accepted as proof of worthlessness." Dustin v. Commissioner,
53 T.C. 491, 502 (1969), afl'd, 467 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1972). Accord, Fox v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. 813, 822 (1968), aff'd per curiam in an unreported order, 70-1 U.S.T.C. 9,373 (9th
Cir. 1970); Bryan v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 104, 130-31 (1959), aff'd in part and rem'd on
other grounds, 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 931 (1961).
219. United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398, 403 (1927).
220. See Esposito v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. 910, 912 (1973) (a continued belief in
the ability of the corporation to turn around did not alter the effect of a prior identifiable
event); Gimbel v. Rothensies, 24 F. Supp. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
221. This is an application of the "pig theory," "so named after the Wall Street adage
that 'you can make money being a bull, and you can make money being a bear; but you
can't make money being a pig."' BrrrKER & EusTicE, supra note 70, 4.04 at 4-10.
222. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 937 (1971).
223. See notes 239-243 & accompanying text infra.
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such circumstances, absence of a market for the stock can be used
to establish identifiable worthlessness.
Evidence of unmarketability, based on facts in existence at an
earlier date, may demonstrate that no going-concern value existed
at the earlier time. 224 Similarly, proof that no actual market existed for the corporation's stock shows no going-concern value. The
difficulty in establishing the absence of a market is in amassing the
evidence. Cases to date have dismissed absence-of-market arguments because the proof presented has been inadequate. 225 The

fact that stock has no ready market does not establish that it has
become worthless, 226 nor does the fact that no buyer was found establish that no market existed.
Notwithstanding the inability of taxpayers in the litigated
cases to establish market worthlessness, absence of a market can
be an identifiable event. If exhaustive efforts to find a buyer have
been made, with prospectuses mailed to likely buyers and agents,
and the replies indicate an industry-wide consensus that the stock
lacks even speculative value, an identifiable event has occurred
which has destroyed value. Admittedly, the event has been constructed by the taxpayer; that, however, is also true of voluntary
bankruptcy, liquidation, and sale of assets. Adequate evidence of
absence of a market establishes that an event has occurred that
signals the end of stock value.
"IdentifiableEvents"
A more practical definition of "identifiable event" can be attempted now that the judicial yardsticks have been reviewed. An
identifiable event is an occurrence that would make a reasonable
taxpayer finally abandon an admittedly improvident investment. 2 7
Numerous identifiable events would fit into this description, but
do not easily fit within the categories discussed up to this point.
Pilferage and deterioration of operating equipment,228 demand on
224. See Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1964).
225. Stevens Bros. Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 93, 124 (1962), modified on
other grounds, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 969 (1964) (petitioner's
president testified that he attempted to sell stock, but did not explain details such as offer-

ing price and methods of offering).
226. Ginsburg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 814, 830 (1974); West End Pottery Co. v.
Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 927, 929 (1927).
227. See, e.g., First Teachers Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. 892, 916 (1980).
228. Hankey v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 481, 485 (1975).
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a loan,229 and an attorney's opinion that loans are beyond recoupment 230 are examples of events that have been held sufficient to
establish worthlessness.
A practical definition of identifiable event is necessary for the
additional reason that the case law discloses that each event is
measured by the overall factual context. No rule defining an "identifiable event" for all purposes can be extracted.2"'
Apparent from the foregoing analysis is that corroboration is a
necessity, but one easily satisfied. If a corporation is in poor
financial condition and possibly headed for disaster, it should not
hesitate to hire a financial consultant to audit the books and recommend a course of action. Insolvency, if it exists, will thereby be
established. Business and tax planning may proceed.
If the consultant believes that the business is salvageable,
value exists as of the date of the report. Business options outlined
in the report can be pursued. If worthlessness eventually occurs,
evidence of value at a fixed date, perhaps the end of the year prior
to the loss, is confirmed.
If the consultant recommends sale or liquidation of the business and estimates the proceeds therefrom, potential value can be
both measured and destroyed by corporate action evincing a plan
to go out of business. If the plan is followed and inconsistent actions are avoided, the insolvency, coupled with the report and the
plan, will produce worthlessness.
Irrevocable Insolvency-The Exceptional Case
The "exceptional" case, in which the liabilities of a corporation greatly exceed its assets, is not at all rare. It arises any time a
corporation is heavily insolvent and cannot find or produce an
identifiable event. When an irrevocable insolvency exists in which
229.

Jessup v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1145, 1149 (1977).

230. First Teachers Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. 892 (1980). If these events
may be perceived as peculiar fact patterns and therefore of limited applicability, it is because they are. In fact, refusal of corporate creditors to accept stock as collateral was judged
insufficient to render stock worthless, the court perhaps deciding that the event was too
subjective. Anthony P. Miller, Inc., v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 729, 746 (1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d
268 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 861 (1948).

231. The reader may well think that the discussion has now come full circle: any subjective occurrence may be an identifiable event. This conclusion may be correct, but it
misses the mark. The purpose of this analysis has not been to suggest to the taxpayer a
method for recharacterizing prior actions, but rather to provide a roadmap for planning
current and future transactions.
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the value of stock or debt has "become finally extinct, ' 132 the de-

termination of extinction constitutes an identifiable event sufficient to fix the year of worthlessness."'
One need not distinguish between insolvencies that are merely
disastrous and those that are irrevocable. "The only safe practice
*

. .

is to claim a loss for the earliest year when it may possibly be

allowed ....."I" The result is that the wise taxpayer often will
deduct the stock, and at least part of the indebtedness, 23 5 in the
first year of insolvency. This practice, however, has not yet been
approved by the courts.
As the exceptional case will arise only when there occurs no
colorable identifiable event such as cessation of business, liquidation, or sale of operating assets, the taxpayer will have to overcome
the presumption
of potential value inherent in continued operations. 23 6 In such situations, the size of the deficit is critical. For
example, in Keeney v. Commissioner,-3 7 the corporation generated
cash flow sufficient to service and repay a part of the indebtedness.
No profits were realized. The size of the indebtedness nevertheless
precluded a finding that the stock could reasonably regain value in
the foreseeable future. 33
If continued operations produce additional deficits, the taxpayer's burden is lighter, especially if the deficits are foreseen, projected by external sources, and cannot be reversed. On the other
hand, if the corporation continues operations on a profitable basis,
232. De Loss v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 840
(1928). See Deeds v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1931); Steadman v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 369 (1968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970).
233. Morton v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1270, 1279 (1938) aff'd, 112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir.
1940). See, e.g., Steadman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 369 (1968), af'd, 424 F.2d I (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970) (corporate stock became worthless in the year audit
showed huge net operating losses, net deficit in shareholders' equity, and no reasonable expectation of future profit).
234. Young v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1941). For a discussion of this
case, see notes 111-13 & accompanying text supra.
235. The two deductions run hand-in-hand. See, e.g., Austin Co. v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 955 (1979) (acq.).
236. See notes 201-222 & accompanying text supra.
237. 116 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1940).
238. "While the taxpayer may have hoped by [conducting business] in 1933 to make
something over the expenses of the [business] and thereby reduce somewhat the Club's indebtedness to him, there was no reasonable ground for hoping by that [business] or subsequent [business] to liquidate the enormous debt; and only so would the stock become of any
value." Id. at 403. Accord, Richards v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. 332, 333 (1959); Morton v.
Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1270, 1278-79 (1938), aft'd, 112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1940).
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it is almost impossible for a court, or a potential buyer, to believe
that the corporation does not continue to possess value. The only
exception to this rule would be in the case of a heavily insolvent
corporation with a history of operating losses, poor creditor relationships, and a limited legal life.
Going-concern Value
Whether a corporation is irrevocably insolvent frequently
turns on whether any goodwill or "going-concern value" remains.
The test of going-concern value is made of the corporation as a
whole, rather than on an asset-by-asset basis as for insolvency. One
court has stated the test as follows:
We suppose that [for the corporation to possess going-concern
value] a purchaser must think that it would be easier, and more
readily profitable, to resume former activities at the old stand
than to start an entirely new enterprise without the related
intangibles.89
Going-concern value is ascertained by examining the entire
operating history of the business to ascertain its goodwill.
Would a prudent purchaser in an arms length transaction have
regarded the stock in this enterprise as representing any equity at
all in this debt-ridden inactive company with its history
of several
240
years of uninterrupted and ruinous operating losses?

The nature of the business is also a factor. In some businesses,
destruction of public confidence may be tantamount to loss of
goodwill or going-concern value. Thus, when officers and employees of a brokerage business were indicted for fraud, the resulting
destruction of the public's confidence in the corporation, plus a
lack of liquidating value, rendered the stock worthless. 241 Yet other
businesses, such as book publishers, may record losses every year
for many years, and then recoup all losses with a single best
seller.242
In these cases of exceptional insolvency, going-concern value
fixes worthlessness as long as there is heavy insolvency and lack of
liquidating value.2 43 Lack of going-concern value shows more than
239. Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1964).
240. Id.
241. Byrum v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 731, 734 (1972) (acq.).
242. Dustin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491 (1969), aff'd, 467 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1972).
243. It is the rare corporation that will own assets worth more singly than in an operating business. Note the effect, for example, of unfinished inventory in Steadman v. Corn-
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the mere absence of a market; it establishes lack of marketability,
which is the bellwether of worthlessness.
Subsequent Events
If a taxpayer deducts as worthless an investment that flourishes in later years, or if the taxpayer refrains from deducting it
until the passing of an "identifiable event" and the investment becomes hopelessly lost almost immediately, the initial year's determination will not be tainted. Subsequent events are not relevant to
a worthlessness inquiry because worthlessness is a factual determination of what a taxpayer could assess in the exercise of sound
business judgment, based upon information as complete as was
then reasonably obtainable. 44
A substantial sale of stock was at one time evidence of value in
a prior year.245 Currently, however, a sale of stock subsequent to
worthlessness will not serve as evidence of prior value, especially if
the sale is of small quantities, at nominal prices, or under extraordinary circumstances.2 4 As one court stated, "Once it appears

from all the surrounding circumstances that a debt has become
worthless, we cannot look to subsequent events to determine if a
debt in fact became worthless. The possibility of collection is
tested by the facts known at that time and not by hindsight.

'247

Inconsistent Actions
The decision to abandon an investment by deducting stock or
debt as a loss is difficult. Few taxpayers are willing to admit defeat
missioner, 424 F.2d 4 n.1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970).

244.

Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. Marie R.R. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 226, 241

(1964).
245. G.E. Employees Sec. Corp. v. Manning, 137 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1943) (although
taxpayer received only two cents on the dollar, amount received was direct evidence stock

had value).
246.

Young v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1941); Brown v. Commissioner, 94

F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1938).
247.

Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. Marie R.R. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 226, 241

(1964). The court went on to state: "However, subsequent events may be used to evaluate
the soundness of our determination that a debt became worthless in a certain year." Id.
Accord, Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1964); Reese v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1228, 1234 (1976) (specific subsequent events simply reflected the circum-

stances of worthlessness that existed in an earlier year).
Whatever the merits of a particular case, subsequent events will undoubtedly be used

by the court to rationalize its holding for a different year of worthlessness if the taxpayer
has not firmly established the deduction by proper record-keeping and corroboration.
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by deducting the loss in the first year of insolvency or even subsequent to the panic caused by one or more identifiable events. The
most common, and the most dangerous, practice of taxpayers is to
continue to make advances to the corporation subsequent to insolvency. If the taxpayer takes the position that the corporation's obligations were worthless at the date of insolvency, then any unsecured advances made with the belief that they would not be
repaid "are in the nature of gifts [or contributions to capital] and
are not deductible as bad debts.

24 8

Moreover, advances made sub-

sequent to insolvency are evidence of the taxpayer's belief in the
potential profitability of the corporation
and are thus inconsistent
49
with a deduction for worthlessness.
Exceptions to the rule concerning advances continuing subsequent to insolvency do exist, even though "it is difficult to understand how an experienced businessman would continue to finance
a business after all reasonable hope and expectation of profits had
been abandoned."2 5 One exception is when advances are made to
aid cash flow to recover at least part of the taxpayer's prior loans
even though profits are impossible. 5 ' Similarly, staving off involuntary bankruptcy and a forced sale of assets at bargain prices, or
fulfilling the requirements of local law25 2 ought to satisfy a court

that the continuing advances are not evidence of a profit motive,
which would negate a finding of worthlessness.
Continuing shareholder investment is also inconsistent with
248.

W.F. Young, Inc. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 159, 164 (1st Cir. 1941) (citations

omitted). Unsecured advances reduce the corporation's outstanding (book) liabilities and
often destroy insolvency. See Midland Distrib., Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730, 734 (5th
Cir. 1973) (once notes are characterized as stock, thus preventing an unjustified bad debt
deduction, the debt may be classified as stock for the purpose of allocating liquidation assets); Northeastern Consol. Co. v. United States, 406 F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396

U.S. 819 (1969) (stock not worthless when debt owed to parent by subsidiary was reclassified as equity); Byerlyte Corp. v. Williams, 170 F. Supp. 48, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959), rev'd and
rem'd, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960) (stock not worthless when loans in excess of $500,000

were reclassified as equity and assets worth less than $150,000 were distributed on liquidation). See also discussion of debt-equity at notes 395-411 & accompanying text infra.
249. Rassieur v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 1942); Herrick v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 708, 710 (1977); Datamation Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
1092, 1104 (1976); Singer v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 337, 346 (1975), af'd, 560 F.2d 196
(5th Cir. 1977); Zarnow v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 213, 217 (1967).
250. Yeager v. United States, 58-1 U.S.T.C. 9174 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
251. See George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 935, 940 (Ct. Cl.

1956); Old Dominion Plywood Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 678, 700 (1966).
252.

See generally Yeager v. United States, 58-1 U.S.T.C. %9174 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
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worthlessness.2 53 Yet, the fact of continuing investment will not be
given weight if the taxpayer becomes an "incorrigible optimist"
with respect to the investment.25 4 Refusing to make'additional contributions to the corporation, however, may be taken as evidence of
2 5s
worthlessness.
Corporate and individual tax returns and financial statements
must be consistent with the taxpayer's determination of worthlessness. A corporation cannot treat shareholder advances as indebtedness, thereby making the corporation insolvent, unless the shareholder treats them similarly on loan applications, on tax returns, 56
and in demand situations. 5 7 Furthermore, board of directors' minutes must be consistent with corporate and individual tax returns
and financial statements. Representations may be of particular importance when third party purchasers are involved.
What is true of direct shareholder actions is equally true of
indirect ones. If a shareholder guarantees the corporation's obligations to a third party, the guarantee is evidence of the shareholder's belief in potential value.2 58
It is apparent from the foregoing that choosing the proper
year of worthlessness is a matter for forethought and planning. A
clear understanding of the meaning of "insolvency" and the concept of "realization" of tax losses is necessary to fix the date of
worthlessness. Financially sound decisions can be accomplished
only by careful planning and attention to precedent. The confusion
in the cases dealing with worthlessness is more apparent than real.
253. Benjamin v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1934); Hanna v. Routzahn, 16 F.
Supp. 28, 30 (N.D. Ohio 1936).
254. See Gimbel v. Rothensies, 24 F. Supp. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1938). If the investment
is worthless when made because no profit motive can then exist, the contribution to capital
will be a gift and no deduction will be permitted. See generally I.R.C. § 165(c)(2).
255. See Kirby v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1939); Darling v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 111 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 866 (1931). Cf. Scifo v. Commissioner,
68 T.C. 714 (1977) (payment on shareholder guarantee of corporate loan not considered by
court in determination of worthlessness).
256. Cf. Scifo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 714 (1977).
257. See the discussion of demand, in text accompanying notes 315-20 infra. See Benjamin v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1934); Forbes v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 571
(4th Cir. 1933); Darling v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 111 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 866
(1931); Dustin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 491, 498 (1969), aff'd, 467 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1972).
Financial entries writing down indebtedness were held to be some evidence of worthlessness
in Lakewood Hospital Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. 499 (1979).
258. Sika Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 856, 864 (1975). See also notes 395407 & accompanying text infra.
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It arises from the countless differing fact patterns, not from the
decisions themselves. The law is settled; only its application to
specific fact patterns is not.
No one element can be singled out as indicative of worthlessness. This is especially true when business operations continue. Insolvency is always a prerequisite to worthlessness, but most decisions result from judicial reaction to several factors and to the
degree of insolvency. In general, the events evidencing these factors occur over several years, so that those events that occur in a
year prior to the deduction serve as cumulative support for a subsequent worthlessness event, and those events that occur in a year
subsequent to deduction confirm by hindsight the fact that prior
events in fact rendered the stock valueless. Each case stands or
falls on the record as a whole; the substance of the transaction, and
not the form in which it is cast, determines the legal consequences.
Judicial and Regulatory Distinctions Between Debt
and Equity
Shareholders often occupy the dual status of investor and
creditor with respect to their holdings in a corporation. This dual
status frequently arises from an optimistic belief in the eventual
success of the venture and an unwillingness to share that success
with outsiders. The tax benefits of a corporate debt structure also
favor a combination of debt and equity: with few exceptions, the
tax consequences of debt to both shareholders and corporations
are more favorable than those of stock.259
The tax benefits of debt holdings, however, place an added
burden on the creditor-shareholder to establish that advances to a
controlled corporation are loans and not contributions to capital.260
Courts have consistently held that proportional debt-equity holdings invite closer scrutiny, especially in the case of sole sharehold259. See generally BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 70, ch. 4. But see Kaplan v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 178 (1972) (I.R.C. § 1244 stock).
260. But see Cornelius v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the
taxpayer, to avoid a doubling of income required by the Subchapter S rules, argued that
what had been characterized as indebtedness by the shareholders was actually an equity
investment. The court held that the taxpayer could not argue for an equity contribution
when he had couched the advance in the form of a loan: "[A]lthough a taxpayer's own documents are not conclusive, they normally override any conflicting subjective considerations
advanced by that taxpayer." Id. at 471. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d
652, 659 n.9 (5th Cir. 1968); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
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ers. 261 The fact of proportional identity between shareholders and
creditors, however, does not, without the presence of additional equity factors, preclude the existence of a bona fide debt,2 2 even if a
sole shareholder-creditor is involved.
Non-shareholder debt holdings have rarely been challenged,
owing to the absence of abuse potential. In most instances, nonshareholder debt arises in an adversarial context in which the focus
is on seniority and security rather than on equity participation.
The only situation in which unrelated non-shareholder debt does
not arise in an adversarial context is in those instances in which an
independent creditor acquires a hybrid instrument. 2 3
The consequence of equity treatment to an individual seeking
a loss deduction is a matter of timing. The loss deduction may be
deferred because the security or debt is not wholly worthless. 2 6 4 No
change in character from capital loss to ordinary loss is possible. 265
The stakes in a parent-subsidiary context, however, are higher.
An intercompany investment invariably consists of a mix of debt
and equity. Subsequent to the initial capital investment in core assets, a parent company often characterizes all subsequent outlays,
whether formal loans, open account advances, or guarantees of
outside indebtedness, as bona fide debt. Problems will arise primarily in the worthlessness context. If the affiliate company is technically insolvent, an identifiable event will eventually occur to confirm ordinary loss treatment under section 165(g)(3). 2 66 If the
261. See, e.g., Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 123-25 (2d Cir. 1956);
Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 381 (1973) (acq.) (parent-subsidiary relationship). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6; Letter Ruling 7906001 (Sept. 30, 1979).
262. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(a) and (b); Tomlinson v. 1661 Corporation, 377 F.2d
291, 297 (5th Cir. 1967) (citing cases); Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 964, 971 (Ct.
Cl. 1968).
263. Courts have had difficulty in distinguishing between the debt and equity elements of such instruments. See In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc., 448 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971);
Farley Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960); Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 212 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Pottstown Finance Co. v. United States, 73
F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Monon R.R. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 345 (1970); Wynnefield Heights, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 953 (1966); Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 3
T.C. 95 (1944), af'd, 146 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1944), aff'd sub nom. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 457 (1943), rev'd,
146 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
264. See text accompanying notes 15-43 supra.
265. Note, however, the annual limitation on capital losses. I.R.C. § 1211. See also id.
§ 1212(b) (capital loss carryovers). There may, however, be a change from short term capital
loss to long term capital loss.
266. See text accompanying notes 167-231 supra. Note that Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10 will
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intercompany advances are held to be equity, however, there will
often be no technical insolvency and no current worthlessness deduction. Moreover, if the affiliate company does not subsequently
lose more money, the stock, that is, stock and debt-turned-equity,
will not be "wholly worthless" within the meaning of section
165(g)(3). 267 The loss, instead of being ordinary, will thus be
26 8
capital.
Inasmuch as the alternative corporate tax on capital gains is
twenty-eight percent, while the marginal corporate tax rate on ordinary income is forty-six percent, losses that can be offset against
ordinary income are more valuable to the corporate taxpayer than
are losses that can be offset only against capital gains.2 6 9 As a prac-

tical matter, corporations frequently have no capital gains, rendering useless any "deduction" for capital losses.27° The existence or
nonexistence of bona fide intercompany debt therefore takes on
added importance. 1
The Distinctions Between Debt and Equity
The validity of purported debt, whether or not the debt is between related taxpayers, depends on whether the rights of the taxpayer are those of a shareholder or a creditor. In an early case, the
Second Circuit stated the distinction:
have no effect on this result if preferred stock is classified as debt. Although what is labelled
as preferred stock may be treated as debt, the worthlessness of the common, other preferred, and purported preferred will depend on seniority.
267. But see the discussion of partially worthless securities in text accompanying notes
32-43 supra.
268. Liquidation problems in which no loss is recognized are discussed in text accompanying notes 430-50 infra.
269. Section 1211(a) provides that "[i]n the case of a corporation, losses from sales or
exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of gains from such sales or
exchanges." Section 1212(a)(1) allows unused capital losses to be carried back three years,
forward five years, and to be offset against capital gains for those years.
270. But see I.R.C. § 1231, which may characterize net business gains as capital gains.
271. In this regard, a corporate taxpayer should be fully aware of the tax benefits of a
wholly worthless stock deduction. In those situations in which it is unclear whether or not a
corporation will eventually regain solvency, it may be proper for good money to follow bad if
the result will be the corporation's ultimate insolvency. Compare the value of an ordinary
loss deduction on stock having a basis of $1,000,000 in which additional advances of
$100,000, characterized as loans, are lost in order to render the corporate stock "wholly
worthless," with the value of a $900,000 stock loss that is nondeductible because the stock is
not "worthless." The only way this result can obtain, however, is if continuing advances to
the troubled subsidiary are characterized as debt. This problem is more fully explored in
text accompanying notes 395-411 infra.
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1455

[T]he vital difference between the shareholder and the creditor
[is that the] shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the risk, and profits from success. The creditor, in
compensation for not sharing the profits, is to be paid independently of the risk of success, and gets a right to dip into the capital when the payment date arrives."'
In Gilbert v. Commissioner,27 3 the Second Circuit sought to
establish guidelines for review of lower court decisions.
The classic debt is an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain
at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable regardless of the debtor's income or
lack thereof. While some variation from this formula is not fatal
to the taxpayer's effort to have the advance treated as a debt for
tax purposes ...4 , too great a variation will of course preclude
7
2

such treatment.

Lower courts generally resolved the debt-equity issue by ex-

amining various objective factors such as those listed in Gilbert.
Few courts, however, agreed on precisely which factors were objective and what weight should be accorded each factor. As a result,
most courts created their own indicia in an effort to ascertain the
economic reality of the transaction.7 5 More than one commentator
has described this "objective" approach as one in which "courts
are at liberty to arrive at opposite results on identical facts depending upon their own whim as to which factors they wish to
stress.

'276

272. Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935).
273. 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
274. Id. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
275. See Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 Tmxms 4 (1969) (discussion
of at least 38 factors upon which different courts have relied).
In view of this lack of uniformity, it is not surprising that the decision of the trial judge
is a finding of fact that, in most jurisdictions, will be binding on appeal unless "clearly
erroneous." See A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970); Road
Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (4th Cir. 1969); McSorley's, Inc. v.
United States, 323 F.2d 900, 901 (10th Cir. 1963); Diamond Bros. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d
725, 731 (3d Cir. 1963); Charter Wire, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 878, 880 (7th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963); Brake & Electric Sales Corp. v. United States, 287
F.2d 426, 428 (1st Cir. 1961); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959); Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159, 166
(6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957). See also United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)..
276. Weis, The Labyrinth of the Thin Corporation,40 TAxEs 568, 589 (1962). See also
Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation,17 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 771, 811 (1959);
Plumb, supra note 31.
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Section 385
With the enactment of section 385 as part of the 1969 Tax
Reform Act,277 it was thought that the debt-equity area would lose
some of its uncertainty as the Treasury aggressively implemented
the legislative mandate to prescribe regulations.2 7s Despite a number of well-reasoned articles urging standards 27 9 that would have
provided debt-equity safe harbors,28 0 the Treasury did not act until
277. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 412(a) (1969).
278. Section 385 provides:
"(a) AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE REGULATIONS - The Secretary is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest
in a corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness.
"(b) FACTORS - The regulations prescribed under this section shall set forth factors which
are to be taken into account in determining with respect to a particular factual situation
whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists or a corporation-shareholder relationship exists. The factors so set forth in the regulations may include among other factors:
"(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest,
"(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any indebtedness of the
corporation,
"(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,
"(4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation, and
"(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and holdings of the
interest in question."
For the pre-1980 Service view of § 385, even without regulations, see Letter Rulings 8006012
(Nov. 5, 1979), 8002007 (Sept. 24, 1979), 7906001 (Sept. 30, 1979), 7846003 (Aug. 3, 1978).
279. See, e.g., Bordman, Section 385: Classificationof Certain Interests as Stock or
Indebtedness-Proposed Regulations, 23 TAx ExEc. 391 (1970); Plumb, supra note 31;
N.Y.S. Bar Assoc. Tax Section, Recommendations as to Federal Tax Distinction Between
Corporate Stock and Indebtedness, 25 TAX. LAW. 57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971
N.Y.S. Bar Recommendations]; Comment, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1695 (1970).
280. In 1971, the New York State Bar Association Tax Section recommended that an
interest in a corporation be classified as indebtedness if it:
"(1) arose and was paid in the ordinary course of business of both parties; or
"(2) matured in a relatively short period [two years was suggested] and was then paid; or
"(3) met all of the following requirements:
"(i) it took the form of a written unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money on
demand or at a specified date or dates not unreasonably distant with interest at a specified
and reasonable rate; and
"(ii) it was not subordinated to trade creditors; and
"(iii) if it was unsecured and was issued to substantial stockholders, the corporation must
have had either (a) a ratio of total debt to equity of not more than a specified ratio [a fiveto-one ratio was suggested], or (b) projected earnings in excess of a specified multiple [a
multiple of three was suggested] of the total interest expense accrued by the corporation;
and
"(iv) it carried no right- to vote for the election of directors in the absence of default; and
"(v) if it was convertible, the conversion price exceeded the market price at the time of
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March, 1980.281
The Proposed Regulations were a creative and workable response to the debt-equity imbroglio. Yet, in large part because of
their unsympathetic and unnecessarily harsh treatment of nonshareholder debt, the Proposed Regulations were met by a storm
of protest. Criticism was founded on the belief that the Proposals
exceeded the congressional mandate, misinterpreted existing judicial thinking, or simply failed to comprehend commercial business
practice. 282 Some of the criticism was well-founded; some was
28 3
not.
issuance by a specified margin."
1971 N.Y.S. Bar Recommendations, supra note 279, at 60, 64-68.
An interest in a corporation would be classified as stock if:
"(1) it was part of a class of obligations held substantially pro rate by substantial stockholders of the obligor or an affiliated corporation; or
"(2) the maturity date was unreasonably distant; or
"(3) it carried a right to vote for the election of directors other than upon the occurrence of
a default; or
"(4) it provided neither a specified rate of interest nor a reasonable discount in lieu of
interest."
Id. at 61, 68-70.
281. Proposed Regulations under I.R.C. § 385 were published on March 24, 1980. 45
Fed. Reg. 18,957 (1980).
282. A brief history of LR.C. § 385 illustrates some of the problem areas.
Section 385 found its beginnings in the 1969 Tax Reform Act in the Senate Finance
Committee as a complement to the House-proposed § 279. Instead of attempting to legislate
debt-equity guidelines, the Senate Finance Committee elected to authorize the Treasury to
prescribe the appropriate rules for distinguishing debt from equity. S. REP. No. 552, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1969). The five factors enumerated in § 385 were not intended to be
exclusive, appropriate in any specific context, or of greater weight than any other indicia.
Nor was § 279 intended to have any impact on the § 385 rules. Id. at 138-39.
Congress intended by § 385 to delegate an extremely broad authority to the Treasury to
draft rules that determine the tax status of purported debt and equity. The Treasury was
authorized to promulgate regulations having legislative, and not merely interpretive force, to
provide certainty and predictability, and to reduce administrative and judicial burdens
brought about by the case-by-case approach of then-existing law. See notes 275-76 & accompanying text supra. See also Comment, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-The
Debt-Equity Imbroglio and Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARV. L.
R.v. 1695, 1706 (1970) (the discretion delegated by Congress "remains essentially
unfettered").
283. An interesting example of the type of criticism leveled at the Proposed Regulations is the 1980 New York State Bar Association Tax Section Report. See Report on Proposed Regs. § 1.385: The Tax Distinctions Between Corporate Debt and Equity by Committee on Corporations, letter to Commissioner Kurtz (August 22, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
1980 N.Y.S. Bar Report]. It interpreted the grant of rule-making authority narrowly.
"The legislative history persists in referring to the development of 'regulatory guidelines' setting forth 'factors' which are to be 'taken into account.' Such language suggests that
the Regulations were to provide guidelines . . .in making the determinations, and were not
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The final Regulations do not remedy all of the problems of the
proposals. Numerous areas of ambiguity and controversy remain.
In general, instead of adopting a broad approach to eliminate judicial line drawing, the Regulations defer for later consideration a
number of threshold definitions. Thus, the'effect of the criticisms
was to pressure the Treasury into cautiousness. 28 As a consequence, the final Regulations neither apply to all transactions nor
provide guidelines in areas in which a degree of certainty, or presumptive certainty, could have been obtained. Notwithstanding
necessarily intended to prescribe binding or conclusive determinations.
"This ambiguity may provoke litigation in the event the Proposed Regulations are
adopted in their present form, since they do not essentially take the approach of prescribing
any guidelines." Id. at A-7 to A-8.
The threat of this last statement is difficult to comprehend. Is the Report seriously
suggesting that the regulatory scheme could be struck down because it provides conclusive,
rather than presumptive, rules for differentiating debt from equity? If that is the implication, it is erroneous. The authority delegated is to the extent "necessary or appropriate."
The final Regulations accordingly adopt bright-line rules that, except for their greater clarity and ease of administration, do not differ markedly from the approach of the commentators. See note 279 supra.
The Regulations, however, go beyond the congressional mandate in one instance-they
do not merely differentiate between debt and equity. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3, discussed in text
accompanying notes 523-44 infra, provides rules for bifurcating certain shareholder instruments into part debt, part contribution to capital, and part debt, part dividend. These rules
derive their authority from §§ 301, 1232, 7805. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(c). The Treasury
also could have relied on § 305(c). Although these rules could have been placed under other
Code provisions, the Treasury correctly decided to define all instruments under the § 385
Regulations. Notwithstanding their location, the part debt-part equity provisions do not
have the legislative force that attaches to the other § 385 Regulations; they have the force
only of interpretive regulations. See generally Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations
Problem, 54 HARv. L. R.v. 398 (1941). This distinction, however, should make no difference;
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3 is far from a "clearly erroneous" interpretation of the Code. For other
views of the Proposed Regulations, see Beghe, Redrawing the Lines Between Corporate
Debt and Equity Interests: The Proposed Regulations Under Section 385, 58 TAxEs 931
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Beghe]; Gershman, Debt-Equity ProposalsProvide Guidance
But Pose Problems for Small Corporations,53 J. TAx. 194 (1980); Pike, Proposed DebtEquity Regulations: Potent New Standardsfor CharacterizingPurportedDebt, 7 J. CORP.
TAX. 195 (1980).
Substantive criticisms of the Proposed Regulations raised more serious questions. Perhaps the most disturbing issue was the unanticipated effect of the Proposed Regulations on
Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) financing. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service
Hearing on the Proposed Regulations Relating to Treatment of Certain Interests as Stock or
Indebtedness, testimony of Robert F. Zicarelli, William P. Lane, and Robert Bolie (July 23,
1980). The broad reach of the nominal capital and principal shareholder rules would have
effectively eliminated the role of the SBIC. The final Regulations eliminate this problem.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Examples (11) and (12)).
284. The new pro-business, anti-regulatory Administration undoubtedly had a similar
effect.

July 19811

WORTHLESSNESS, DEBT-EQUITY

these problems, the final Regulations are a significant improvement over existing case law.
Scope of the Section 385 Regulations
The final Regulations apply to instruments28 5 and preferred
stock 286 issued after December 31, 1981,87 and to cash advances
and guaranteed loans 288 made subsequent to December 31, 1981.289
The final Regulations also apply to instruments issued prior to
January 1, 1982, the terms of which are changed "sufficiently" subsequent to December 31, 1981 that the change is considered an exchange of instruments,29 0 and to "proportional" instruments, the
terms of which are changed after December 31, 1981.2
The final Regulations are addressed primarily to "instruments, 2 9 2 defined as "any bond, note, debenture, or similar written evidence of an obligation. 29 3 If an obligation is unwritten, the
rules of sections 1.385-1 through 1.385-6 are inapplicable. Certain
unwritten obligations are addressed, however, in Regulation section 1.385-7.1" Interests such as bank deposits, insurance policies,
claims for wages, and trade accounts payable fall outside the Regu285. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(c). See text accompanying notes 523-33 infra.
286. See Tress. Reg. § 1.385-10. See text accompanying notes 668-77 infra.
287. Although the final Regulations under § 385 were to become effective on May 1,
1981, see T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15 (1981), the Treasury postponed the effective date in
order to review comments and consider policy objections. See T.D. 7774, 1981-22 I.R.B. 6.
288. That is, certain cash advances made to corporations. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7. See
text accompanying notes 648-67 infra. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9. See text accompanying
notes 688-95.
289. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(a). The regulations do not apply to instruments issued pursuant to a bankruptcy reorganization plan filed on or before December 29, 1980 Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-1(a)(2)(i), nor to instruments, loans, or preferred stock issued or made pursuant to a
written contract that was binding on December 29, 1980 (Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a)(2)(ii)).
290. 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,439 (1980). Apparently, the failure to pay interest or principal
when due or the fact that the instrument is a demand note bearing an unreasonable rate of
interest will not create a "reissuance." Id.
For those taxpayers who wish the Regulations to apply to previously issued instruments, an exchange of instruments will not constitute an "issuance." Such instruments
would be "sufficiently identical" to preclude application of the reissuance rules. There is,
however, no theoretical bar to a taxpayer election to be governed by the Regulations. A
clarifying amendment on this point would be helpful.
291. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j). See text accompanying notes 630-34 infra.
292. They are also addressed to certain preferred stock that partakes of the attributes
of an instrument. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10. See text accompanying notes 668-77 infra.
293. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(c).
294. See text accompanying notes 648-67 infra.
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lations. 9 5 If an interest or obligation falls outside the scope of the
Regulations, it continues to be governed by existing case law with29 6
out reference to the Regulations.
. An "obligation" is "an interest in a corporation that is treated
as indebtedness under applicable nontax law. ' 29 7 This definition is
far from clear. Aside from the difficulties and uncertainties involved in ascertaining "applicable nontax law," this definition
omits a significant exception found in Proposed Regulation section
1.385-3(d)(1): "[The term 'instrument'] does not include any evidence of an obligation to make a contingent payment of principal
arising from the sale of property to the corporation by an independent creditor . . . ." Thus, if the sole shareholder of X Corporation sold all of his or her stock to Y Corporation for consideration
contingent on future profitability, the Proposed Regulations would
not have applied to the transaction if the shareholder and Y Corporation were unrelated. The rationales for this exception were the
absence of potential for abuse29 8 and the burden of enforcing a
contrary rule.2 9
The final Regulations contain no such exception and, more
surprisingly, do not explain the deletion. One must search the
Temporary Regulations under the new installment sales provision
to discover that language similar to that deleted from the section
385 Regulations is incorporated into the section 453 Regulations.3 00
295. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(b). The Regulations do not define these interests. It would
be proper for the Regulations to define "trade accounts payable" in their ordinary business
usage: short-term obligations acquired for goods or services arising in the ordinary course of
business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(5)(v), quoted at note 561 infra.
296. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(b)(1). To this extent, case law will have a significant and
continuing effect on the debt-equity distinction.
297. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(d).
298. Absence of abuse potential is predicated upon the adversity of interests between
buyer and seller. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b) (fair market value as price at which a willing
buyer and a willing seller would exchange instrument presumes lack of compulsion to buy or
sell on either side); Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (goodwill vs.
covenant not to compete). However, this adversity does not reduce the seller's subsequent
participation in the risks and awards of corporate profits. Theoretically, even an "independent creditor" may hold a hybrid instrument that partakes of a predominant equity flavor.
299. Treating an agreement to make a contingent payment of principal as a "hybrid
instrument" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5, discussed in text at notes 505-21
infra, would create enormous valuation problems.
300. A cross-reference in the I.R.C. § 385 Regulations would be appropriate.
The rules of both the § 385 Regulations and the § 453 Temporary Regulations are consistent with the clearly evidenced intent of Congress in the Installment Sales Revision Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, § 2(a), that even cases where the sales price is indefinite and no
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Temporary Regulation section 15A.453-1(d)(8) provides:
The regulations under Section 385 do not apply to an instrument
(as defined in § 1.385-3(c)) providing for a contingent payment of
principal (with or without stated interest) issued in connection
with a sale or other disposition of property to a corporation if
§ 1.385-6 (relating to proportionality) does not apply to such instrument (or to a class of instruments which includes such
instrument).3 0 1
The proportionality test represents a tradeoff between the opposing principles of allowing contingent sales and treating equityflavored instruments as stock.
Under Regulation section 1.385-5, 02 a hybrid instrument is
defined as an instrument having equity features. An equity feature
is the right to convert the instrument into stock or a right to contingent payments other than a call premium. A hybrid instrument
is treated as stock, regardless of the person to whom it is issued, if
its equity features predominate, that is, if the value of its equity
features exceeds fifty percent of its fair market value. Under this
standard, an instrument providing for wholly indeterminate payments, such as a percentage of sales or production, would be
treated as equity. If the payments were within the range of a
stated minimum and maximum, the instrument's treatment as equity would depend on the range of payments and on the value of
the instrument.3 0 3 Under Regulation section 1.385-6(c),3 04 a hybrid
instrument issued to a shareholder would be treated automatically
as equity if held in proportion to stock ownership.
The section 453 Temporary Regulations avoid the valuation
problems by adopting a bright-line rule. If contingent contractual
payments are made to a proportional shareholder, the contract will
be treated as an equity interest. If the seller is not a proportional
maximum selling price can be determined can qualify for installment reporting.
301. Temp. Tress. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(8) (Example (2)) is a holdover from the independent creditor standard of the § 385 Proposed Regulations. It makes no sense in the
context of the proportionality rule of the final Regulations; that is, the contingent payment
in that Example cannot be treated as an equity interest under the Regulations. In addition,
although the examples specify various circumstances in which interest is or is not stated,
this will be irrelevant under the approach adopted.
302. For a discussion of Tress. Reg. § 1.385-5, see text accompanying notes 505-21
infra.
303. The valuation question would raise significant problems. It illustrates that there
is a practical, as well as a theoretical, incompatibility between §§ 453 and 385.
304. For a discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c), see text accompanying notes 612-14
infra.
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shareholder, the contract will not be characterized under the section 385 Regulations. This rule is a marked improvement over the
"independent creditor" distinction drawn by the Proposed Regulations, which required valuation under Regulation section 1.385-5
whenever a contingent payment was receivable by a shareholder
owning between five percent and fifty percent of the corporation's
stock.
A contingent payment contract will not necessarily be
characterized as debt, however, even though not made to a proportional
shareholder. Temporary Regulation section 15A.453-1(d)(8) provides that if the instrument is not to be tested under the section
385 Regulations, it "will be treated as stock or indebtedness under
applicable principles of law without reference to the regulations
under section 385."s'5 Moreover, several courts have denied debt
status when the purchase price of property was entirely contingent
and payable over a substantial period of time, especially when the
property transferred represented core business assets or the corporate purchaser was otherwise minimally capitalized.s"
The Judicial Approach
The judicial approach to distinguishing debt from equity requires the resolution of three questions: (1) do the formal rights
and remedies of the purported creditor correspond with normal
creditor protections? (2) did the parties genuinely intend to create
a debtor-creditor relationship? (3) was the economic reality of the
transaction consistent with the reasonable risks of a creditor?307
305. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(b)(1). Temp. Tress. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(4) states that
"[ilf the agreement neither specifies a maximum selling price nor limits payments to a fixed
period, a question arises whether a sale realistically has occurred or whether, in economic
effect, payments received are in the nature of rent or royalty income. Arrangements of this
sort will be closely scrutinized." The determination that the arrangement qualifies as a sale
takes into account "all of the pertinent facts, including the nature of the property." Id.
Presumably, custom will be of great significance, so that patents and perhaps copyrights,
which have traditionally been sold for indeterminant percentage payments, will more likely
be accorded sale treatment. This inquiry should be similar to that for differentiating debt
from equity, that is, it seeks to ascertain the bona fides of a transaction.
306. See Knollwood Memorial Gardens v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 764 (1966) (percentage of sales of cemetery lots payable over more than 20 years); Sherwood Memorial Gardens,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 211 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1965) (percentage of
proceeds from resale of cemetery lots payable over 15 years). But see Kensico v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1938) (exempt cemetery). Cf. BirTKER & Eusrca, supra note 70,
3.01, at 3-6 (applicability of I.R.C. § 351 when only securities are received).
307. See Plumb, supra note 31, at 411-12. "Underlying the 'traditional debt-equity'
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The leading cases have listed between eight and sixteen factors to be weighed in determining whether purported debt is to be
treated as debt or equity. 08 The Tax Court framed the ultimate
inquiry as follows, adopting factors somewhat different from those
employed in the leading cases, and relying primarily on the evidentiary factors set out by William Plumb in his seminal article:30 9
"Was there a genuine intention to create a bona fide debt, with a
reasonable expectation of repayment, and did that intention comport with the economic reality of creating a debtor-creditor relationship?"3 10 This test has been relied upon in a number of recent
cases.311

Factors of Hindsight-Form
The formal trappings of a debtor-creditor relationship are usually essential to the creation of valid indebtedness.3 12 Courts have
frequently overlooked the form of a transaction, however, when the
substance has been inconsistent.313 Five factors generally have
criteria is the fundamental notion that a valid debt, for Federal income tax purposes, exists
when there is both a genuine intention that the funds be repaid and also a reasonable expectation based on economic reality that repayment will be made, independent of the success of
the venture to which the funds are supplied." Dataxnation Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. 1092, 1105 (1976).
308. Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972) (13 factors);
A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1970) (11 factors); Fin Hay
Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968) (16 factors); Tomlinson v. 1661
Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1967) (11 factors); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Commissioner,
63 T.C. 790, 796-99 (1975) (13 factors). See Kolkey v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 37, 59 (1956)
(acq.), affl'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958) (8 factors). See also Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAXEs 4 (1969).
309. See Plumb, supra note 31, at 271.
310. Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 377 (1973) (acq.). It
appears that this test will be applied in subsequent Tax Court litigation. See Dungan v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1307 (1977); Johnson v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1780 (1977);
Stevenhagen v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 852 (1975).
311. See, e.g., Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977); Alterman Foods, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1974); Midland Distributors, Inc.
v. United States, 481 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973); Fischer v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 32
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Hall Paving Co. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Bordo
Products Co. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1312 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Litton Business Systems, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367 (1973); Frankel v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 343 (1973); Bixby v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757 (1972); Mennuto v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 910 (1971).
312. See Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 532 (1st Cir. 1976);
Fischer v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
313. See, e.g., Tampa & Gulf Coast R.R. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1393 (1971), afl'd
per curiam, 469 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1972).
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been held to bear on form: maturity date, remedies for default,
lack of subordination to outside
creditors, adequate interest, and
14
provision for repayment.

A fixed or ascertainable maturity date is often perceived as the
most important of the formal factors. 15 Nevertheless, even a demand obligation having no fixed maturity date will be accepted as
evidence of bona fide indebtedness because it has a due date
within the control of the creditor. 1 Similarly, open and revolving
account advances between related taxpayers 31 7 have been upheld
because they gave rise to an enforceable debt obligation.318 The
perceptive taxpayer should recognize, however, that open account
advances are more likely to receive judicial sanction if reduced to
writing and authorized by appropriate corporate action. 319
A factor related to maturity date is the creditor's ability to
compel payment in the event of default. While an agreement to
this effect is not
strictly necessary, it is helpful, and its omission
3 20
fatal.
be
may
Subordination to general outside creditors is a factor that
tends to emphasize equity features.3

21

The majority view is that

314. See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1972);
Plumb, supra note 31, at 411-57.
315. See, e.g., Wood Preserving Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117, 119 (4th Cir.
1965) (purported debt found to be equity mainly because of the absence of "a fixed or ascertainable debt maturity date").
316. Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. United States, 61 T.C. 367, 378 (1973) (acq.).
317. See notes 334-37 & accompanying text infra.
318. Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 291 (6th Cir. 1960); Rowan v. United
States, 219 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1955); American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States,
371 F.2d 842, 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Irbco Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 359, 367 (1966);
Scotland Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 265, 274-75 (1965); Allied Stores Corp. v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. 1149, 1155-56, 1162 (1960). Cf. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 575, 577 (1968) (acq.) (parent corporation's advances constituted indebtedness despite lack of formal evidence, absence of interest, lack of security); C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 649, 655-56 (1968), rem'd for entry of decision in
accordance with compromise agreement of the parties, 406 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1969) (open
account arrangement may be considered indebtedness so long as clearly designed to reflect
"mutually offsetting business dealings based on continuing credit and intermittent, but assumed, repayment"). But cf. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. United States, 611 F.2d 866 (Ct. Cl.
1980) ("advances" by subsidiary to parent were dividends).
319. See Cohen v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 336, 337 (2d Cir. 1945). But see Ray v.
United States, 68-1 U.S.T.C. 9152 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1322 (6th
Cir. 1969).
320. See United States v. South Georgia Ry., 107 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1939).
321. Subordination to specific creditors will not normally cast doubt on debt that is
otherwise bona fide. See, e.g., Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965, 971-72 (Ct. CL.
1968). See also P.M. Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786, 789-90 (3d Cir. 1962);
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subordination, in and of itself, will not be sufficient to support a
finding of de facto equity.3 22 Nevertheless, several cases have indicated that subordinated debt between related taxpayers is similar
to preferred stock.3 23 Consequently, subordination at the time of
corporate formation, 2 ' while perhaps not fatal per se in the majority of jurisdictions, may be fatal in fact.
Provision for the payment of interest is a factor that may
readily indicate whether an obligation most nearly resembles debt
or equity. For example, interest payable at the discretion of the
debtor is similar to a common stock dividend. In addition, interest
contingent on earnings is similar to a preferred stock distribution.
No interest at all suggests that what was characterized as a loan
was actually a contribution to capital. Most cases, however, cannot
be easily categorized. Courts focus instead on whether the interest
charged was reasonable in light of the perceived risks, 23 that is,
whether the interest charged was less than that demanded by
outside creditors. 2 8
Several courts have had to determine "reasonable" interest in
the context of intercompany loans. In general, courts have held
that the purported debt is equity when an outsider would not have
loaned except at a significantly higher interest rate and the rate
paid by the creditor-shareholder on its loans equalled or exceeded
that paid by the debtor-subsidiary. 27 Courts more interested in
Brinker v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 478 (9th
Cir. 1955).
322. See, e.g., Harlan v. United States, 409 F.2d 904, 907-08 (5th Cir. 1969); Kraft
Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1956).
323. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schmoll Fils Associated, 110 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir.
1940); Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 706, 717 (1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir.
1965). See also Letter Ruling 7906001 (Sept. 30, 1979).
324. See R. C. Owen Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. 673, 676 (1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d
410 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966). The problem of midstream subordination is discussed at notes 366-87 infra.
325. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 19P8).
326. See McSorley's, Inc. v. United States, 63-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9231 (D. Colo. 1962), affld,
323 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1963).
327. See McSorley's, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 900, 901 (10th Cir. 1963) (unreasonable for shareholders to charge 4%, without security, when second mortgage financing
was available only at 12%); Wagner Electric Corp. v. United States, 75-1 U.S.T.C.
9471
(Ct Cl. T.J.D. 1975) (interest was reasonable when paid at a rate 2% above prime); Litton
Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 378 (acq.) (1973) (interest was reasonable "in light of the prevailing interest rates in the financial community at that time" when
it was / % above prime and 2 % above that paid by the creditor-shareholder); Motel Corp.
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1433, 1438 (1970) (unreasonable for shareholders to charge 51/2 %
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the overall substance, however, have had no trouble finding other
factors to be of greater significance, even when the rate of interest
was unreasonable. 81
Factors of Hindsight-Intent
If the parties' intent, as manifested by their overt actions, was
to create indebtedness, this intent will be determinative despite
the form of the transaction. As intent can change, unless the parties maintain a consistent approach to the treatment of the purported debt, a court may recharacterize the debt as equity.32

9

Fur-

thermore, even without an explicit finding of changed intent, a
court will often rely on present actions in finding that there was no
initial intent to create a debtor-creditor relationship. Judicial factors that evidence intent in a related taxpayer context include formal documentation, the existence of security, payment history, and
voluntary subordination. 330
Formal documentation has been given almost controlling
weight by some courts.331 A valid debt may exist, however, even
when *noformal debt instrument has been executed.3 2 The validity
when outsiders demanded 13 to 14%); S.P. Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 764, 767
(1968) (no outsider would have loaned at 5%); 2554-58 Creston Corp. v. Commissioner, 40
T.C. 932, 937 (1963) (it was unreasonable for shareholder to charge 10% when outsiders
were asking 18%); Allied Stores Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. 1149, 1155-56 (1960)
(interest was reasonable when it was "normally higher" than that paid by the parent). But
see Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1967) ("That outsiders offer
credit only on prohibitive terms does not transmute a stockholder loan into equity
capital.").
328. See, e.g., Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667, 692 (1965).
329. See discussion of "Factors of Foresight" in text accompanying notes 366-429
infra.
330. See Plumb, supra note 31, at 457-503. An additional factor in gauging intent is
the creditor's failure to enforce payment on default. This factor is discussed in text accompanying notes 388-94 infra.
331. J.S. Biritz Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 1967)
(where the transaction was "not a tax-avoidance scheme nor a mere sham or masquerade,"
the formalities of indebtedness were upheld). Compare Cohen v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d
336, 337 (2d Cir. 1945) (absence of corporate action authorizing creation of the debt) with
Ray v. United States, 68-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9152 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), afl'd per curiam, 409 F.2d
1322 (6th Cir. 1969) (corporate authorization is unnecessary in a closely held corporation).
332. Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960); Rowan v. United States,
219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955); Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d
718 (9th Cir. 1949); American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 857
(Ct. Cl. 1967) ("formal indicia of indebtedness are merely clues to, but not indisputable
proof of, the ultimate fact"); Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 575 (1968)
(acq.).
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of informal debt has been given greater recognition in situations
involving affiliated taxpayers, in which other factors justifiably
have been given preponderant weight.33 3
Courts uniformly have disregarded the absence of formal documentation in cases involving revolving account advances between
related entities.33 4 The same result should hold for open account
advances." 5 The use of "revolving account advances" is a common
conglomerate practice in which cash or supplies are continuously
advanced to subsidiaries and ongoing repayment is automatically
made out of cash flow. This procedure is employed so that the parent, with its higher line of credit and "prime" borrowing ability,
can borrow for the needs of all its businesses, thereby permitting
the performance of each subsidiary to be measured by factors
other than credit-worthiness and the vagaries of local financing.3 3 6
The judicial approach of disregarding formal documentation in
such cases is therefore proper. The transaction can justifiably be
tested by objective economic factors such as rate of interest, voluntary subordination, payment history, conformity with outside creditor practices, and subsequent conduct,33 7 because the parent is
acting as banker for its subsidiaries and repayment is automatic.
A security interest is often strong evidence that a valid debt
was intended 3 3 Its absence in transactions between related enti333. American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 857 (Ct. Cl.
1967); Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 377-78 (1973) (acq.).
334. See Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955); American Processing &
Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Litton Business Systems, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367 (1973) (acq.); C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 649, 655-57 (1968), rem'd for entry-of decision in accordance with compromise agreement of the parties,406 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1969); Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 575 (1968) (acq.); Allied Stores Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. 1149, 1155-56, 1162
(1960). Cf. Jack Daniel Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d 569, 584-85 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(courts, in determining the substance of a given transaction, do not depend upon any one
characteristic as determinative). But cf. Northeastern Consolidated Co. v. United States,
279 F. Supp. 592, 596 (N.D. IMI.1967), af'd, 406 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 819 (1969) (no bona fide debt created by cash advances).
335. See American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 854 (Ct. Cl.
1967) ("the open account... was the product of credits and debits resulting from mutually
advantageous trading").
336. See Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 370 (1973)
(acq.). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7, and text accompanying notes 648-67.
337. For a discussion of subsequent conduct, see text accompanying notes 366-429
infra.
338. Estate of Howes v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 909, 923 (1958) (acq.), aff'd sub nom.,
Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959).
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ties, however, has not given rise to the negative inference that no
debt was intended.
While the absence of taking a security interest on a debt transaction has sometimes been considered as tending to negative a genuine intention to create a debt, the fact that [the taxpayer] had a
100% stock interest in [the debtor-subsidiary] adequately substitutes for an independent security interest, or at least minimizes
the importance thereof.83 9
As a practical matter, it is of little consequence to the creditor-shareholder whether his or her advances are secured or unsecured. Outside creditors either will insist on preference, thereby
compelling the taxpayer to subordinate,4 0 or will accept the creditworthiness of the debtor corporation. In the latter situation, a
shareholder security interest would create no practical difficulties
unless it is excessive. The former situation would, of course, prevent such an arrangement. In either situation, the fact of voluntary
subordination3 41 will weigh against debt treatment if subsequent
events compel a change in status.us Thus, a shrewd taxpayer
should consider securing intercompany debt at the time the advances are made.
Hindsight into repayment history is a valuable objective
method that courts have used to gauge taxpayer intent. Even the
best arrangement of facts will be unavailing if the debtor's payments demonstrate a preference for outside creditors, the cash
needs of shareholders, or internal growth.3 43 As courts ascribe sub-

stantial weight to objective evidence of repayment,

4

a history of

339. Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 381 (1973) (acq.).
See also J. S. Biritz Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 1967);
Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949); American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Malone &
Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 575 (1968) (acq.).
340. For a discussion of subordination, see text accompanying notes 321-24 supra.
341. Alternatives to voluntary subordination, however, are available, and include
shareholder guarantees and indirect loans secured by the shareholder. These alternatives are
explored in text accompanying notes 405-11 infra.
342. See text accompanying notes 350-52 infra. An alternative to subordination is a
shareholder guarantee, which has the same effect, but has less judicial stigma. As a result of
the promulgation of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9, however, it is likely that a guarantee would be
treated by a court as the equivalent of subordination. See Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725, 732 (3d Cir. 1963); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 63-1
U.S.T.C. 9110 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
343. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36, 40 (5th Cir. 1967); John Lizak,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 804, 809 (1969).
344. Timely payment of interest may also be important. Compare United States v.'
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principal and interest payments will likely be accepted as evidence

of debt despite continued advances that increase the year-end balance.3 ' 5 Conglomerates that have adopted the revolving charge account system should be aware that proper record-keeping and
awareness of current financing requirements are elements of a
bona fide
debtor-creditor relationship to be neglected only at great
6
peril.

"

Repayment history may be misleading, however. It is possible
that a "temporary lull" in payments might be deemphasized by a
court more impressed by other factors. 47 Query the effect of nonpayment for a substantial period of time, followed by repayments
of interest arrearages, and then by regular and significant interest
and principal payments.3 8 Although a reasonable expectation of
repayment must have existed at the time the debt was created,s4
there is no justification for overlooking subsequent events that reaffirm such intent.
Voluntary subordination has not been sufficient in and of itself to support a finding that an equity contribution was originally
intended, or to convert admittedly valid debt into an equity advance.3 50 Nevertheless, in many circumstances the effect of suborHenderson, 375 F.2d 36, 40 (5th Cir. 1967) (court found that the purported debt was equity
primarily because of the absence of principal and interest payments) with Tomlinson v.
1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1967) (absence of interest payments not determinative).
See also Gordon Lubricating Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 697, 706, 710 (1965) (payment
of interest a positive factor).
345. See cases cited in note 344 supra.
346. For the proper approach to such an account, see Litton's procedures as outlined
in Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367 (1973) (acq.). Note that the
court did not consider detrimental the suspension of interest and principal payments after
the advances were challenged by the Service. Id. at 380 n.9.
347. See BrrrnR & EusTicE, supra note 70, 1 4.02, at 4-7, at which the authors state
that "hybrid instruments that are held to constitute 'stock' should not necessarily be condemned to permanent equity status, although judicial examples of retransformation into
indebtedness have yet to be found." The § 385 Regulations take the opposite view, stating
that once an instrument or loan is classified as equity, it cannot be reclassified. Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.385-4(b), -7(d). See text accompanying notes 468-73 and 648-60 infra.
348. See Gordon Lubricating Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 697, 706, 710 (1965). But
compare Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 823, 828 (D. N.J. 1966), aff'd,
398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968) (repayment will be unavailing if precipitated by a tax audit)
with Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 1169, 1174-75 (1972), rem'd on
another issue, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974) (tax motivation for repayments did not destroy
debt character).
349. Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 380 (1973) (acq.).
350. See Bullock v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 276, 299 (1956) (acq.), aff'd on other
grounds, 253 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1958). But see McMinn v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. 913, 925
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dination is to relegate prior loans to the status of preferred equity.
A number of courts have so held. 5'
It is difficult to perceive how a trial judge would not be adversely influenced by voluntary subordination. Accordingly, taxpayers should avoid outright subordination by finding means to
obtain the same goal. 52
Factors of Hindsight-EconomicFactors
A court will consider economic factors to determine, by hindsight, whether the shareholder-creditor's advances were placed at
the risk of the enterprise, 3 53 or whether the reliance on the debtor's
ability to pay was reasonable, as shown by the operations of the
debtor.3 54 Economic factors include thinness of capital structure,
use to which the advances are put, source of repayment, and consistency of actions with that of an independent creditor.3 55
At one time, courts and commentators sought a magic debt-toequity ratio that could conclusively identify a debt structure as
reasonable or excessive 56 The present view is that
[t]hin capitalization ... is very strong evidence [of an equity interest] where (1) the debt to equity ratio was high to start with,
(2) the parties understood that it would likely go higher, and (3)
substantial portions of these funds were used for the purchase of
capital assets and for meeting expenses needed to commence
(1962).
351. See, e.g., Watson v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 437, 440 (2d Cir. 1942); Jewell Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. 1048, 1056 (1962), aff'd, 318 F.2d 695 (4th Cir.
1963).
352. For a discussion of practical alternatives, see text accompanying notes 405-11 infra. For a discussion of shareholders acting as guarantors or endorsers, see Lutz, Capital
Formation of Speculative Enterprises, 34 TAXES 420, 423 (1956).
353. Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1962).
354. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. 1048, 1055 (1962), af'd, 318
F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1963).
355. See PLUMB, supra note 31, at 503-38. See also notes 367-429 & accompanying text
infra.
356. E.g., Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXES 830
(1956); Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 17 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 771
(1959); Kramer, Tax Consequences of Inadequate Equity Capital: The Thin Corporation
Problem, 96 J. ACCOUNTANcY 449 (1953); Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporationsand
Shareholders:American Law Institute Tax Project-AmericanBar Association Committee
Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAX. L. REv. 1, 46 (1958); Trevsch, Corporate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Reminders of Some Old Problems Under the New
Code, 32 TAXES 1023 (1954).

WORTHLESSNESS, DEBT-EQUITY

July 19811
operations s357

The second economic factor is the use to which advances are
put. Advances used to purchase core assets resemble a capital investment.3 5 8 Conversely, when advances have been used to finance
operations and to generate their own cash flow for repayment,
courts generally have ruled in favor of debt treatment. 59 In neither
event, however, is the use of advances of sufficient importance to
be determinative of a debt-equity issues60 and this factor probably
has received more attention than it deserves.
The source of debtor repayment was at one time considered a
factor of importance. This is no longer the case. Nevertheless, if it
can be established that an advance was made in contemplation of
repayment out of liquidation proceeds, courts will infer that a capital contribution was intended.361 Courts, however, take a more realistic view of the normal circumstance of repayment out of profits
or cash flow, and rely primarily on factors other than source of
debtor repayment. The test, therefore, is whether at "the. time of
the creation of the advance account . . . it was reasonably ex-

pected that even without an increase in sales the business would
continue to produce
sufficient cash flow and profits to adequately
362
service the debt.
Another economic factor considered by the courts involves a
comparison of the taxpayer's actions with those of a hypothetical
independent creditor. "The acid test of the economic reality of a
purported debt is whether an unrelated party would have extended
357. United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36, 40 (5th Cir. 1967). The absence of such
circumstances, however, would appear to make this factor moot. See Estate of Mixon v.
United States, 464 F.2d 394, 408 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d
291, 299 n.18 (5th Cir. 1967). But see I.R.C. § 385(b)(3). See notes 559-71 & accompanying
text infra.
358. Berkowitz v. United States, 411 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1969); Wood Preserving
Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1965); McSorley's, Inc. v. United States,

323 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1963); Charter Wire, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 878, 880
(7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
359. E.g., Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1955); Malone & Hyde,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 575, 579 (1968) (acq.).
360. Cf. Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'g, 24 T.C.
923 (1955) (choice of equity or debt financing for portion of corporation's operations varies

from corporation to corporation; no particular method of issuance of stock and incurring of
indebtedness can be labeled as "normal").
361. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. United States, 411 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1969); Ram
Corp. v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 831, 834 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
362.

Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 380 (1973) (acq.).
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credit in the circumstances. 3 63 This test is satisfied if "the terms
of the advance account were not a patent distortion of what would
normally have been available to [the debtor-subsidiary] as independent debt financing, but were reasonably comparable to such
debt acquired in an arm's-length transaction."3 64 Thus, the burden
on the taxpayer is to establish, by documentation or expert testimony, the existence of outside financing standards that do not differ markedly from those that were imposed. 6 5
Here again, the astute taxpayer may be able to amass invaluable documentation for debt treatment. "Independent standards"
are not the utopian measures that the phrase implies, but rather
are subjective evaluations of unknowable risks. The taxpayer aware
of this task at an early date ordinarily has little difficulty obtaining
independent estimates of loan conditions that are "reasonably
comparable" to those he or she decides to impose.
Factors of Foresight-MidstreamTransformation
An obligation that has been classified as indebtedness at issuance may be reclassified as equity if the creditor's interest is
placed at the risk of the enterprise. The section 385 Regulations
provide specific situations in which transformation from debt to
equity may occur. When the Regulations are not applicable, 6 similar but more subjective rules provided by existing case law have
continuing vitality.
Initially, it must be realized that debt characterization is not
immutable. Moreover, as one commentator has noted, the debt-equity factors are far from objective standards. 67 Too often a court
"refuses to be bound by prior precedents, relies apparently on an
internal reaction to the 'propriety' of the transaction, and then assembles a combination of previously enunciated standards to sustain its conclusion."36 The taxpayer's behavior during a time of
363. Plumb, supra note 31, at 530.
364. Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 379 (1973) (acq.).
365. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1974). See
note 327 supra.
366. For a discussion of the scope of the § 385 Regulations, see text accompanying
notes 286-306 supra.
367. Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation,17 N.Y.U. INST. FE. TAX.
771 (1959).
368. Id. at 811.
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crisis may have a profound effect on a trial judge.3 69 Accordingly,

once the taxpayer decides to bury the investment and claim a bad
debt or worthless stock deduction, he or she should marshal all
available resources in an effort to create a fact pattern conducive
to a finding of debt.
Substantial precedent exists for treating as equity an advance
that, in earlier years, was apparently valid debt, if subsequent actions demonstrate a change of status.370 Two recent cases illustrate

the possibility of a midstream transformation. 7 1 All previous efforts to establish debt may be undone by actions evidencing an
intent by the taxpayer to protect his or her status as shareholder.
The courts in Cuyuna Realty Co. v. United States37 2 and
Tampa & Gulf Coast Railroad v. Commissioner7 S found the following facts to be of crucial importance in the change of status: (1)
the subsidiary accrued an interest deduction although the parent
did not accrue interest income;374 (2) the parent gratuitously cancelled the purported debt, but attempted to have the subsidiary
make use of the net operating loss carryovers; 375 (3) the subsidiary
369. See Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 1169, 1174-75 (1972),
rev'd, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974).
370. See note 371 infra. See also BnrKR & EUSTICE, supra note 70, 4.02, at 4-7, in
which the authors state that "hybrid instruments that are held to constitute 'stock' should
not necessarily be condemned to permanent equity status." Cf. Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 1169, 1174-75 (1972), rev'd, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974) (subsequent actions led to a finding of debt).
371. Tampa & Gulf Coast R.R. v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1972); Cuyuna
Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 298, 302 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Accord, A.R. Lantz Co. v.
United States, 283 F. Supp. 164, 170 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1970)
("Surely by 1963 and 1964, and I believe sooner, the character of the advances was that of
an [equity] investment."); National Say. & Trust Co. v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 325, 332
(D.D.C. 1968); Sayles Finishing Plants, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 214, 217, 220-21 (Ct.
CL 1968) ("Even if the disputed bonds had been valid indebtedness at their inception, subsequent conduct of the parties belie their status as debt in the taxable years here involved."); W.B. Killhour Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. 855, 862-67 (1973); Hollenbeck v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 740, 749 (1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 2 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Whatever
character the advances may have had at the time of their making, they had become irrevocably committed to the enterprise by October 28, 1961. They were then equity, and entirely
at the risk of the business.").
372. 382 F.2d 298 (Ct. CL.1967).
373. 469 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1972).
374. 382 F.2d at 300; 469 F.2d at 264. See notes 412-29 & accompanying text infra.
375. 382 F.2d at 300. See Natbony, Twice Burned or Twice Blessed-Double Deductions in the Affiliated CorporationContext, 6 J. CoRP. TAX 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Natbony]. But see I.R.C. § 108, as amended by the Bankruptcy Tax Reform Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 3389 (1980). Note, however, that the stock-for-debt
exception retains vitality. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Capento Secs. Corp., 140 F.2d 382 (1st
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had become hopelessly insolvent at a prior date and there was no
reasonable prospect that the advances would be repaid;"7 6 (4) the
parent failed to force the subsidiary into bankruptcy;37 7 (5) the

subsidiary was in arrears in the payment of interest and had made
no recent repayments of principal;37 8 (6) the debt-equity ratio had
climbed to more than 300 to 1;379 (7) income and cash flow were

insufficient to make payments on the advances.380
Other courts faced with less extreme facts have not reached
the same conclusion. They have bifurcated the advances, holding
that those made prior to the date that recovery became hopeless
were valid debts and those made subsequent to that date were capital contributions.381 The problem remains in discerning at what
point a court would be likely to reach the extreme conclusion of
midstream transformation.
The threshold question is whether substance and form have
been consistent. If it appears that the taxpayer's primary motive
was other than to protect his or her advances, a court may rely on
the taxpayer's most recent conduct as evidence of a shareholder's
intent to maximize profits. Thus, post-insolvency actions will be
subjected to intense scrutiny, especially if the taxpayer has structured the transaction to maximize his or her after-tax income.
Awareness of this risk is essential. A taxpayer should be content
with mere bifurcation if such scrutiny reveals actions inconsistent
38 2
with a creditor's concern for protecting his or her advances.
It is difficult to see how a court could find a change of intent if
the parties have merely continued advances subsequent to insolCir. 1944). But see I.R.C. § 108(e)(8).
376. 382 F.2d at 299-300, 302; 469 F.2d at 264.
377. 382 F.2d at 300, 302 ("no attempt was made to enforce payment of the obligations"); 469 F.2d at 264. See notes 388-94 & accompanying text infra.
378. 382 F.2d at 300, 302 (minimal annual interest payments had been made); 469
F.2d at 264 (the subsidiary had not made interest payments for 30 years and the principal
had been overdue for 7 years).
379. 382 F.2d at 299-300, 302.
380. Id. at 302.
381. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc. v. Smith, 59-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9322 (E.D. Pa.
1959); C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 649, 659-60 (1968) (acq.);
Scotland Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 265, 277 (1965); Funk v. Commissioner, 35
T.C. 42, 50 (1960); Bihlmaier v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 620, 626 (1951). Cf. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930) (approximation of proper amount of deduction for
business expense is proper).
382. See cases cited in note 381 supra.
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vency.3 8 3 Continued advances coupled with (1) an unwillingness to
make demand for payment, 84 (2) an effort, unaffected by a business rationale, to maximize tax benefits, 85 and (3) the use of cash
flow and income to satisfy outside liabilities (that is, de facto subordination), 8 6 however, would provide a court with adequate support for a finding of de facto equity.
The converse is also true. When the actions of the parties
evince an initial intent to create an equity interest, subsequent acthe character of the advances, "recreating" a creditions may alter
38 7
tor interest.
A taxpayer whose related corporation has become insolvent
would thus do well to order his or her affairs so that a court will
find neither an overall intent to create an equity interest nor subsequent actions to support a changed intent. Such ordered behavior may even permit a court to justify a transformation of equity to
debt.
Factors of Foresight-Failureto Enforce on Default
In the event of a default, a creditor must decide whether and
when to make a demand for repayment. A creditor's failure to enforce its rights upon default will, in general, weigh against the existence of bona fide indebtedness. 8 8 If refraining from demand is
likely to result in a turnaround, making more funds available for
debt retirement, 8 9 no adverse inference will be drawn. Similarly,
383. However, a court may well find that these advances were capital contributions.
See notes 395-411 & accompanying text infra. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f), discussed in
notes 623-29 & accompanying text infra.
384. See notes 389-94 & accompanying text infra. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k) and
(1), discussed in notes 635-47 & accompanying text infra. The taxpayer should not forget the
many cases that have resolved the debt-equity issue in favor of equity treatment by relying
on subsequent events to tip the scales, and then assembled "a combination of previously
enunciated standards to sustain [the] conclusion." Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin
Incorporation,17 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 771, 811 (1959).
385. See text accompanying notes 394-95 infra.
386. See notes 395-96 & accompanying text infra. De facto subordination would
clearly be a "change in terms" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)(2): "subordination (however effected) . . . is ordinarily a substantial change [in terms]." (Emphasis
added.)
387. See note 370 & accompanying text supra. But see note 334 & accompanying text
supra.
388. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408, 418-19 (1954), aff'd, 236
F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
389. See, e.g., Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667, 690 (1965).
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no demand need be made if the purpose of the extension is to obtain a more favorable market for the assets and prompt demand
would havoc the corporation. 90 Indeed, extensions for bona fide
business reasons have been sanctioned in numerous cases. 91
The taxpayer who has deducted debt as partially worthless,
and stock as wholly so, however, walks a fine line. The taxpayer
cannot argue the hope for a turnaround without also suggesting
that the corporation retains potential value. Potential value, however, belies worthlessness.
The taxpayer therefore must rely on more fundamental reasons for the failure to act. He or she may assert the need to maintain a costly yet necessary source of supply. 9 2 The taxpayer may

be required or compelled 93 to maintain the subsidiary as a single
unit in order to find a willing buyer. 94 On the other hand, he or
she may merely need time to choose the proper course of action.
A significant problem in circumstances of bona fide extensions
is to convince a court in subsequent litigation that the taxpayer's
motives were pure. There is no easy resolution. Tax counsel must
press the client for the reason for perpetuating a corporation that
is hopelessly insolvent. If perpetuation is for tax incentives alone
and not for a business rationale, the taxpayer should be apprised
of the risks and urged to follow an alternative course.
A record of the decision-making process must be maintained
to establish the business reasons for failure to make demand.
Counsel should suggest that a committee be formed to consider alternatives pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors. Minutes documenting the rationale for extension and excusing the delay between worthlessness and demand occasioned by the
decisionmaking process will then be available for use in discussions
with the Service and before a court. Periodic reassessment is also
advisable.
390. E.g., Bordo Products Co. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1312, 1325 (Ct. CL 1973).
391. See, e.g., Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (capital
improvements); Leach Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 563, 577 (1958) (war contracts).
392. See Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). See notes 44-76
& accompanying text supra.
393. A requirement might exist pursuant to an antitrust divestiture order.
394. This might occur when the sum of a corporation's assets are worth more as a
going concern than as individual units.
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Factors of Foresight-Advances Continuing After Insolvency
Once a valid business decision is made to forbear demand, the
taxpayer must decide whether and in what form additional
financial support will be given. The primary consideration in the
decision is whether business needs warrant additional capital. Tax
considerations, however, should not be overlooked, especially when
the tax risks may be effectively minimized by reasonable foresight.
Indeed, taxpayers blind to the tax consequences of efforts to avoid
financial ruin may manage to prevent one financial calamity only
to cause another.
The lowest risk situation is that in which post-insolvency advances are made that generate income and cash flow. Such income
will not affect the character of the advances, but will defeat the
claim for worthless stock and bad debt losses because potential
value likely remains.9 5 This possibility need not concern the taxpayer, because the financial benefits of a revitalized investment
will normally outweigh the lost tax refund. Moreover, only timing
will be affected if hindsight reveals an improper worthlessness
deduction. 9 6
A more problematic situation arises when the advances either
maintain the status quo, that is, they neither produce gain nor accelerate loss, or are absorbed as operating expenses with no possibility of recoupment. Advances may not be denied debt status and
may not taint prior loans if made with an intent to protect one's
creditor position, either by minimizing losses and thereby avoiding
involuntary bankruptcy,39 7 or by enabling the corporation to at
least break even.3 8 Evidence of such intent, perhaps in the form of
projections of corporate performance, must be present at the time
the advances are made.3 99
The decision to continue advances after insolvency can be explained simply. The creditor-shareholder has either a business mo395. It is possible, however, for the corporation to be so hopelessly insolvent or for
potential income to be so insignificant that continuing advances would not defeat a worthlessness claim. See note 398 infra and note 248 supra.
396. But see notes 719-32 & accompanying text infra.
397. This might result, for example, in a sale of assets for less than their real value as
a going enterprise.
398. George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 935, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1956);
Old Dominion Plywood Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 678, 700 (1966).
399. See George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 935, 940 (Ct. Cl.
1956).
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tivation or an interest in revitalizing his or her investment. If the
former, justification for ordinary loss treatment can often be
found. If the latter, continuing direct advances can produce only
disaster,4 0 0 and an alternative course of action ought to be recommended to avoid tax problems.
A creditor-shareholder may nonetheless wish to assume the
risks of a midstream transformation or a disallowance of worthlessness deductions in an attempt to protect a substantial investment.
After all, absent additional adverse factors, a midstream transformation is remote and a worthlessness deduction merely a matter of
timing. °1
It is universally recognized that an advance made without reasonable expectation of repayment cannot create valid indebtedness. 40 2 The fact that prior advances have been charged off as
worthless constitutes virtually conclusive evidence that such expectation was lacking. 40 3 In some situations, post-insolvency advances
may also taint prior loans, especially if made under similar procedures, such as open or revolving charge accounts.0 4 The result can
be devastating.
It was once thought that capital contributions could be converted into valid indebtedness by a simple technique: obtain debt
financing through an outside lender and then guarantee payment.
When payment on the guarantee is demanded and no contribution
from the debtor is forthcoming, payment by the guarantor will produce a bad debt deduction.40 5
Courts, however, have been perceptive in following this sleight
400. See Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1963).
401. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that insolvency advances lacking a business
rationale can never achieve true debt status. The most that can be hoped for is that sufficient dust can be raised to blot out substance, leaving the Service (and the courts) to attempt to follow the transaction's hazy form. At worst, the continuing advances will be
treated as capital contributions and as a factor in negating the shareholder's intent to create
valid indebtedness.
402. American Cigar Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 425, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290
U.S. 699 (1933).
403. Dodd v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 570, 578 (4th Cir. 1962); Reading Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 306, 310 (3d Cir. 1942); Bihlmaier v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 620, 626 (1951).
404. See Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725, 732 (3d Cir. 1963); Gilbert
v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1959); Southeastern Aviation Underwriters v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 412, 425 (1966). See note 371 supra.
405. See Lutz, Capital Formation of Speculative Enterprises, 34 TAxMs 423 (1956).
The same result would presumably occur for payments made directly by a parent to its
subsidiary's creditors.
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of hand. "[TIhe 'traditional debt-equity principles' which determine whether a direct advance-in the form of a loan-constitutes
a loan or a contribution to capital also determine whether an indirect advance-in the form of a loan guarantee-similarly constitutes a loan or a contribution to capital." 40 6 Moreover, these principles are applied at the time the guarantee is entered into, not at
the time the guarantor performs on the obligation. °7 Consequently, a guarantee entered into after the date of insolvency will
result in a contribution to capital, or treatment as a separate class
of equity, upon performance. This rule, however, does not foreclose
the possibility of an ordinary loss deduction for the continuing advances under other statutory provisions. Thus, several avenues of
planning are open to taxpayers with the foresight to structure a
business rationale for the guarantee, direct advance, or direct payment to a creditor of the subsidiary.
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Only those expenses ordinary and
necessary to the taxpayer's business and incurred with no intent to
seek repayment are deductible under section 162. A section 162 deduction, therefore, is unaffected by worthlessness considerations.
Thus, a deduction has been allowed for payments made to protect
or promote a taxpayer's business,0 8 to protect the taxpayer's position as a creditor,0 9 and to protect or preserve a source of supply.4 10 It will be impossible to establish a business purpose, how406. Datamation Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1092, 1105 (1976) (citing
Santa Anita Consol. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968)); Plantation Patterns, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 817, 825 (1970), af'd, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1076 (1972). See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9, discussed in text accompanying notes 688-95
infra. See also Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 794 (D. Or. 1965), rev'd,
378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967).
407. Datamation Servs. Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1092, 1105 (1976); Santa
Anita Consol. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968). See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9.
408. Payments made to outside creditors at the time the debtor was being liquidated
were held to be ordinary and necessary business expenses in Allen v. Commissioner, 283
F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1960), in which they were made "to protect the reputation and credit
standing" of the payer's business. Accord, Frazier v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 951, 963-65
(1975); Santa Anita Consol. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 561 (1968) (payment on a guarantee was a business expense motivated by a desire to protect the taxpayer's business reputation and was deductible under I.R.C. § 162).
409. See George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 935 (Ct. Cl. 1956);
Old Dominion Plywood Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 678, 700 (1966). See also Christie
Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 498 (1969).
410. Payments made directly by a parent to its subsidiary were held deductible when
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ever, if the taxpayer has taken the position that the "advance" will
be repaid. An expectation of repayment is inconsistent with an intent to incur an expense.4 1 1
Factors of Foresight-Accrualof Interest After Insolvency
The failure to act consistently as debtor and creditor can be
strong evidence of an intent to expose an "advance" to equity risk.
The evidence of shareholder intent can become decisive when it
can be established that the motivation to act was tax avoidance.
This may arise when a taxpayer accrues a bad debt loss, in whole
or in part,412 forbears from demand for repayment, and does not
accrue and report as income interest on the liability that its subsidiary is accruing and deducting. This practice reduces the tax
burden of the related group and may be interpreted as a tax avoidance scheme.413
they "were made to maintain and preserve this source of supply and were clearly a business
necessity." Fishing Tackle Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 638, 644 (1957) (acq.). See
also Metro Land Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 263 (1981) (payments that enhance business borrowing ability to avert financial crisis).
411. Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 719-22 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Datamation Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
1092, 1105 (1976).
412. When a partially worthless bad debt is charged off, the creditor ceases to accrue
interest income on the worthless part, but continues to report as income interest due and
owing on the part that may be collected. If interest on the non-charged-off part of the debt
is never paid, the amount of the unpaid interest increases the outstanding indebtedness, and
may thereby provide an additional cushion of bad debt to prevent the debtor from regaining
solvency; thus, it may aid the taxpayer in obtaining an eventual ordinary loss deduction for
wholly worthless stock under I.R.C. § 165(g)(3). Determination of proper accrual of interest
income is made on the basis of the "reasonable expectancy" of payment (Corn Exch. Bank
v. United States, 37 F.2d 34, 34 (2d Cir. 1930))-a question of fact and often conjecture.
The charge-off of partial bad debts is discretionary and may constitute some evidence of the
reasonable expectation of repayment by the creditor, especially if founded on documented
cash flow projections. Because of these two factors, it may often be in the creditor-parent's
interest, and within its power, to eschew a present partial bad debt deduction, or claim a
smaller one, in favor of a later deduction and a present increase in the outstanding debt.
413. Prior to 1981, even if the subsidiary earned no income with which to offset the
interest deductions and thereby incurred a net operating loss, the net operating loss carryover could have been availed of by a revitalization with fresh assets. This aspect of the
"double deduction" problem is discussed in Natbony, supra note 375. This device has been
mostly eliminated by enactment of I.R.C. § 108. But note that the stock-for-debt exception
retains vitality. But see I.R.C. § 108(e)(8). It should be noted that the effect of a double
deduction also can be obtained by inconsistent accrual when income is available to the subsidiary to offset the deduction.
If the subsidiary's indebtedness is not worthless, income would be accrued by the parent; if the interest is not paid, it is added to the amount of the outstanding debt. Treas.
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"Inconsistent" accrual treatment can bear heavily on the validity of purported loans. In Tampa & Gulf Coast Railroad v.
Commissioner,""the Fifth Circuit found this factor to be of overriding importance. 15 Other courts in similar inconsistent accrual
situations have found purported debt to be equity without specific
reliance on this factor. 1 6 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume
that in those cases this factor had a negative impact on the courts'
view of creditor intent.
Cases addressing inconsistent accrual nevertheless provide
substantial support for inconsistent accrual treatment, even between related entities. The rule on the accrual of interest income is
that an accrual basis creditor need not accrue and report as income
"that which is not received during the taxable year and in all
probability will not be received within a reasonable time thereafter.'' 17 To constitute income, the creditor must have a "reasonable
418
expectancy" of receiving the interest.
The majority rule on the accrual of interest deductions is that
interest on bona fide indebtedness is accruable and deductible
even "when the financial condition of the corporation is such that
there is no reasonable expectancy that it will pay the accrued in420
terest in full."' 419 In Pearlman v. Commissioner,'
however, the
Tax Court held that accrual of interest deductions is improper
when it is not reasonable to conclude that payment will ever be
Reg. §§ 1.166-1(e), -6(a)(2). The interest-cum-debt may thereafter be charged off as a bad
debt loss. As the subsidiary's accrued interest deduction has previously been used either to
offset items of income or to contribute to the creation of a net operating loss, it is easy to
see how a single deduction has been turned into a double deduction.
414. 469 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1972).
415. Id. at 264.
416. See note 371 supra.
417. Corn Exch. Bank v. United States, 37 F.2d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 1930). Compare GreerRobbins Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 92, 93 (9th Cir. 1941) with W.H. Langley & Co. v.
Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1297, 1302-03 (1931).
418. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 989, 996 (1958), appeal dismissed,
114 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1958). See also Harmont Plaza, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 632,
650 (1975).
419. Rev. Rul. 70-367, 1970-2 C.B. 37. Accord, Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 393 (5th
Cir. 1955) ("interest legally owed is deductible by an insolvent accrual basis taxpayer");
Keebey's Inc. v. Paschal, 188 F.2d 113, 115 (8th Cir. 1951); Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'g 45 B.T.A. 1041, 1045 (1941); Cuyuna
Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 298, 301 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see Panhandle Ref. Co. v.
Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 651, 656 (1941) (examination of the effect of a debtor's precarious
financial condition).
420. 4 T.C. 34 (1944), aft'd, 153 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946).
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made.421 Pearlman affirmed the position taken by the Tax Court in
Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner,422 despite Zimmerman's
reversal by the Eighth Circuit. 423

Other courts have not adopted

the Pearlmanview, although some acceptance can be found among
424
commentators and in dicta.
A thorny problem is thus presented when the debtor-subsidiary is insolvent and the creditor-parent has taken a bad debt deduction. 425 "Inconsistent" accrual treatment, while perhaps justifi-

able under precedent, is certain to result in judicial scrutiny, if not
censure. Those taxpayers unafraid of scrutiny on the issues of
debt-equity and change of intent may attempt the "extra deduction" route. The majority of taxpayers, however, would be better
advised to adopt the position taken by the Tax Court in Cohen v.
Commissioner42e and the Fifth Circuit in Tampa & Gulf Coast
Railroad.417 If a bad debt has been charged off as worthless, the
debtor-subsidiary should eschew the accrual of interest deductions
that stand no reasonable likelihood of payment. Such restraint will
permit a position consistent with the non-accrual of interest income by the creditor-parent.4 2 8 The creditor-parent should make

it clear in writing, however, that it in no way intends to release the
debtor from its obligation to pay interest or from its underlying
obligation on the loan.429
421. Id. at 54. See also Rodman v: Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. 1307, 1318 (1973), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976); Cohen v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 855
(1954) (acq.); Brainard v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1180, 1184 (1946), rem'd, 47-2 U.S.T.C.
9306 (7th Cir. 1947).
422. 45 B.T.A. 1041 (1941), rev'd, 130 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942).
423. Id.
424. See Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 410 (5th Cir. 1969);
Guardian Inv. Corp. v. Phinney, 253 F.2d 326, 334 n.12 (5th Cir. 1958); Holland, Accrual
Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 MICH. L. REv. 149, 172-79 (1949).
425. No such problem exists, however, in those situations in which consolidated returns re filed. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-13(b)(1), -19(b)(2)(iii), -32, -33.
426. 21 T.C. 855 (1954) (acq.).
427. 469 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 56 T.C. 1393 (1971).
428. This position also appears to produce the "proper" tax result, a factor that courts
in future cases may find of overpowering importance.
429. A court faced with this situation should rule in favor of consistency. The Eighth
Circuit decision in Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942),
should be overruled. The decision has no rational basis in tax theory and serves no legitimate purpose. Moreover, the Zimmermani Steel line of cases should be overruled to eliminate the possibility of an unwarranted tax windfall in the related taxpayer context. See
notes 419-24 & accompanying text supra.
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The Effect of Equity Characterization
A finding of de facto equity will preclude a deduction under
section 166. Moreover, no worthless stock deduction will be allowed under section 165(g)(3) unless the equity is, in fact, "wholly
worthless."4 3 0 Equity securities can become wholly worthless in two
situations only: - (1) when no assets remain after expenses are
paid 43 1 and outside liabilities are satisfied, or (2) when the debtturned-equity is characterized as a preferred stock interest and
such "preferred stock" absorbs the remaining assets.43 2 The former
situation presents no difficulty. The latter requires some
discussion.
Assume a situation in which a creditor-parent owns all of the
stock s and holds all of the debt of its subsidiary. The stock has
recently become worthless within the meaning of section 165(a).
The parent, relying on the validity of its debt, takes a worthless
stock deduction for the taxable year in issue. In addition, the parent directs its subsidiary to sell its assets and transfer the cash
proceeds in full satisfaction of the intercompany indebtedness '43 in
order to avoid the potential problems that an outright sale of the
corporation might involve.43 5 Thereafter, the corporate entity is
dissolved. 3 6
If, in subsequent litigation, the purported debt is held to have
been a contribution to capital, which increased the parent's stock
basis in the subsidiary, then the question arises of the effect to be
given the purported "satisfaction of intercompany indebtedness."
430. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. But see notes 44-76 & accompanying
text supra.
431. See text accompanying notes 135-64, supra.
432. See, e.g., Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 660 (1941).
433. Assume one class of common stock, with no preferred stock issued or outstanding.
434. The remaining debt may be cancelled to set the stage for a "double deduction."
See Natbony, supra note 375. But see I.R.C. § 108.
435. A sale of stock is not possible if the debt is valid, because a bona fide creditor
would not permit the assets that serve as his security to be sold without the proceeds being
used to satisfy his obligations. In such circumstances, an independent creditor would be
most likely to demand payment and compel a sale of assets. There also may be a contingent
liability problem.
436. The corporate shell may be kept alive in order to "revitalize" the subsidiary and
thereby make use of its net operating loss carryovers. See Textron, Inc. v. United States,
418 F. Supp. 39 (D.R.I. 1976), aft'd, 561 F.2d 1023 (1st Cir. 1977). But see LR.C. § 108. It
may also be kept alive nierely so that state incorporation costs need not be duplicated
should there be a future need for a corporate shell.
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The Service has prescribed liquidation treatment in such debtturned-equity situations. 43 7 The Service's position finds support in
Treasury Regulations, 4 8 which recognize a "status of liquidation"

"when the corporation ceases to be a going concern and its activities are merely for the purpose of winding up its affairs, paying its
debts, and distributing any remaining balance to its shareholders.' 4s9 Liquidation treatment in the debt-turned-equity situation
is also consistent with the general rule that a distribution on stock
is treated as a liquidation.
A section 332 liquidation will thus occur 440 when a subsidiary
distributes cash 44 1 to its parent "in cancellation or redemption of

all stock of the dissolved corporation." If the liquidating distribution is in respect of preferred stock with a liquidation preference
greater than that of the cash distribution, however, section 332442will
not apply because not "all stock" was cancelled or redeemed.

It

may be critical, then, to determine whether debt-turned-equity will
be treated as a contribution to capital or as a preferred class of
437. See Brief for Defendant at 22-23, Wagner Elec. Corp. v. United States, 75-1 U.S.
T.C. 1 9471 (Ct. CL T.J.D. 1975).
438. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(c).
439. Id. A liquidation may be completed prior to the actual dissolution of the liquidating corporation. Legal dissolution of the corporation, however, is not required. Id. Amounts
distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation are treated as full payment in exchange
for the stock. I.R.C. § 331(a)(1). There is no recognition of gain or loss by an affiliated
corporation on the receipt of property distributed in complete liquidation of another affiliated corporation. I.R.C. § 332; Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(a).
It is unclear whether Treas. Reg. § 1.331-2(c) is correct in ignoring the transfer of stock.
If the shareholders intend to maintain their equity in the corporation, it is difficiult to see
why the liquidation rules ought to apply. See Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F.2d 691 (W.D. Ky.
1925), aff'd per curiam, 13 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 721 (1926). Thus, if
the corporate shell is to be revitalized, the result should be that a distribution is made on
the stock, producing a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits. (This would result in
the retention of corporate attributes in the shell and a dividends-received deduction equal
to the full amount of the distribution. I.R.C. § 243.) Conversely, if an intent exists to wind
up the corporate existence, the result should be liquidation treatment. It therefore may be
wise to plan to reuse the corporate shell.
440. Section 332(b) has three requirements: (1) 80% stock ownership; (2) a plan of
complete liquidation; and (3) the distributions in complete liquidation must occur within a
three year period. On the specific conditions of § 332(b), see BITTKER & EUSTicE, supra note
70, at 11.41.
441. Cash is "property" for purposes of § 332(a); an all-cash distribution falls within
the purview of a property distribution. Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 970
(6th Cir. 1945); International Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 678 (1948), aff'd per
curiam, 175 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1949); Rev. Rul. 69-379, 1969-2 C.B. 48.
442. Commissioner v. Spaulding Bakeries, Inc., 252 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1958), af'g
27 T.C. 684 (1957) (nonacq.).
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1485 "

stock.4 "
Few cases have addressed whether shareholder advances found
to constitute equity contributions qualify as a second class of
stock. Those few cases are divided on the issue, although a majority holds that the advances are a second class of stock in the nature of a preferred interest. 44 Shareholder intent is the critical inquiry. If the shareholder's intent, as evidenced by overt actions
and the economic reality of the transactions, were to create an interest superior to that of a common stockholder, then the advances
would be treated as preferred stock." 5 Thus, the closer a taxpayer
comes to creating valid indebtedness, the greater the likelihood
will be that, in the event debt characterization is denied, a court
will characterize the debt-turned-equity as a second class of stock
entitled to a preference on liquidation.4 6
The new section 385 Regulations treat all debt-turned-equity
as preferred stock "for all purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code." 447 Even though the Regulations have prospective application only, the likely effect of this provision will be judicial adoption
of a senior preferred stock rule.448 The section 385 Regulations not-

withstanding, the facts of a particular case may lead a court to
conclude that the advances should be treated as a contribution to
capital. The result would be no recognition of loss on the liquidating distribution.4 ' 9 Instead, the parent would inherit the subsidi443. See note 437 supra.
444. See Piedmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 1344, 1349 (1966), reu'd on
other grounds, 388 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1968); Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 635,

649 (1965), af'd, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Sherwood
Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 211, 230 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir. 1965); Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 706, 717 (1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th
Cir. 1965). But see Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. 1048, 1056 (1962),

aff'd, 318 F.2d 695, 699 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Byerlyte Corp. v. Williams, 170 F. Supp. 48,
62-63 (N.D. Ohio 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960); Estate of
Allison v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 174, 178 n.2 (1971) (citing cases in support of findings

against the Commissioner's arguments for a second class of stock disqualifying Subchapter
S status).
445. This inquiry parallels the inquiry into debt-equity characterization. See notes
272-75 & accompanying text supra.
446. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(a) (defining "preferred stock"); Walter, 'Preferred
Stock' and 'Common Stock': The Meaning of the Terms and the Importance of the Distinction for Tax Purposes, 5 J. CoRP. TAx 211, 214-16 (1978) (discussing the definition of
"preferred stock" in the regulations).
447. Trees. Reg. § 1.385-4(c). See note 468 and accompanying text infra.
448. Trees. Reg. § 1.385-1(a).
449. LR.C. § 332(a). See also I.R.C. § 337(c)(2)(A) (§ 337 nonrecognition will not apply
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ary's tax attributes pursuant to sections 334(b)(1) and 381.
An advance that is held to be a second class of stock in the
nature of a preferred interest, however, will qualify for section 332
treatment if the distribution exceeds the value of the debt-turnedpreferred. If the distribution does not exceed the value of the preferred, then the common stock will be wholly worthless within the
meaning of section 165(g)(3) and the loss on the preferred stock
will fall within the definition of complete liquidation. The character of the loss on the preferred stock will be determined under section 331.450

Section 385
Interests

Regulations-Post-December

31,

1981

All non-hybrid "instruments, 451 that is, "straight debt instruments," 452 are treated generally as debt under the Regulations. Instruments and certain obligations that contain equity features that
if the basis of the property distributed pursuant to § 332 is determined under § 334(b)(1)).
Note, however, that if § 332 does not apply because of the existence of debt-turned-preferred stock, § 337 may automatically apply to defeat the recognition of loss incurred by the
subsidiary on the sale of assets.
450. Section 331 prescribes artificial exchange treatment for any distribution in a complete liquidation. Thus, the nature of preferred stock as a capital asset or not determines
whether the loss is capital or ordinary. The author can suggest two means of obtaining ordinary loss treatment: (1) if the investment is a Corn Products asset, see Corn Prod. Ref. Co.
v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Midland Distrib., Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730
(5th Cir. 1973); see also Javaras, supra note 59; or (2) if stock is that of an "affiliate,"
especially an affiliate in a consolidated group. See S. REP. No. 1530, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1970) (affiliates are "closely enough related, in effect, to treat them as one operating business"). The loss under § 165(g)(3) was regarded as "a loss of part of the business of the
parent corporation." Id. (referring to the 1971 amendments to I.R.C. § 165(g), Pub. L. No.
91-687, 84 Stat. 2071 (1971)). See Textron, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 1023, 1027 (1st
Cir. 1977) (Bownes, J., dissenting). See also Javaras, supra,note 59, at 790-92. See notes 4850 & accompanying text supra. Although the latter offers a novel approach to the problem,
further exploration of this concept is justified, see Javaras, supra note 59 at 790-92; see also
notes 44-76 and accompanying text supra, and adoption of such a position before the Service may provide the added measure of government uncertainty to produce a favorable
compromise.
451. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(d) defines an "instrument" as "any
bond, note, debenture, or similar written evidence of an obligation." An "obligation" is "an
interest in a corporation that is treated as indebtedness under applicable nontax law."
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(e). See notes 285-301 & accompanying text supra.
452. A "straight debt instrument" is "any instrument other than a hybrid instrument." Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(f). Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(e) defines a "hybrid instrument" as
"an instrument that is convertible into stock or one (such as an income bond or a participating bond) that provides for any contingent payment to the holder (other than a call
premium)."

July 19811

WORTHLESSNESS, DEBT-EQUITY

demonstrate a probability that the holder may act or is acting
more like a shareholder than a creditor, on the other hand, are
treated as stock."3
Straight debt instruments not held by shareholders are never
treated as stock. This sharply departs from the nominal capitalization rules of the Proposed Regulations, which would have treated
as equity all instruments issued by. a corporation having a debt-toequity ratio greater than ten to one.45 The final Regulations retreat from the position of the Proposed Regulations in order "not
[to] interfere with the normal operations of small business investment companies, commercial lenders or other independent creditors. '4 55 The retreat is proper because an independent creditor
who, in contrast to theoholder of a hybrid instrument, has no contingent equity interest, would be concerned primarily, if not solely,
with preserving his or her debt position. Consequently, the independent creditor's intent would be unassailable and there would be
no reason to recharacterize his or her interest as equity.
Hybrid instruments, 4 56 however, contain the potential for tax
abuse, even when held by independent creditors. The potential for
abuse is apparent from the nature of the instrument; the conversion or participation in earnings feature makes the holder's interest more than that of a creditor. Thus, the holder will be influenced in his or her treatment of the corporation by the extent of
the equity potential. The Regulations address this problem by
treating all hybrid instruments having an equity predominance as
equity interests,'4 57 an equitable result, albeit difficult to administer. Hybrid instruments held proportionally by shareholders necessarily have an equity predominance and thus will always be char4 58
acterized as equity.
The Regulations, notwithstanding their approach to nonshareholder instruments, primarily address shareholder abuse.
Standards of shareholder intent and measurements of economic
substance are pivotal in the determination of whether shareholder
obligations will be reclassified as equity.
The primary standard of shareholder intent employed by the
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

See notes 522-647 & accompanying text infra.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.385-8; 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,962 (1980).
45 Fed. Reg. 86,438 (1980). See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Examples (11), (12)).
See note 452 supra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5. See notes 505-21 & accompanying text infra.
Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(c). See notes 612-14 & accompanying text infra.
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Regulations is proportionality of stockholdings to debtholdings. 459
This standard, while valid,'46 0 is far too narrow, because it over-

looks avenues of significant shareholder abuse. A shareholder with
an equity interest greater than his or her debt interest may treat
the debt as an extension of stock interest. For example, a ten percent shareholder will treat its five percent debt interest as equity
as long as the indebtedness is enforced as a class, because the value
of ten percent of the outstanding debt exceeds the value of its five
percent debt interest. Admittedly, the Regulations cannot address
all such situations. On the other hand, to sanction all is equally
unacceptable. The Proposed Regulations attempted a middle path
by proscribing certain actions by "principal shareholders."
Whatever the excesses of such an approach, the final Regulations
seemingly approve relationships that invite abuse almost as much
as those proportional holdings that are proscribed. 61
Proportional holdings, however, are not sufficient in themselves to cause reclassification of an instrument.6 2 Economic substance must also be absent before an instrument is classified as
equity. 463 The Regulations balance the presence of factors that
suggest an intent to expose the obligation to shareholder risk with
the presence of economic indicators that demonstrate the likelihood that shareholder considerations predominate. This "factor"
approach differs little from the proposals advanced by commenta459. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a). See notes 572-610 & accompanying text infra.
460. It is valid because, for example, a 90% shareholder would have little reason to
enforce an 80% debtholding, because in any event a substantial portion of the debt will
inure to his or her equity in the corporation. To the extent that a shareholder holds a proportional debt interest, his or her creditor concerns are secondary, and should therefore be
ignored.
461. See notes 572-610 & accompanying text infra.
462. The "Supplementary Information" to the final Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. at
86,440 (1980), suggests that the result could have been otherwise: "Because the characterization of. proportionate advances as debt instead of stock is so heavily influenced by tax considerations, one possibility would have been for the section 385 regulations to classify all
proportionately-held debt as stock. . . . [T]he final regulations have rejected this approach.
Treasury believed it would have been unsound policy in effect to deny corporations access to
shareholder capital in the form of indebtedness when loans on the same terms could have
been obtained from independent lenders." The Treasury's implication that proportionality
alone could be a basis for reclassification is questionable and was properly rejected.
463. Economic factors include hybrid holdings, excessive debt, unreasonable interest
rate or nonpayment of reasonable interest in a demand instrument, failure to pay principal,
exercise due diligence in collection and the instrument provides for, or there is paid, interest
at an unreasonable rate, and certain obligations that are not evidenced by an instrument.
See Tress. Reg. §§ 1.385-6, -7. See notes 611-67 & accompanying text infra.
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tors in the early 1970's. 4 64 Greater simplicity and conclusiveness is
achieved under the Regulations.
The Regulations do not merely define an instrument as debt
or equity. They also characterize an instrument as part debt and
part equity. Regardless of proportionality, the Regulations require
that each shareholder deal with the corporation at arm's length. If
the shareholder paid too much for an instrument, the excess is
treated as a contribution to capital. If too little was paid, the dif4 5
ference is treated as a section 301 distribution.
This result is theoretically valid because all shareholder dealings with a corporation are subject to abuse and capable of analysis
by arm's length standards. Although ascertaining market value is a
difficult task, 66 the Regulations' valuation approach will provide
shareholder-creditors with an added incentive to conduct their affairs by commercial means using provable commercial standards.
Furthermore, this approach offers some opportunity for compromise, which may reduce litigation.8 7
Once an instrument is treated as stock under section 385, it is
treated as preferred stock for all purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code. 418 "Interest" is treated as a section 301 distribution, and
464. See note 279 supra.
465. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a). See notes 523-44 & accompanying text infra. Cf. Joyce &
Del Cotto, Interest-FreeLoans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAX L. REv. 459 (1980).
466. See notes 474-83 & accompanying text infra.
467. See 45 Fed. Reg. 18,959 (1980). The pressure for compromise'will be increased by
the Tax Court's recent admonition that valuation disputes be settled and not litigated. See,
e.g., Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 451-52 (1980). Not only will
this provision reduce litigation, it also will enhance the bargaining positions of examining
agents.
468. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c). This will create disclosure problems, for example, in taxfree acquisitions. It may also create unintended consequences under I.R.C. §§ 302(c)(2),
453B (see Rev. Rul. 72-264, 1972-1 C.B. 131, Rev. Rul. 73-423, 1973-2 C.B. 161), 108(e), and
351(d). "Such preferred stock is considered to have the same terms (e.g., voting rights) as
the instrument has under applicable local law. Each class of instruments classified as preferred stock is treated as a separate class of preferred stock ....
[Slee § 1.992-1(d)(2) for an
exception to this rule." Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c). One effect of treating each class of "preferred stock" as a separate class would be to terminate an election under Subchapter S.
"However, the Treasury has not yet determined whether the corporation will have 'more
than one class of stock' within the meaning of section 1371(a)(4) ....
This point will be
covered exclusively by § 1.1371-1(h) [which is reserved for this purpose]." 45 Fed. Reg.
86,438, 86,445 (1980). The "more than one class of stock" rule of I.R.C. § 1371(a)(4) "was
enacted to avoid difficulties in allocating corporate income and loss among the shareholders
...
and was intended to apply to differences created by corporate action only.... ." BiTTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 70, 1 6.02, at 6-8. See Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 486
F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973); James L. Stinnett, 54 T.C. 221 (1970); T.I.R. 1248 [1973] FED.
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payments of "principal" fall within sections 302-303.
If an instrument is reclassified as stock, the "reclassification"
will be treated as an "E" reorganization.4 6 9 No gain or loss is recognized. 7 0 Once an obligation is classified as equity, however, it remains classified as equity.4 1 A change in terms, in subsequent enforcement, or even in ownership has no effect. 47 2 This treatment is
consistent with characterization as an "E" reorganization. 47 3
FairMarket Value
The fair market value of an instrument is relevant to two inquiries: (1) in determining whether an instrument issued to a
shareholder is part equity (as when issue price exceeds fair market
value), or part sections 301 or 305 distribution (as when an instrument is issued at a discount), 47 4 and (2) in the nonproportional
shareholder context, in ascertaining whether a hybrid instrument's
equity features predominate over its debt features. 7 5
The fair market value of an instrument is "the price at which
TAXss (P-H) 55,385. The proper result would be to treat the reclassification as not affecting the Subchapter S election.
469. "E" reorganization refers to § 368(a)(1)(E). Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c)(ii). See also
I.R.C. § 367(b) (relating to foreign corporations making inbound transfers).
470. I.R.C. § 354. See also I.R.C. §§ 305, 306; Trees. Reg. § 1.305-5(b). "Since the
intent is to treat the exchange as taxfree, the exchange is also considered to satisfy section
354(a)(1) (i.e., the instrument is treated as a security for this purpose)." (Emphasis in
original). 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438, 86,439 (1980) (emphasis added). Does "this purpose" include
transfers falling within §§ 351 and 355? The answer should be yes. See Plumb, supra note
31, at 596. But see note 473 infra. The validity of this rule is not clear. It reasonably may be
challenged by a taxpayer seeking to recognize a loss.
471. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(b)(1).
472. Id. But see notes 684-87 & accompanying text infra.
473. An exchange of stock for debt creates "boot" to the full extent of the fair market
value of the indebtedness. I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2), 356(a)(1), 356(d). However, not all debt is a
"security." See, e.g., Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933). Can the "Supplementary Information," discussed at note 470 supra, overturn Supreme Court precedent? Is the consequence that debt
that is not a "security" can transmute into equity and back into debt? See also §§ 108(e),
351(d), 354(b)(2)(B), 453B. The "boot" would usually be treated as a dividend. I.R.C. §
356(a)(2) (under which courts have applied the dividend standard of I.RC. § 302). See
BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 70, I 14.17, at 14-81 to -85. This result can be achieved by
the adoption of a plan of reorganization. But creating a boot dividend by means of a factual
reclassification is neither a desirable nor an intended consequence of § 368(a)(1)(E). See
generally id., I 14.11, at 14-30 to -31. In providing for the one-way transmutation, the Regulations take the proper view.
474. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a). See notes 523-44 & accompanying text infra.
475. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5. See note 505-21 infra. If an instrument is exchanged for
property, see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d), that property also must be valued.
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it would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of all relevant facts."47 6 In determining
price, "[t]he buyer and the seller would be expected to consider
the relevant factors affecting the risks of the investment . .. ,
[m]any of [which] are the same as the factors mentioned in the
case law in distinguishing stock from indebtedness. ' 47 7 The fair
market value of an instrument may be determined by the relatively simple task of using present value and standard bond tables.4 78 Any noncommercial term used by a taxpayer to distort fair
market value may be ignored. 7
The Regulations provide two "rules of convenience" for facilitating the valuation of instruments issued in an arm's length transaction. First, the fair market value of a straight debt instrument4 80
is considered equal to its face if, on the date of issue, the stated
rate of interest is "reasonable," 481 and the consideration paid is
equal to the face amount of the instrument.8 2 Second, the fair
market value conclusively is presumed to equal the issue price if
the instrument is registered with the SEC and sold for cash.48 3
These rules are imminently workable. Appraisal should be
necessary as a practical matter only for hybrid instruments issued
for property or offered in a limited market. Even when appraisal is
necessary, a minor difference in valuation usually will not lead to a
major difference in tax treatment, because the hybrid instrument
rules require only that fifty-or, in certain circumstances, fortyfive-percent of an instrument's value be attributable to its debt
features for it to be classified as indebtedness. Moreover, a straight
debt instrument will remain classified as debt even if a part is
treated as a contribution to capital or affects the amount of a sec476. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(i). See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551
(1973); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).
477. 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,959 (1980), which adds: "For an extensive discussion of these
factors and the case law, see Plumb . .. ."
478. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(ii). For examples, see Tress. Reg. § 1.12323(b)(2)(ii)(d). The only difficulty is in ascertaining the proper discount rate. See 1980 N.Y.S.
Bar Report, supra note 283, at B-6 to B-8.
479. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(iii)(A).
480. See note 452 supra.
481. "Reasonable" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e). See notes 484-95 &
accompanying text infra. Should "reasonable" rate of interest be ascertained by United

States or foreign situs standards?
482.
483.

Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i).
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii).
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tion 301 distribution.
Reasonable Rate of Interest
The rate of interest on a bona fide debt instrument must be
"reasonable." The problem of determining reasonableness is most
difficult when a shareholder 484 holds indebtedness. The Regulations define "reasonableness" by providing a flexible general rule
with a liberal "rule of convenience" for recourse liabilities.8 5
(1) In general. The annual rate of interest on an instrument
issued by a corporation is reasonable if it is within the normal
range of rates paid to independent creditors on similar instruments by corporations of the same general size and in the same
general industry, geographic location, and financial condition on
the date the determination is made.4 86
(2) Rule of convenience. For purposes of the regulations
under section 385, an annual rate of interest on an instrument is
considered to be reasonable if(i) On the date the determination is made, (A) it is equal to
the rate in effect under section 6621, the prime rate in effect at
any local commercial bank,48 7 or a rate determined from time to

time by the Secretary taking into consideration the average yield
on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of
comparable maturity488 or (B) it is between any two of the rates
484. See discussion of Tress. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) ("shareholder") at note 523 infra. See
discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a) ("proportional shareholder") in text accompanying
notes 572-610 infra. See discussion of Tress. Reg. § 1.385-7 (non-"independent creditor") in
text accompanying notes 661-67 infra.
485. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(3) excludes nonrecourse liabilities from the rule of convenience in order to give effect to the debt-to-equity ratio element.
486. This portion of the regulatory scheme was criticized as being difficult for shareholders to determine at the date of a loan. The Treasury response is intriguing. "These
comments, however, fail to recognize that the debt-equity problem is an extraordinarily difficult one .... Any attempt to reduce the problem further, to a set of purely mechanical
formulas would necessarily result in oversimplification. There is a certain irreducible core of
difficulty in making the debt-equity distinction, and some exercise of judgment is ultimately
required. The final regulations present this judgment as a relatively straightforward exercise in valuation, and this is quite possibly the most that can be done." 45 Fed. Reg. 86,442
(1980). Reasonable rate of interest depends on weighing the case law factors, such as maturity date, subordination, capitalization. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(5) (Example 1)).
487. "'[L]ocal commercial bank' includes any commercial bank at which the issuing
corporation ordinarily does business." Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(4).
488. "It is anticipated that these rates will be published in a revenue procedure. This
change allows corporations to use the interest rates on longer term Treasury obligations as
safe harbor rates when the prime rate may not be an accurate indicator of long-term interest
rates." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,443 (1980). It appears likely that the Secretary will establish dif-
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described in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (i), and
(ii) At the end of the taxable year in which the determination
is made, the debt-to-equity ratio of the issuing corporation is not
greater than 1:1.89
Under the rule of convenience, if a calendar year corporation's
debt-to-equity ratio, measured by the adjusted basis standard of
asset valuation,4 9 0 happens to exceed 1:1 at the end of the taxpayer's taxable year, a loan obtained at the beginning of the year,
for example, at or near the prime rate will subject the corporation
to the heavier burden of proof under Treasury Regulations section
1.385-6(e)(1). Although testing reasonableness on the last day of
the taxable year may be convenient, it is not equitable. A debt-toequity ratio has little relevance eleven months after the creation of
an obligation. 9 1 Moreover, this "rule of convenience" may require
the taxpayer to establish and document the reasonableness of a
rate of interest negotiated some time earlier. The rationality of this
provision is questionable. A more equitable "rule of convenience"
definition of "reasonable" would measure the debt-to-equity ratio
as of the date on which the obligation arises. Although this rule
may be difficult to administer, because, for example, depreciation
is more easily computed at year's end, the added degree of fairness
492
would more than compensate for the difficulty.
The requirement of a 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio applies only
when the taxpayer needs a safe harbor. Despite the lack of precision in the "adjusted basis" aspect of the debt-to-equity ratio definition 49 3 and the conservative nature of the 1:1 ratio, the only effect is to compel the taxpayer to meet the heavier evidentiary
ferent safe harbor rates for bonds having different terms. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(3)
(Example (1)).
489. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(3) (footnotes supplied). Treasury adopted the 1:1 debtto-equity ratio for two reasons: "First, [a 1:1 ratio] covers a majority of all corporations.
Extensive statistical analysis indicates that more than 55 percent of all corporations filing
tax returns in a recent year and more than 60 percent of all new corporations had debt-toequity ratios of less than 1:1. Second, a debt-to-equity ratio of 1:1 is exceptionally high by
the standards of public corporations." 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,961 (1980). The average corporate
debt-to-equity ratio appears to be approximately 0.7:1. See generally RMA Annual Statement Studies (1977).
490. See text accompanying notes 559-71 infra.
491. The Regulations attempt to mitigate the problem somewhat by factoring in a
corporation's net operating loss for the taxable year. See note 565 infra. While helpful, this
addition does little to further economic substance.
492. If debt is issued at incorporation, the randomness of the end-of-year test can be
eliminated by election of a one-day year.
493. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(2). See text accompanying notes 561-69 infra.
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burden of establishing a commercial rate of interest.4H This burden can be met by comparing the rate with contemporaneous or
comparable outside borrowing, or by referring to the interest rate
paid by borrowers with superior credit ratings. 4 5 Problems will
arise only in those situations in which a corporation has no credit
rating and no outside borrowings, which is a circumstance sufficiently fraught with valuation difficulties to warrant seeking shelter in the safe harbor. The increased certainty brought to the debtequity area by the reliance on reasonable rate of interest and fair
market value more than compensates for this inconvenience.
Non-shareholderInstruments
"Straight debt instruments ' 496 issued to "independent creditors" are always treated as debt under the final Regulations. 497 An
"independent creditor" is a creditor who neither owns stock proportionately in the corporation nor owns five percent or more of
the corporation's stock by application of the attribution rules of
section 318(a). 98 If a creditor owns five percent or more of the
stock, directly or indirectly, the determination of whether the creditor is an "independent creditor" is made from "all relevant facts
'499
and circumstances.
"Independent creditors" are treated as bona fide lenders because instruments issued to them are not normally open to tax
abuse. The terms of the instrument derive from an adversarial
agreement: neither party is under an obligation to loan or borrow,
and neither derives any direct benefit from issuance aside from the
terms of the obligation. Therefore, the theoretical basis for the
Regulations' exclusion of independent creditor instruments is
clear. Exactly what an "independent creditor" is or should be,
494. "In view of the fact that the safe harbor rates are, in most cases, below-market
rates, the 1:1 safe harbor ratio has not been increased. If this ratio were increased, most
corporations would be able to rely upon the regulations to avoid the uncertainty inherent in
the factor-oriented approach of the case law and, at the same time, charge below-market
interest rates on proportionate debt." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,443 (1980).
495. "Moreover, the ways of proving the corporation's ability to borrow from outside
creditors at commercial rates are similar to those of proving the fair market value of a corporation's assets." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,443 (1980).
496. Straight debt instruments are all instruments other than hybrid instruments. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(f). See notes 451-52 supra.
497. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-4 to -7. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a).
498. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2).
499. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(1). See notes 661-67 & accompanying text infra.
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however, is not.
The Regulations' Examples shed little light on the reasoning
of the Treasury. A creditor remains independent if he or she exacts
the right to designate a director. 00 A creditor who may appoint
even a majority of the directors apparently will remain independent because he or she falls within the safe harbor rule.5 0 1 This
result is supportable because the right to manage the corporation
is not a right to participate in earnings. The Regulations, however,
give no clue whether the right to designate a director is a relevant
"fact or circumstance" in the situation of a more than five percent
shareholder.
A creditor is not independent if he or she owns, actually or by
attribution, five percent or more of the corporation's stock.502
Also, a creditor who owns less than five percent of the corporation's stock is not independent if his or her stock and debt holdings are "substantially proportionate."5 0 3 The Regulations ought
not to apply to non-proportionate stock and debt holdings, even if
the creditor is not "independent" by reason of stockholdings exceeding five percent.5 0'
Hybrid Instruments
A hybrid instrument 0 5 issued to a non-"proportional" creditor 1 is treated as stock if, on the date of issuance, the fair market
value of the instrument's equity features predominates.50 The eq50

500. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(4) (Example (3)).
501. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2). ,
502. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(4) (Example (1)).
503. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2)(ii), -(b)(4) (Example (4)). See also notes 572-610
& accompanying text infra.
504. See notes 661-67 & accompanying text infra.
505. See note 452 supra.
506. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a),(b). See notes 572-610 & accompanying text infra.
507. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a). An exception to the predominance standard, permitting
the value of the "debt features" to be as low as 45%, is provided if "clear and convincing
evidence" shows that on the date of issuance both the issuer and holder reasonably believed
that the instrument's debt features predominated. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(c). See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-5(0 (Example (9)). The purpose of this exception is to eliminate the danger that a
minor good faith valuation error may result in a major difference in tax consequences. It will
require, however, that the issuer and holder rely on expert valuation in order to satisfy the
standard of "clear and convincing evidence." Such good faith reliance, whether the actual
value is 45% or even 40%, should be sufficient to serve the policy interests of the Regulations and the problems of commercial business practice. As such, the "minor" difference in
valuation should be expanded to reach 40%. The practical effect of not expanding the safe
harbor will be simply to compel a court to reach a finding of fact more consistent with the
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uity features of an instrument are the right to stock conversion
and the right to contingent payments other than a call premium. 8
The purpose of the hybrid instrument rules is to treat as stock
those instruments that evidence a predominant participation right
in the corporation's earnings and losses. Instruments with a right
only to fixed payments of interest and principal do not evidence
such a participation right and are accordingly treated as debt.509 If
taxpayer's expert. Because the purpose of the Regulations is to conserve judicial resources, a
broader safe harbor would provide the better solution.
508. Treas. Reg.-§ 1.385-5(b). See also notes 668-77 & accompanying text infra.
509. These are so-called "straight debt-instruments," defined at note 452 supra. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(e) (Examples (5), (9), (10), (14)); Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(0 (Example
(1)).
Fixed payments of interest and principal are those payments that are "definitely ascertainable" as to rate and sum, respectively, and date, and that cannot be impaired without
the holder's consent. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(2)-(3). The holder must have a right to receive principal when due and to receive interest within 90 days of its due date. A payment is
"definitely ascertainable" as to date if it is payable on demand or due on ascertainable
dates. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d).
Interest and principal are definitely ascertainable if they are invariable, or their variability is subject to an uncontrolled external standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(4)(ii)(B): "A
principal sum is not variable simply because it is within the borrower's control to prepay all
or a portion of the principal sum." The distinction adopted by the Regulations is that a
"date contingency" is not contingent if it is within the borrower's control.
Nonrecourse debt and recourse debt receive the same treatment under the Regulations.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(f) (Example (4)).
An external standard is uncontrolled if it is not subject to the borrower's control and is
not related to the success or failure of the borrower's business or activities. A payment that
is not "fixed" under this formulation may nonetheless be treated as fixed if it is guaranteed
by another person Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(7), or if the contingencies, which, for example,
permit impairment without the holder's consent, are illusory. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(6). It
is interesting to recognize that some of the rights that are the usual indicia of equity have
no effect on a weighing of debt versus equity features, that is, voting rights and subordination are almost irrelevant. See Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Co., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.
1935) (subordination increases value of other factors); Plumb, supra note 31, at 447 (voting
rights not a decisive factor). Subordination, however, will affect valuation.
The classification of a payment as fixed is not affected by the fact that: "(i) The instrument is issued under an indenture that satisfies the requirements of section 316 of the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 (15 U.S.C. § 77ppp); (ii) A holder's right to receive interest or principal may be impaired by the operation of the Federal bankruptcy laws (Title 11, U.S.C.), the
Railroad Modification Act (47 U.S.C. § 20b), or any similar provision of law; or (iii) A
holder's right to receive interest or principal may be impaired in the event of the insolvency
of the issuing corporation (either in the sense that the corporation is not able to pay its
debts as they become due or in the sense that its liabilities exceed its assets)." Treas. Reg. §
1.385-5(d)(5).
Debt issued in redemption of stock is often subject to state law limitations. For example, payments of principal and interest cannot be made if the corporation is or would be
rendered insolvent. See Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations,
79 HARv. L. REv. 303 (1965). Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(5)(iii) treats such an insolvency limita-
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neither interest nor principal is "fixed," the instrument is treated
as an equity investment.5 1 ° If payment of either principal or interest is not fixed, however, the instrument is not a "straight debt
instrument" and must be classified under the Regulations' predominance standard.511
The Regulations provide a four-step process for determining
predominance. First, the instrument's "fixed" and "contingent" elements are identified. This is a simple all or nothing definitional
process. 512 Second, the fair market value of the instrument is detion as a form of subordination that is not a "contingency." See 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438, 86,43940 (1980). This concept is illustrated in Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(e) (Example (11)).
However, in Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(e) (Example (12)), local law provides an additional
restriction which the Regulations do treat as a "contingency." In Example (12), nontax law
provides that each payment can be made only out of earned surplus. The Example finds
that the instrument lacks the right to any fixed payment and is therefore stock. This result
would obtain in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 500(a), 501 (West
1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.035(l)(5) (1979); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6 (1979). Cf. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW. § 513(a) (McKinney 1963) (payments allowed out of "surplus"; see Tress. Reg. §
1.385-10(c) (Example (6)).
The Regulations' treatment of state law earned surplus is theoretically correct; that is,
the redeemed shareholder has a continuing equity participation. This would be especially
true if the redemption price exceeded fair market value, as it well might in a family corporation context. Payments in a more usual closely held context are merely suspended; they are
not wholly contingent. Yet, the line drawn here is exceedingly fine. The rationale for state
law earned surplus limitations on redemption payments has no relationship whatsoever to
the tax distinctions between debt and equity. The state law concept of "earned surplus" is
an historic, balance sheet figure reflecting past earnings. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5, and Treas.
Reg. § 1.385-10, appear to be most concerned with payments out of future earnings, a different concept. More importantly, however, notwithstanding its theoretical validity, the Regulations' standard may be unworkable. A redeemed shareholder in an earned surplus jurisdiction would be unable to waive family attribution, see I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A), because his or
her instrument is treated as stock for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-4(c)(1). One consequence, therefore, of treating an earned surplus limitation as a
"contingency" would be in a § 318 context, in which dividend treatment under §§ 302(d)
and 301 would be mandated without necessarily having "dividend equivalency." A less formalistic distinction than incorporation in an "earned surplus" jurisdiction therefore is appropriate. The Treasury should reconsider its conclusion on this issue. Although the Regulations provide a simple expedient for avoiding the problem-a shareholder guarantee, see
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-5(d)(7), -10(c) (Example (5))-the jurisdictional earned surplus distinction should not, of itself, support a substantive tax difference. All that is accomplished is the
creation of another trap for the unwary.
510. In this respect, the instrument provides for payments normally associated with
preferred stock. See notes 688-95 & accompanying text infra (discussion of preferred stock).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(e) (Examples (8), (12)).
511. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(e) (Examples (1)-(7), (13)), -5(f) (Examples (2)-(8)).
512. Some theoretical support may exist for a weighing approach in which an "equity
feature" may not have a complete equity flavor, e.g., when a payment of interest is not made
it will bear interest at a reasonable rate until paid. In the interests of administrative simplicity, the Regulations treat the value of the entire contingency as an equity feature. If an
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termined. The "Supplementary Information" to the Regulations

assumes that, in most cases, the fair market value of the instrument will be equal to its issue price.5 18 This assumption is valid if

the instrument is marketed to the public. If the instrument is sold
privately, there is no reason not to hold the parties to the form of
their transaction. 14 Valuation at issue price compels a valuation of
the instrument's debt or equity features to reach a conclusion on
predominance.

The Regulations' third step is to value the instrument's "debt
features, 515 inasmuch as equity features have no readily ascertainable market value. This valuation will be relatively simple if the
corporation has a credit rating-the applicable discount rate for

the corporation 516 can be ascertained and present value methods

applied.517 If a corporation does not have an ascertainable credit
rating, then prior arm's length borrowing will provide a starting

point for valuing the instrument's debt features. If the hybrid instrument is the corporation's first attempt to borrow, the instrument will be held to a more rigorous standard. The parties to a
hybrid instrument possessing demonstrable "equity features"
therefore will be put to their proof.

The fourth and final step is to compare the value of the instrument's "debt features" to its fair market value. If the difference between the debt features and the fair market value exceeds
fifty percent of the instrument's value, the hybrid instrument will

be classified as preferred stock.51 8 This initial classification is
immutable.5 19
allocation to "debt flavor" were permitted, valuation would become an impossible task.
513. 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,959 (1980). The "Explanation of Changes," id.at 86,438, "supplements the 'Supplementary Information' contained in the notice of proposed rulemaking."
514. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b). The "fair market value" "rules of convenience" are
discussed at text accompanying notes 480-83 supra.
515. The "fixed" principal and/or "fixed" interest.
516. The discount rate of a comparable corporation with an established credit rating
also could be used.
517. 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,960 (1980). Subordination will increase the discount rate.
Id. Cf. Examples (3) and (4) of Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(e) (1980), 45 Fed. Reg. at
18,967 (1980).
However, minor differences in the discount rate employed may result in profound valuation effects. Because the discount rate will derive from the same subjective judicial factors
that created problems under prior law, the Regulations' approach is not the revolutionary
improvement suggested in the Supplementary Information. Cf. Tress. Reg. § 1.12323(b)(2)(ii) (1979) (discussing valuation of investment units).
518. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(c), discussed at note 507 supra.
519. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) tests the instrument "on the day of issue." See Tress.
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There is one exception to this process. A corporation can create two separate interests, lock them together, and thereby avoid
predominance and proportional holding analyses. Such locked interests will be treated separately, that is, one as debt, the other as
stock.52 0 This
is a substantial and appropriate concession by the
5 21
Treasury.
The approach of the Regulations is creative and theoretically
sound. Characterization of hybrid instruments has been a difficult
judicial task, and the concept of reducing each case to a valuation
exercise appears to eliminate a great number of uncertainties. Although the Regulations' approach is not, and could not be, a simple mathematical equation, it comes as close as possible to providing an objective formula for classifying hybrid instruments, while
necessarily taking into accounf the subjective factors intrinsic to a
determination of fair market value.
Shareholder Obligations
The Regulations are directed primarily at shareholder instruments, the area of greatest abuse. Straight debt instruments issued
to shareholders are "ordinarily" classified as debt.2 2 Hybrid instruments issued proportionately to shareholders, on the other
hand, are always classified as stock.
Bifurcation Rules
5
A debt instrument issued to a shareholder

2S

at a premium

524

Reg. § 1.385-4(b)(1). Unless there is a change in terms sufficiently "substantial" to be considered an exchange of instruments, the § 385 Regulations cannot again apply. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 86,439 (1980).
520. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-8(a) states: "[F]or example, if a corporation issues a bond
with a nondetachable warrant, the bond and the warrant are treated as two separate interests in the corporation."
521. This rule also appears to be contrary to existing law. See Universal Castings
Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 107, 115 (1961), af'd, 303 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1962), cited in
45 Fed. Reg. 18,962 (1980).
522. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-2. Instead of defining "ordinarily," the Regulations define the
exceptions to debt treatment, leaving the undefined within the ambit of the "ordinary."
523. For this purpose, a person is a shareholder only if he or she owns stock directly.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) does not provide for attribution. The Treasury elected to have existing law apply to nonshareholder bargain sales. 45 Fed. Reg.at 86,439 (1980). See Sammons v. United States, 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Harry
L. Epstein v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 459 (1969); George W. Knipe v. Commissioner, 24
T.C.M. 668 (1965), aff'd per curiam sub nom., Equitable Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,
356 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966); Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2 C.B.
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will result in a contribution to capital in the amount of the premium.525 If the instrument is treated as debt, the face of the instrument exceeds its "issue price," and the instrument was issued
for cash, then the excess of its face amount over its initial fair market value will be treated as "original issue discount" within the
meaning of section 1232.526 If 'the issue price exceeds the face
amount, then there is original issue premium. 217 If an instrument
issued to a shareholder is treated as preferred stock,52 8 then the
excess of its face amount, that is, its redemption price, 529 over the
initial fair market value may result in a deemed dividend on preferred stock during the period prior to the earliest call date.530
112. But see White Tool & Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 116 (1980); R.T. French
Co. v. Commissioner, 960 T.C. 836 (1973). Why the Treasury decided that existing law
should apply instead of providing regulatory guidelines is unclear and creates potential inconsistencies. There is no requirement, for example, that a court apply family attribution
and the regulatory rules in a bargain redemption context, although the failure to do so may
result in an inconsistency.
524. That is, issue price exceeds fair market value.
525. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a)(1). The contribution to capital may be treated as a gift,
see note 523 supra, compensation, see I.R.C. § 83, or, if the instrument is treated as stock,
as a constructive dividend within the meaning of I.R.C. § 305, see note 530 infra.
526. See I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(A) and (E); Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4(a)(1).
If an instrument is issued in exchange for "property," as defined in § 1232(b)(2), Treas.
Reg. § 1.385-3(a) will not apply. This is not made clear by the Regulations, and should be
clarified; it is taken for granted in the Supplementary Information, 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,961
(1980). If the instrument is issued proportionately to shareholders, see text accompanying
notes 572-610 infra, then Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d) will apply.
Section 1232 will treat the excessive consideration in a different manner. Although the
excess of the issue price over fair market value will be treated as a contribution to capital,
the excess of the face amount over initial fair market value will not create original issue
discount. This is because issue price is treated as stated redemption price at maturity. I.R.C.
§ 1232(b)(2). As a result, there will be capital gain at maturity and no ratable income during
the term of the obligation. There is a corresponding effect on the corporation's basis in the
property, that is, the corporation's basis will equal the shareholders' basis plus any gain
recognized.
The inconsistency of application owing to the nature of shareholder consideration is
unsupportable. See notes 615-22 & accompanying text infra. Although based on a statutory
distinction, the Treasury should reconsider the applicability of § 1232 to the debt-equity
area.
527. See I.R.C. § 171; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2).
528. Under Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-6 or -7. See text accompanying notes 612-13 infra.
529. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(i).
530. Under § 305(b)(4) or (c), there may be a deemed dividend unless and to the extent the preferred stock is immediately redeemable at a reasonable redemption price. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c)(2) (Example (4)). To prevent application of § 305(b) (i.e., Treas.
Reg. § 1.305-5(b)), shareholder instruments should contain an immediate prepayment right,
the theory apparently being that a right to immediate redemption does not represent divi.dend equivalency, but rather a right to participate in growth. The Service's current ruling
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Conversely, if the fair market value of an, instrument exceeds
its issue price, then the difference between the fair market value
and the issue price is treated as a distribution to which section 301
applies.5 31 If face exceeds issue price, section 1232 again will apply; if issue price exceeds face, there will be original issue premium. 5 3 2 If, however, the instrument is treated as stock under
other provisions of the section 385 Regulations, then the difference

between the fair market value and the issue price will be treated as
a distribution to which section 305 applies.533
The bifurcation rules have been much criticized. One commentator has argued that the rules
conflict with and partially supersede the rules of Code section 482
and certain treaties that provide safe harbors for intercompany
debt within controlled groups. They may also conflict with the
imputed interest rules of Code section 483 in cases of disproportionately held shareholder debt issued in payment of property.3 3 '

This argument criticizes the lack of consistent arm's length
standards in the section 385 Proposed Regulations and in the regulations then in existence under sections 482 and 483. Under the
final section 385 Regulations, the problem has been properly reduced to one of administrative procedures: interest will be reasonaposition is that a right to immediate redemption does not give rise to dividend original issue
discount within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b)(1). See Letter Ruling 7852038
(Sept. 27, 1978). However, the Service could easily take the position in the future that a
right to immediate redemption creates an immediate deemed dividend. Note that a prepayment right does not affect the "fixed" principal definition of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(4)(ii).
If there is a distribution within 36 months of the issuance of "preferred stock," §
305(b)(2) will apply. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(b)(4).
531. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-3(a)(2). But note that, under Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j) (which is
cross-referenced in the Regulation) and Rev. Rul. 68-629, 1968-2 C.B. 154, a corporate
shareholder would not receive a dividend distribution upon receipt of stock having a higher
fair market value than the consideration paid, because Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j) provides that
the dividend distribution is measured by the lesser of the fair market value or adjusted basis
of the instrument in the hands of the distributing corporation over the consideration paid
by the shareholder and, under Rev. Rul. 68-629, the distributing corporation's adjusted basis in the instrument would be zero.
532. See notes 526-27 supra.
533. The distribution will usually be nontaxable within the meaning of § 305(a), but
will create § 306 stock.
One effect of the inadequate consideration rule is to allow corporations that have no
earnings and profits to bail out future earnings. The dividend will be a return of capital,
LR.C. § 301(c)(2), and a subsequent sale will result in capital gain. See Pike, Proposed
Debt-Equity Regs: Potent New Standards for CharacterizingPurportedDebt, 7 J. CoRP.
TAx. 195, 223-32 (1980).
534. Beghe, supra note 283, at 944.
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ble if it falls within guidelines established by the Secretary.53 5 Presumably, guidelines under the three sections will be integrated.
The addition of Treasury Regulation section 1.482-2(a)(4), (5) and
(6)536 and the change of I.R.C. sections 482 and 483 interest
rates 537 will further resolve the difficulties in overlapping fact

patterns.
Another criticism is that the rules "present a number of opportunities for tax avoidance. For example, foreign corporate investors might exploit the rules to generate excessive discount income that would be deductible by the domestic issuer and exempt
from withholding and nontaxable under treaty rules.

5 38

This criti-

cism, while valid, would be better resolved by treaty than by regulatory change. 9
The rules have also been criticized for effectively forcing
closely held corporations to pay higher interest rates to avoid a
finding of contribution to capital and original issue discount. This
pressure to pay higher interest rates similarly inhibits salvage
loans by shareholders. This criticism has little merit. The rules
requiring conformity to higher standards are justified to the extent
that shareholder loans are subject to greater abuse. Interest at a
commercial market rate is not an overly burdensome standard. °
Moreover, salvage loans by shareholders often have an equity
535. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(i).
536. Tress. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(5) provides that the I.R.C. § 385 Regulations, supplemented by the original issue discount provisions of I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3) and the bond premium rules of Tress. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2), will be applied prior to the I.R.C. § 482 Regulations. Debt may be bifurcated or recharacterized under the I.R.C. § 385 Regulations even if
it satisfies the requirements of § 482, for example, if the interest rate on the debt falls
within the safe harbor rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2. If a debt is classified as stock under the
§ 385 Regulations, the § 482 Regulations will not apply. If interest is imputed under Tress.
Reg. § 1.385-3(a) or I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3), it "will be considered an arm's length interest rate
for purposes of section 482." See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(6).
537. Effective July 1, 1981, the "safe haven" under Tress. Reg. § 1.482-2 for loans
between related entities is 11 to 13%, and under Tress. Reg. § 1.483-1 for installment sales,
it is 9%. T.D. 7781, 1981-30, I.R.B. 5. See 45 Fed. Reg. 57,739 (1980). But see I.R.C. §
483(g).
538. Beghe, supra note 283, at 944.
539. It should be noted, however, that the opportunity for whipsaw is not limited to
foreign investors. For example, a corporation may take the position that a premium was
paid for an instrument even though the shareholder is taking an inconsistent position.
540. The Treasury believes that the higher commercial rates will be beneficial because
they "will enable small businesses to obtain loans from their shareholders at the same rates
paid by the largest corporations." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,443 (1980).
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flavor.5 41 If outside creditors would not lend to the corporation, the
as a partial or a
Regulations are correct in treating the instrument
2

complete contribution to risk capital.5

A number of basic policy criticisms constitute a final attack on
the rules. These criticisms address the concepts of original issue
discount and amortizable premium.58 While arguably valid, all
5
may be rebutted. "
"Safe Harbor"
The "safe harbor" is set out in the Summary at Treasury Regulations section 1.385-2(d). It is not intended to serve as a definition, but rather as an outline of the nonoperative areas of the regu5
latory scheme.4

A "straight debt instrument" 5' 6 will fall within the safe harbor
7

when three conditions are satisfied:"
(1) Principaland interest. The instrument has a fixed maturity
date"4 and provides for annual payments of interest at (i) the
rate in effect under section 6621, (ii) the prime rate in effect at
any local commercial bank, or (iii) a rate determined from time to
time by the Secretary taking into consideration the average yield
on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of
comparable maturity, or (iv) any rate in between." 9
(2) Debt-to-equity ratio. The debt-to-equity ratio of the corpora-

541. See text accompanying notes 402-04 supra.
542. If interest rates would have to be imputed at a noncommercial rate, that is, 30 to
40%, the Treasury decided that the instrument should be reclassified as equity. This is
partially accomplished by the "excessive debt" rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f). See 45 Fed.
Reg. at 86,441 (1980).
543. See Beghe, supra note 283, at 945.
544. These criticisms are founded primarily on concerns about capital formation and
the inequity of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) as a trap for the unwary and the unsophisticated.
The capital formation policy evidenced in the Regulations, for example, reduction of capital
gain by imputed contribution to capital, or payment of taxes without receipt of cash, is
firmly entrenched in the Code, e.g., §§ 305(c), 1232, and cannot be removed absent legislative action. As such, this policy should be consistently apjlied. The LR.C. § 385 Regulations
do exactly that. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) functions as a trap only when shareholders attempt
tax avoidance, that is, issue noncommercial instruments.
545. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(0 states: "This section is merely a summary ...
and is
subject in all respects to the more complete rules contained in §§ 1.385-3 through 1.385-10."
546. See note 452 supra.
547. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(d). (Footnotes supplied). Several problems created by these
positive requirements are explored below in the discussions of defined terms and debt-equity factors.
548. See Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(1).
549. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e).
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tion does not exceed 1:1.550
(3) Paid when due. All principal and interest on the instrument
are paid when due.5 51
The term "safe harbor," however, is misleading. Although
Treasury Regulation section 1.385-1(d) neatly gathers the elements
of conclusive safety, it fails to state that the absence of some ele5 2 It
ments, though not others, may not be fatal to debt treatment.
also omits the significant proviso that the consideration paid for
the instrument must equal its face in order to avoid the bifurcation
rules of sectibn 1.385-3.55s Thus, section 1232 may apply to instruments issued as part of an investment unit:5 even though the safe
harbor includes the "rule of convenience" requirements for equating the face amount with the fair market value.55 5 To this extent,
the "safe harbor" is not totally safe. To fail to summarize this requirement is misleading.
The Regulations as drafted have no need of a "safe harbor."
An instrument is classified as indebtedness for all Internal Revenue Code purposes if it falls outside the Regulations' proscriptions.558 The Regulations, nevertheless, provide a definition of
"safe harbor" that converts the language of the proscribing provisions to a positive statement of debt classification.
Definitions
The cornerstone of the Regulations is a set of definitions that
serves as a standard of reasonable conduct. These definitions make
important distinctions on the basis of debt-to-equity ratio, fair
market value,5 57 reasonable rate of interest, 558 and shareholder
proportionality.
The Regulations place great reliance on the definition of debtto-equity ratio to determine the classification of instruments held
550. See Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2) and (f).
551. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k) and (1)(3).
552. Thus, the rate of interest need not fall within the safe harbor guidelines and the
debt-to-equity ratio may exceed 1:1 as long as interest nevertheless is "reasonable." See
Trees. Reg. § 1.385-6(e).
553. See Trees. Reg. § 1.385-2(d) (last sentence). See also notes 523-33 & accompanying text supra.
554. See Trees. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(ii).
555. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2). See notes 480-83 & accompanying text supra.
556. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(a).
557. See notes 474-83 & accompanying text supra.
558. See notes 484-95 & accompanying text supra.
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by shareholders. A ratio of 1:1 is the maximum permitted in the
"rule of convenience" definition of "reasonable rate of interest." 559
Ratios of 10:1 and 3:1 are the primary standard for ascertaining
whether a corporation is nominally capitalized.560 The definition of
debt-to-equity ratio, however, does much more than define safe
and unsafe harbors; it is a standard integral to the Regulations'
scheme.
The definition of "debt-to-equity ratio" is the ratio of the corporation's liabilities to the stockholders' equity.56 The definition
of stockholders' equity, however, departs from accounting theory
and substitutes a rule of convenience.5 62 Stockholders' equity in a
corporation is defined as "the excess of-(i) The adjusted basis of
its assets (less reserves for bad debts, if applicable, and other similar asset offsets56s ) over (ii) Its liabilities (including liabilities excluded under paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section)." 56
In computing stockholders' equity,5 65 the adjusted basis of a
559. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2).
560. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f). See notes 623-29 & accompanying text infra.
561. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(1) provides: "The debt-to-equity ratio of a corporation is
the ratio that-(i) The corporation's liabilities (excluding trade accounts payable, accrued
operating expenses and taxes, and other similar items) bears to (ii) The stockholders'
equity."
Trade accounts payable and similar items are omitted from liabilities, "[b]ecause trade
accounts payable vary during the ordinary course of business in a way that is largely beyond
the control of shareholders . . . ." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,443 (1980). Treas. Reg. § 1.3856(g)(5)(v) provides that "[a] liability is treated in the same manner as a trade account payable if it is(A) Incurred under a commercial financing agreement (such as an automobile 'floorplan'
agreement) to buy an item of inventory,
(B) Secured by the item, and
(C) Due on (or before) sale of the item."
562. This debt-to-equity rule of convenience will materially affect only the "reasonable
rate of interest rule of convenience" for the 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio required thereunder.
Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2). It cannot impact negatively on "excessive debt" inquiries. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2).
563. This is for the purpose of equalizing cash and accrual method taxpayers.
564. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(2) (emphasis added) (footnotes supplied). See note 561
supra. Debt-to-equity ratio is determined on the last day of the taxable year both for purposes of the reasonable rate of interest rule of convenience, Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(ii),
and the safe harbor rule for excessive debt (Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f(4) (last sentence)).
565. Four adjustments are provided: "(i) In the case of a corporation that uses the
cash method of accounting, the adjusted basis of trade accounts receivable shall be deemed
to be equal to the face amount of the receivables (less an appropriate reserve for
uncollectibles).
"(ii) In determining the debt-to-equity ratio of a corporation at the end of a taxable
year, the stockholders' equity shall be increased by the amount of any net operating loss
(determined without regard to sections 1211(a) and 1212) sustained by the corporation dur-
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corporation's assets56 6 and the amount of its liabilities are deter-

mined by use of the corporation's normal accounting method." 7
The computation is made without regard to any reclassification
under section 385, except that preferred stock treated as debt
under section 385 is considered a liability.56 8 Moreover, "[tihe
debt-to-equity ratio shall be computed without regard to distortions created by a temporary contribution to equity or any similar
contrivance."56 9
The debt-to-equity ratios of members of an affiliated group
are computed by treating lower-tier subsidiaries as operating divisions.57 0 Thus, a parent is deemed to own a ratable share of its

subsidiaries' assets and to owe a ratable share of its liabilities.
Parent-subsidiary investments and liabilities that are duplicative
57
are eliminated.

1

Proportionality
"Substantial proportionality" between stockholdings and any
class of debtholdings is the most important of the Regulations' definitions. The Regulations are founded on the premise that nonproportionate debt is not easily abused. 73 Consequently, proporing the taxable year ...
"(iii) [Certain bank corporations must make adjustments pursuant to I.R.C. §
279(c)(5)(A).]
"(iv) [Insurance company insurance reserves are treated as trade accounts payable.]"
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(5). Subparagraph (ii) is helpful to balance the effect of the Regulations' end-of-the-taxable-year rule.
566. The Treasury's purpose in adopting the adjusted basis standard was simplicity of
application. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,959 (1980) ("The fair market value of the corporation's
assets, although theoretically a more correct measure than adjusted basis, is not used in
determining stockholders' equity because of the greater difficulty inherent in valuing operating assets."). The definition, and its various qualifications, is successful in accomplishing
that goal. Adjusted basis for tax purposes is an objective figure that is readily ascertainable.
"Readily ascertainable" does not mean free of problems. There may be questions of law
(such as, based tipon the form of acquisition, is basis carried over or computed at cost?) and
issues of fact (such as, what is the proper "useful life" of an asset?) The Treasury's formulation is workable, equitable, and efficient. The problems under the Proposed Regulations
have all been corrected. See, e.g., 1980 N.Y.S. Bar Report, supra note 283, at B-8 to B-13.
567. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(3)(i).
568. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(3)(ii). See Pike, Proposed Debt-Equity Regs: Potent
New Standardsfor CharacterizingDebt, 7 J. CoRP. TAx 195, 215 (1980).
5#9. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(5)(vi)(A).
570. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(h).
571. This mirrors the approach taken in Treas. Reg. § 1.279-6.
572. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a).
573. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a), discussed at notes 523-44 & accompanying text
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tionality is the linchpin of analysis.

Surprisingly, the Regulations contain only a general description of "proportionality.

' 57 4

Perhaps more surprising is a statement in the Treasury Explanation that "the definition of proportionality has been clarified to the extent possible. ' 575 Rather than
promulgating regulatory guidelines providing measurements of
proportionality, the Treasury has stated that it "anticipate[s] that
.. . guidelines will be published as a revenue procedure. ' 57 8 A
revenue procedure, however, does not possess the force of either
legislative or interpretative regulations.5 7 ' For the sake of consistency and ease of administrative and judicial review, the Treasury
should have provided regulatory areas of conclusive proportionality
and nonproportionality along with a list of factors to be used in
deciding cases not within the conclusive areas. This factor approach could have been facilitated, for example, by using a standard deviation approach permitting a disparity of whatever percentage is deemed appropriate. 57 81
The rule of "conclusive
proportionality" should have applied in all cases in which eighty
percent or more of the shareholders own any portion of any class

of debt.579 Finally, a presumptive safe harbor should have been
provided for cases in which both stockholdings and debtholdings
do not exceed fifty percent.
A rule of "conclusive proportionality" would have the effect of
equating the "control" of a corporation with an overriding equity
interest.58 0 At a certain level of ownership, there predominates a
supra, and Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7, discussed at notes 648-67 infra.
574. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(2).
575. 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,441 (1980). The impetus for treating only proportionate shareholder debt as subject to abuse was apparently provided by Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions
in the Tax Treatment of the Corporationand Its Shareholders,42 TUL.L. REv. 251 (1968),
cited in 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,440 (1980). Although the Stone article provides convincing support for treating proportional shareholder debt as similar to an equity interest, it does not
provide support for treating nonproportional debt as presumptively valid. In this, the Treasury should not have withdrawn as far as it did. Compare the "principal shareholder" rules
of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7, 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,969-71 (1980).
576. 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,441 (1980).
577. See generally Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HRv. L.
REV. 398 (1941).
578. See, e.g., Letter to Commissioner of Internal Revenue from Robert J. McGee
(April 1, 1980).
579. That is, the Regulations should have treated debt owned by certain shareholders
as a separate class and, therefore, proportional (subject, of course, to a standard deviation
formula).
580. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 332, 368(c), 382.
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desire to further growth at the cost of subordinating other investments to the risks of the enterprise. Substantial support exists in
the Code for an eighty percent definition of "predominance."5 81
A presumption based on this high degree of ownership is compelling. It would not reclassify the instrument; rather, it would
serve merely to scrutinize the instrument under tests of arm's
length dealing.
A presumptive safe harbor also would be appropriate. Shareholders who engage in bona fide business transactions with their
corporations would be able to do so in safety. More importantly,
the presumptive safe harbor would prescribe an area of theoretical
non-abuse; even a fifty percent shareholder would not often sacrifice one-half of his or her debt interest to further his or her equity
interests. Exceptions, however, would have to be recognized. For
example, if the debtholders must or will act together,582 the creditor-shareholder loses nothing by treating its debtholdings as equity. A case by case analysis, based on factors set forth by the
Treasury, would be helpful in these cases.as
Finally, a standard deviation formula can be used to differentiate abusive from non-abusive structures."" For example, if a
forty percent shareholder owns one percent of a class of indebtedness and eleven one percent shareholders own, disproportionately,
fifty percent of that class, there is little likelihood that the eleven
shareholders would act in concert to give precedence to their equity interests, even though a majority of shareholders own a majority of a class of indebtedness.585 A factor approach would be ap-

propriate in such a case. Conversely, if three shareholders each
own twenty-five percent of the stock and twenty-five percent of
the debt, no factor approach would be necessary. Their interests
581.

See I.R.C. § 1239. But cf. I.R.C. § 267 (50%); I.R.C. § 269 (50%); I.R.C.

§

302(b)(2)(B) (50%).
582.

Debtholders will be compelled to act together if the debt instruments provide, for

example, that certain actions to enforce the debt must be agreed to by a majority (or more)
of the debtholders. Debtholders will act together by choice if a quid pro quo exists, such as
outside business interests or informal indemnification. See Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(7). See
note 590 infra.
583. In the absence of a specific adverse factor, the burden of proof should be shifted

to the Commissioner. Cf. I.R.C. § 534 (accumulated earnings tax; reasonable accumulations).
584. The formula would find its greatest use in the context of 50% to 80% proportionality. See text preceding note 595 infra. See also note 579 supra.
585. This appears to be the threshold measure of proportionality. See text accompanying notes 593-610 infra.
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would be inextricably intertwined and, hence, "substantially
proportionate."58
In addition to the failure to take a definitive approach, the
standard of proportionality under the Regulations is vague. The
greater clarity sought by the Treasury is not attained. 87 Indeed,
the present language of the Regulations serves only to obfuscate.
Section 1.385-6(a)(2) defines "substantial proportionality" as
actual and constructive stock ownership, 588 which, when compared
to the holdings of any class of instruments, 59 is proportionate as
"determined from all relevant facts and circumstances . .

.,.

An exception is provided for widely held stock and instruments
that are separately traded and readily marketable.591 "Indepen586. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Example (2)).
587. See note 575 & accompanying text supra.
588. The rules of § 318(a) are "taken into account"; however, stock owned constructively under § 318(a)(4) (relating to options) "is taken into account [only] to the extent that
it is reasonable to expect, at the time of the determination, that the options may be exercised." Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(2). See 1971 N.Y.S. Bar Report, supra note 283, at 63. Because § 318(a) attribution is only one of the "facts and circumstances" included in determining substantial proportionality, facts negating attribution, such as family hostility, will
also weigh in the determination. Compare Robin Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43
(lst Cir. 1975), with David Metzger Trust, 76 T.C. 42 (1981). Similarly, close business ties
and relationships that almost, but not quite, fall within the attribution rules of § 318 (e.g.,
in-laws, cousins, siblings) also will be appropriate to a determination of "substantial proportionality." Although these additional elements make a determination of substantial proportionality "fair" and "equitable," they also require a case by case analysis. In this writer's
opinion, cross-reference to an existing attribution rule would be more desirable.
589. Two or more classes of instruments may be considered as one, for example, if
they are issued pursuant to a plan and holdings will be substantially proportionate after
completion of the plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(4)(i). The application of the step transaction doctrine in this context should be based on the "mutual interdependency" standard,
see American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), affl'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950), rather than, for example, the "binding commitment" test. See Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968). See generally Mintz & Plumb,
Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 247 (1954).
Two classes will also be considered as one if they are treated as a single class and thereby
are held in substantial proportion. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-6(a)(6), Examples (13), (14);
1.385-6(a)(4)(ii).
One class will be treated as two if part of the class is treated differently, for example, if
interest is paid on one portion but not on the other. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(5).
590. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(1). If all the facts and circumstances suggest that the
terms of an instrument were not fixed at arm's length or not diligently enforced and there
are related non-arm's length transactions, then the instrument may be treated as held proportionately, whatever the actual percentages. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(7). See Reed v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1957); Broadway Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. United States,
220 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
591. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(i).
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dent creditors" are specifically excluded from the definition of
proportionality. 2
The Examples in the Regulations provide insight into the
Treasury's thinking. In Example (5), the indirect ownership of
eighty-five percent of a class of debentures by a one hundred per' 593
cent shareholder was found to be "substantially proportionate,

while in two other Examples 594 the direct ownership of fifty percent of a class of debentures by a one hundred percent shareholder, and of one hundred percent of a class of debentures by a
fifty percent shareholder, was not so found. It would appear from
these Examples that a danger exists for a majority of shareholders
owing a majority of a class of debt. As a practical matter, however,
the spread between fifty percent and eighty-five percent is large.
The Regulations provide no clear guidance. 5
Two additional Examples are worthy of comment. Example
(3)596 states that, if three shareholders each own one-third of the
outstanding stock and ten percent of a class of debentures, there is
no proportionality. In Example (2),
in which one hundred percent of the shareholders own ninety percent of the debentures,
however, the Treasury views the holdings as proportional. The rationale of Example (2) appears to be that the three shareholders,
despite non-pro rata proportionality, would have little reason to
treat their debtholdings differently from their stockholdings. A
failure to enforce would inure directly to their stockholdings.598
Yet, in Example (3), in which debtholdings among the shareholders are pro rata and a failure to enforce 599 would inure proportion592. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(ii). An "independent creditor" is defined, in part, as
one whose holdings of stock and instruments are not proportionate. Trees. Reg. § 1.385-6(b).
593. Trees. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Example (5)).
594. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Examples (7) and (13)(a)).
595. See also Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(c)(3) (Example) (where three shareholders owning
50%, 30%, and 20% each hold, respectively, 60%, 25%, and 15% of a single class of debt;
held proportional); Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Example (2)) (where three 3 shareholders
hold 40%, 30%, and 20% of a single class of debt; held proportional); Tress. Reg. § 1.3856(k)(2) (Example (1)) (where a 100% shareholder owns 80% of the debt; held,
proportional).
596. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Example (3)).
597. Id. (Example (2)).
598. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,440 (1980) ("if the shareholder elects to receive debt, the
allocation of the repayments between principal and interest makes little non-tax difference"). However, if the requirements of the "Deep Rock" doctrine are satisfied, Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939), a creditor-shareholder will share ratably
with outside creditors in insolvency proceedings.
599. For example, nonenforcement because of the shareholders' mutuality of interest.
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ately to their stockholdings, the Treasury finds no proportionality.
If interest is not paid by the shareholders or if there is a subordination of shareholder debtholdings, the change in terms will
result in treatment of the shareholders' debtholdings as a separate
class, and "substantial proportionality" will exist at that point 0 0
But the obligation of Example (3) will be free from scrutiny under
the Regulations if there is a default and the creditor-shareholders
fail to exercise the ordinary diligence of independent creditors,6 01
or if the instrument is issued at a time when there is "excessive
debt, ' 0 2 or if an advance is "payable on demand."6 03 Such enhanced opportunity for abuse by taxpayers owning a controlling
equity interest and a proportional amount of any class of debt
should lead the Treasury to reconsider Example (3). The elimination from the final Regulations of the "principal shareholder" concept outlined in the Proposals6 °o does not justify a laissez faire ap'60 5
proach to "controlling shareholders.
Example (8)06 outlines a capital structure in which A owns all
the common stock and fifty percent of the senior debentures of Y
Corporation. B, unrelated to A, owns the remaining senior debentures and one hundred percent of a class of junior debentures,
which are convertible into one hundred shares of Y common stock.
The Example states that "it is reasonable to expect that B may
ultimately exercise the conversion privilege." Relying on section
1.385-6(a)(2)(ii), 07 the Example finds that the senior debentures
are proportionate and the junior debentures 0 8 are not.
600. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(5) and -6(a)(6) (Examples (13) and (14)).
601. This is so, as long as other members of the class do not act inconsistently. See
Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(3).
602. Cf. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(f).
603. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(1). These results obtain owing to the requirement that
economic substance exist only if there is "proportionality." See 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,440
(1980).
604. See Proposed Trees. Reg. § 1.385-6, 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,969-71 (1980). The Treasury states: "Several comments contended that in most cases there will be a sufficient economic incentive for shareholder-creditors to enforce their rights under debt instruments not
held in substantially the same proportion as the corporation's stock. Treasury agrees with
these comments." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,441 (December 31, 1980) (emphasis added). "Most
cases" nevertheless leaves substantial room for abuse.
605. See text accompanying notes 580-81 supra.
606. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Example (8)).
607. See note 588 supra.
608. It is important to recognize that the hybrid junior debentures need not have predominant "equity features" in order to conclude that they reasonably "may" be exercised.
Therefore, although the junior debentures are treated by the Regulations as valid indebted-
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Example (8) differs slightly from its counterpart in the Proposed Regulations. e0 9 In the Proposed Regulations, A and B each
owned fifty percent of the junior debentures instead of B owning
one hundred percent. The Proposed Example concluded that the
senior debentures would be treated as substantially proportionate
because they would be proportionate on B's exercise of the conversion right under the junior debentures. The Example ignored the
fact that, if it is reasonable for B to convert, it would also be reasonable for A to do so, and that such conversion would result in A

owning two-thirds of the stock and fifty percent of the debt and B
owning one-third of the stock and fifty percent of the debt. It is
unclear whether such non-pro rata holdings should be treated as
substantially proportionate. The final Regulations retreat from the
issue6 l ° and from the conversion presumptions of the Proposals.
ProportionalEquity Factors""
Hybrid Instruments
All hybrid instruments issued "proportionally" to shareholders
are treated as preferred stock. 1 2 This conclusive rule is proper because of the congruence of interest between proportional hybrid
holding and equity participation. The validity of this rule is made
ness, they nevertheless may taint shareholder interests. In other words, even though a
100% shareholder owning 50% or less of a class of debt "ordinarily" will not be deemed to
hold the stock and debt "proportionately," any additional .factor that reasonably may tip
shareholder debtholdings to a "majority" will produce proportionality, despite the logical
inconsistency of treating senior debentures as equity and junior debentures as debt. See
Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972).
609. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(3) (Example (8)) at 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,969
(1980).
610. See note 595 supra. This may presage a reconsideration of what exactly is "substantially proportionate" in a non-pro rata setting, and when an option should be viewed as
exercised.
611. The Treasury states: "When the initial terms of proportionately-held shareholder
debt are not arm's length terms, the regulations, where possible, in effect create arm's length
terms by adjusting the interest rate. However, when the terms are not arm's length and
arm's length terms cannot be created by adjusting the interest rate (e.g., debt issued for
property), then the final regulations classify the proportionately-held shareholder debt as
stock.
"The final regulations also require shareholders to enforce the terms of proportionate
debt according to an arm's length standard." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,440 (1980).
612. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c). See the discussions of proportionality, at text accompanying notes 572-610 supra, and reclassification, at text accompanying notes 456-73 supra.
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clearer by reason of the "locked interest safe harbor," 613 which permits the division of debt and equity features into separate
interests.6 14

Instruments Not Issued for Money
An instrument issued proportionately to a shareholder 1 5 that
states an unreasonable rate of interest at date of issue16 and whose
issuance does not give rise to original issue discount under section
1232(a)(3), or amortizable bond premium under Treasury Regulation section 1.61-12(c)(2),11 7 will also be classified as stock.618 There
613. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-8.
614. See note 520 & accompanying text supra.
615. See text accompanying notes 572-610 supra.
616. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(d). See text accompanying notes 484-95 supra.
617. The Treasury Explanation outlines the parameters and policy of Treas. Reg. §
1.385-6(d) as follows: "First, the original issue discount rules are applicable to certain instrunents issued for property (e.g., instruments issued for marketable securities). In such
cases, the original issue discount provisions apply and, accordingly, § 1.385-6(d)(1) is not
applicable.
"Second, there are certain situations where it may not be clear under present law
whether the original issue discount provisions of section 1232 would apply (e.g., an instrument issued as a dividend or as compensation). Section 1.385-6(d)(1) applies in these situations unless section 1232 is found to be applicable. This is in accordance with the policy of
the regulations not to classify proportionately-held instruments as stock because they do not
bear a reasonable interest rate if the interest rate can be adjusted to an arm's length rate
through the creation of original issue discount or premium.
"Only when it is not possible to adjust the interest rate by creating discount or premium
(e.g., debt issued for property) do the regulations classify the entire debt as equity." 45 Fed.
Reg. at 86,442 (1980).
618. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d) applies only to instruments "issued" by a corporation,
see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(b), and, therefore, does not apply to liabilities assumed or
taken subject to (for example, in exchanges under §§ 351 or 1031). Consequently, if A
purchases property from B and gives a nonrecourse purchase money mortgage at an unreasonable rate of interest (for example, in return for B's agreement to compensate A by salary
or reciprocal purchase) and thereafter transfers the property subject to the mortgage to
wholly-owned X Corporation, Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d) by its terms will not apply. There is
no "contrivance" exception in Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d), cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(7) (nonarms' length transactions); id. § 1.385-6(g)(vi)(A) (debt-to-equity ratio computed without
regard to distorting contrivances), although the § 385 regulations do not preclude the application of the "substance over form" doctrine. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,960 (1980). To be sure,
§ 357(b) could be applied if, as is proper, avoidance of § 385 is viewed as tax avoidance and
a bona fide business purpose is not a defense. When the stepping together of interdependent steps leaves a court with the choice of applying either § 357(b) or § 1.385-6(d), the
statutory rule of § 357(b) should take precedence, even though boot under I.R.C. § 357(b)
often will be less onerous than reclassification under Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d). Cf. I.R.C. §§
356(d), 368(a), 1031(b), 1031(d). Conversely, if C, the sole shareholder of Y Corporation,
sells property to D in whole or partial return for a nonrecourse purchase money mortgage
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is an exception for instruments exchanged for an equal or greater

amount of indebtedness if both an independent creditor and an
independent debtor would have agreed to the exchange. 1'
The rationale for this provision is that, because Congress decided to provide bifurcation rules only for those items of "property" addressed by section 1232(a)(3) and Treasury Regulation
section 1.61-12(c)(2), no other "property" transfers can fragment
an instrument into part debt-part equity.62 0 Section 1.385-3(a)
therefore has no application to non-section 1232(a)(3) "property"
exchanged by a shareholder for an instrument. The Treasury
elected to have the Regulations classify the entire interest as equity, instead of exercising the authority delegated by Congress to
provide that all consideration is subject to the bifurcation rules.6 2 1
The absence of a policy rationale for treating instruments issued
for property differently from instruments issued for cash warrants
62 2
reconsideration of this rule.
and, as an interdependent step, D sells property to Y, which Y takes subject to the mortgage, I.R.C. § 357(b) will not be applicable and Treasury Regulation § 1.385-6(d) will reclassify the "purchase money note" as preferred stock. It should be noted that the tax avoidance opportunity arises from the unnecessary complexity added by reading the
requirements of I.R.C. § 1232 into § 385. See note 622 infra.
619. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(3). But see Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(j), discussed at notes
630-34 infra. For purposes of ascertaining the amount of indebtedness exchanged, principal
includes interest accrued but unpaid up until the date of the exchange, but only to the
extent that such interest is paid-with principal in the exchange. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(3).
620. See note 617 supra.
621. See the discussion of regulatory authority in text accompanying note 282 supra.
622. Section 1232 and Tress. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2) will not normally apply unless the
"property" constitutes stock or securities traded on an established securities market. I.R.C.
§ 1232(b)(2). However, debt-equity case law has not distinguished among obligations issued
for cash, property, and services.
The Treasury felt compelled to follow the I.R.C. § 1232 pattern in the I.R.C. § 385
context. (It is revealing to note that the Treasury apparently has not felt compelled to follow this aspect of the § 1232 pattern in the mirror image "redemption premium" area of
Tress. Reg. § 1.305-5(b).) However, there is no rationale for such a course. The purpose of §
385, after all, is to distinguish between bona fide debt and de facto equity. The character of
the loan is irrelevant to this inquiry. Section 1232 serves a completely different purpose.
This becomes apparent when the genesis of § 1232(b)(2) is explored. The House and the
Senate Finance Committee had agreed that § 1232 would include obligations issued for
property; the definition of "issue price" was amended on the Senate floor. The amendment
was added to prevent whipsaw based on issuers placing a lower value on the property and
debtors claiming a higher value. See 115 CONG. REc. 36730-31 (1969). Whether or not this
valuation dilemma gives rise to a valid distinction for purposes of § 1232, it has no validity
for purposes of distinguishing debt from equity under § 385. For an excellent analysis of §
1232 generally and this issue specifically, see Javaras, Reform Act Changes in the Original
Issue Discount Rules, 49 TAXES 197, 207-10 (1971). See note 648 infra. See also Note, Discounted Preferred Stock under the New Section 305 Treasury Regulations: On Confusing
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Excessive Debt
The Regulations treat as stock those instruments that are
"substantially proportionate" to stockholdings 23 and are, in light
of the corporation's capital structure, "excessive" when issued. 24
A corporation's capital structure evinces "excessive" debt if all the
terms and conditions of the instrument and the corporation's
financial structure would not be satisfactory to an institutional independent creditor. 25 However, to provide a readily ascertainable
yardstick to guide in the planning of a capital structure, the Regulations also define a safe harbor for debt treatment. The corporation's debt will not be treated as excessive if the corporation's
debt-to-equity ratio6'2 does not exceed 10:1627 and the corporation's "inside debt-to-equity ratio" does not exceed 3:1.628
Debt and Equity, 84 YALE L.J. 324, 334-44 (1974).
A bargain sale of "property" by a proportional shareholder who receives in return an
instrument will be subject to Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d).
Note the opportunity for planning upon incorporation. If cash and property are exchanged for stock and securities, a shareholder should certainly be able to earmark the cash
or, if beneficial, the property, as exchanged for the securities. If earmarking is not permissible, perhaps delay in the transfer of cash or property for securities would be sufficient to
prevent, for example, pro rata allocation. Again, what is created is a trap for the
unsophisticated.
623. See text accompanying notes 572-610 supra.
624. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f).
625. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2). "For this purpose, the corporation's size, industry,
geographic location, and financial condition must be taken into account." Id. See Plumb,
supra note 31, at 610.
An exception is made for instruments issued in exchange for an equal or greater principal amount of indebtedness. The principal amount of indebtedness includes interest accrued
but unpaid until the date of the exchange, but only to the extent that such interest is paid
with principal in the exchange. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(0(5). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j),
discussed at notes 630-34 & accompanying text infra, and Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k), discussed at notes 635-43 & accompanying text infra.
626. Defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g). See text accompanying notes 559-71 supra.
627. "Extensive statistical analysis tends to confirm that a ratio in excess of 10:1 is
extreme. Nearly 85 percent of all corporations filing tax returns in a recent year and more
than 90 percent of all new corporations had debt-to-equity ratios. . . of less than 10:1." 45
Fed. Reg. at 18,962 (1980).
628. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(3). A corporation's "inside debt-to-equity ratio" is determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g), except that liabilities to "independent creditors" are
excluded (except in computing stockholders' equity). Trees. Reg. § 1.385-6(f(4). The Treasury explains the insertion of the 3:1 inside ratio as follows: "First, the proposed regulations
were premised on the assumption that shareholders lending proportionately to their corporations would not create unusually high debt-equity ratios to produce large interest deductions at the corporate level because the interest or discount produced by § 1.385-3 and section 1232 would be taxed currently to the shareholders as ordinary income . . . .Several
comments pointed out, however, that this deterrent was not present in situations where the
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By providing for an independent creditor test, which may be
corroborated easily,6 29 the Regulations reach a reasonable compromise between ease of administration and equity. The institutional
lender standard, more stringent than the marketplace, and the safe
harbor rule, despite its use of an adjusted basis formula for ascertaining stockholders' equity, will be useful to proportional shareholders in structuring corporate capitalization. The in terrorem nature of these rules certainly will reduce the quantity of litigation
arising from factual disagreements.
Change in Terms
Voluntary subordination, change in interest rate, even if offset
by other changes,6 30 postponement of maturity date, or any other
"substantial change" affecting the fair market value of an instrument 3 1 held by a proportionate shareholder 3 2 results in a reissuance of the instrument on the day the issuer and the holder enter
into a binding agreement to make such a change. 33 The instrument will be evaluated anew under all the Regulations' tests.6 34
Payment History
Timely payment of interest and principal retains the same importance in the Regulations that it has been given in the case
shareholders were not paying tax on the interest income (e.g., certain nonresident alien
shareholders, taxpayers with large net operating losses, or charitable organizations) ...
This debt would have produced large interest deductions that could have been used to offset
tax at the corporate level without being taxed to the shareholders.
"The second reason for the inside ratio of 3:1 is to limit the situations where very large
amounts of discount will be imputed under § 1.385-3 and section 1232. As a general matter,
when the inside ratio exceeds 3:1 and the loans do not satisfy the standard of § 1.385-6(f)(2),
the proper interest rates would tend to be so high as to be noncommercial (e.g., as high as 30
to 40 percent)." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,411 (1980). Commentators generally favored a 3:1 debtto-equity ratio.
629. For example, it may be corroborated by applying the corporation's credit rating
to commercial lending practices as of the date the instrument is issued.
630. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)(4) (Example (2)).
631. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)(1)(i) and (2). Substitution of collateral and prepayment
are not "substantial changes." Id.
632. See text accompanying notes 572-610 supra.
633. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)(1) and (3). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(3), (f)(5), and
(j)(4) (Examples (1) and (3)). "[Section] 1.385-6(j) does not change existing law as to when a
change in the terms of an instrument will constitute a taxable exchange of instruments." 45
Fed. Reg. at 86,443 (1980).
634. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)(1).
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law.13 5 Inthe context of proportionate shareholder loans, payment
history is a decisive factor in the continuing classification of purported debt.
A proportionately held debt instrument as6 will be reclassified
as stock if a corporation fails to pay interest when due6 37 and the
shareholder does not pursue available remedies with the ordinary
diligence of an independent creditor.""8 The shareholder must also
pursue available remedies if principal remains unpaid ninety days
after it is due. Failure to act as would an independent creditor will
cause the instrument to be treated as payable on demand.639 Debtequity classification will then turn on reasonable rate of interest.6 0
There is an exception, however, if the amount of the obligation on
which there is a default in principal, plus the amount of "unwritten shareholder obligations," ' does not exceed $25,000 and the
defaulted obligation is repaid 6 2 within six months of issuance."'
Instruments Payable on Demand
Although the absence of a fixed maturity date is no bar to the
existence of a bona fide debt, it does create a potential for tax
635. See text accompanying notes 343-49 supra.
636. See text accompanying notes 572-610 supra.
637. A corporation fails to pay interest when due if the interest is not paid within 90
days of the end of the taxable year. For this purpose, payment of interest with property
other than money (for example, a note) will be considered payment, but only to the extent
of the fair market value of the property. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k)(3). An intercompany
offset should be a "payment" for this purpose. But see note 642 infra.
638. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-4(k)(1). This does not require that a lawsuit be brought. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k)(2) (Example (3)). See text accompanying notes 388-94 supra.
The reclassification will occur on the later of the first day of the taxable year during
which the failure to pay occurs (an effective retroactive reclassification), or the first day on
which the instrument is treated as held proportionately. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k)(1). For
purposes of Trees. Reg. § 1.385-6(k), interest accrued prior to the date at which a proportional shareholder holds the debt is disregarded. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k)(4)(i). Apparently,
a reclassification will retroactively terminate a waiver of family attribution under §
302(c)(2), because the instrument will be reclassified as preferred stock for all purposes of
the Code. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-4(c)(1).
639. See text accompanying notes 644-47 infra.
640. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6()(1)(iii). The instrument is treated as payable on demand
beginning on the day after the day on which the principal is due. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(3).
641. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-7. See text accompanying notes 648-67 infra.'
642. An instrument is not considered to be repaid if it is reissued, renewed, or offset in
any manner. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(1)(4)(i) (last sentence). But see note 652 infra.
643. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(t)(4)(i). For the meaning of "failure to pay," see note 637
supra. See also note 654 infra.
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avoidance. 8 " This potential, however, is insufficient to treat proportionately held demand obligations as equity interests without
some additional evidence of non-arm's length dealing. Accordingly, the Regulations proscribe only proportionately held instruments" 5 that are payable on demand and that provide for an unreasonable rate of interest at issuance, 48 or for any subsequent
6 7

year.

The purpose of this provision is to ensure that a shareholder's
behavior conforms to that of an independent creditor. As there is
no fixed maturity date, the bifurcation rules of Treasury Regulation section 1.385-3(a) will not apply to impose original issue discount or amortizable bond premium. Hence, it is required in Treasury Regulation section 1.385-6(1) that interest be fixed and paid at
a reasonable rate. The effect of this subsection is to require, consistent with commercial practice, periodic interest rate adjustments
on shareholder demand obligations.
Shareholder Obligations Not Evidenced by an Instrument
Any cash advance6 4 8 by a non-"independent creditor" will be
644. An example of such potential is that the obligation is subject to manipulation at
the shareholder-creditor's discretion. The shareholder may choose to enhance his or her
equity participation at the expense of the "indebtedness." This can be accomplished by a de
facto deferral in maturity, which is similar to a failure to enforce. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)
(change in terms). See text accompanying notes 630-34 supra.
645. See text accompanying notes 572-610 supra.
646. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(t)(1). A reasonable rate of interest is defined in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-6(e). See text accompanying notes 484-95 supra.
647. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(1) and (2). If an instrument is reclassified as preferred
stock, it is treated as stock on the first day of the taxable year during which a reasonable

rate of interest was not paid. See note 651 infra. A rate is considered reasonable if it is
reasonable as of any day of the taxable year. Id. The effect of this rule is merely to require a
December 31 adjustment, payable within 90 days, see note 637 supra, to achieve a reasonable rate of interest, even if the rate is not commercially reasonable. See I.R.C. § 6621. As
such, the payable-on-demand provision is a trap for the unwary and the unsophisticated.
648. A "cash advance" is a loan not evidenced by an instrument within six months
after the day on which the loan is made. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(a)(1)(ii). See note 660 infra.
Loans of property fall outside the Regulations and are governed by existing case law.
See note 296 & accompanying text supra. The rationale for this is unclear. The Treasury
states that "[t]he failure of a corporation to reduce to writing the terms of large cash advances creates doubt as to the tax status of the advances." 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,962 (1980).
But the Treasury apparently finds the situation in which a large amount of cash is used by a
shareholder to purchase property and the property is advanced to the shareholder's corporation sufficiently arm's length to be governed by existing case law, that is, I.R.C. § 1232 and
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2). See text accompanying notes 523-30 supra. If it is the Treasury's
intent to classify in this way cash and property advances, the intent is premised on a mis-
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classified as a contribution to capital649 if the corporation has "excessive debt" when the loan is made s ° or there is a failure to pay
51
interest on the loan at a reasonable rate during any taxable year.
A cash advance repaid within six months6 52 will fall outside of this
section to the extent that it, plus other cash advances treated as
debt,65 s does not exceed $25,000.6"
This provision reflects a number of substantial changes, and
several improvements, over the Proposed Regulation. 5 5 First, the
final Regulation provides a presumption of debt treatment unless
certain "equity features" are present. Second, the final Regulation
defines "excessive debt" by reference to section 1.385-6(f), 5 6 while
65 7
the Proposed Regulation employed a 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio.
Third, the final Regulation provides a "retroactive qualification"
conception. Cash and property advances do not provide a basis for distinguishing debt from
equity. See note 622 and accompanying text supra.
Moreover, it often is difficult to distinguish between advances of cash and property. Is a
certificate of deposit "cash"? Marketable securities? See I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2). Inventory?
Services? See note 622 supra.
649. Such a cash advance will not be classified as preferred stock. The rationale for
this classification is unclear, especially if the advance is granted preference under local law,
because it undoubtedly would be if evidenced by a writing.
650. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(b)(2). Excessive debt is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f).
651. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(c). The loan is reclassified as a contribution to capital on
the later of either the first day of the taxable year or the date of the loan. Id. A rate is
considered reasonable if it falls within the definition of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e) as of any
day of the taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(c). The effect of this provision is merely to
require an adjustment on December 31, payable within 90 days, to achieve a reasonable rate
of interest, even if the rate is not commercially reasonable. See I.R.C. § 6621. As such, the
reclassification rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(c)(1) has no teeth; it is solely a trap for the
unwary. See note 647 supra;Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(c)(2). For the effects of reclassification,
see Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(d).
652. Any manner of offset is not considered a repayment. Treas. Reg. § 1.3857(a)(2)(B)(ii). An offset of intercompany debt, however, should be a "payment" for this purpose. See note 637 supra.
653. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(e) (Example (3)).
654. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(a)(2). The intent is to except interim seasonal or extraordinary close corporation advances that are de minimus and short-term. Yet, $25,000 may be
substantial in a number of contexts and $100,000 de minimis in others, and six months has
no relevance to many seasonal businesses. Because of this arbitrariness, this exception will
have only limited usefulness. It will apply only rarely to affiliated or large closely held corporations. An alternative would be an exception based on percentage of net worth and seasonal nature of business.
655. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9, 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,962 (1980). See 45 Fed. Reg.
at 86,443-44 (1980).
656. See notes 623-29 & accompanying text supra.
657. Because of the use of adjusted basis in determining stockholders' equity, the 1:1
debt-to-equity requirement would have operated inequitably.
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rule applicable to instruments issued within six months of the
making of the loan. 5 8 The Proposed Regulation was unclear on
this point.
The intention of the Treasury in making several other changes
was to expand the application of the rules relating to unwritten
obligations.6 9 Instead of isolating the problem areas and clarifying
the broad new definitions of unwritten obligations and independent creditors, the final Regulation, if anything, makes the area
less clear. 60
The primary problem with Treasury Regulation section
1.385-7 lies in its use of the undefined term, "independent creditor." An "independent creditor" is ascertained by taking "into account . . . all relevant facts and circumstances."6' ' It is unclear,
however, what the relevant facts and circumstances are. The "safe
harbor"6 62 and the Examples provide some clues, 66 but no
answers.
A creditor will be deemed to be independent if he or she owns,
directly or indirectly, less than five percent of the corporation's
stock, 6 4 and if his or her direct and indirect holdings are not "substantially proportionate."668 It is not clear, however, in what circumstances a five percent or greater nonproportionate shareholder
may be an "independent creditor." The Treasury Explanation sug658. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(a)(1)(ii).
659. 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,443 (1980).
660. The Treasury Explanation states that "this section would apply to two types of
loans: (i) unwritten loans and (ii) loans where the material terms and conditions are contained in a document other than an instrument (e.g., a board of directors' resolution or an
entry on a corporation's books)." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,443-44 (1980). This is substantially
broader than the Proposed Regulation, which would not have applied to an obligation for
which there was written evidence, such as a board of directors' resolution, i.e., an obligation
the material terms of which, such as fixed principal amount, maturity, rate of interest, subordination, were contained in a written document or set of related documents.
It .is
unclear, moreover, why the Treasury chose to exclude only instruments, and not
other writings. If the intent is to discourage self-serving or fraudulent notations, or noncontemporaneous corporate minutes, then it is supportable, if misguided. After all, self-serving, non-contemporaneous instruments could as easily be executed. If there is a theoretical
basis for such distinction, it escapes this writer.
661. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b). See notes 498-504 & accompanying text supra.
662. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2). See text accompanying note 498 supra.
663. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(4).
664. That is, by I.R.C. § 318(a) attribution, except that stock constructively owned by
an unrelated person within the meaning of I.R.C. § 318(a)(4) is not taken into account.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2) and (3).
665. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2). See text accompanying notes 572-610 supra.
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gests a de minimis standard balanced against all the facts and circumstances,
the latter becoming more important as stockholdings
6
increase.

66

The Examples in Treasury Regulation section 1.385-6(b)(4) illustrate the safe harbor rule, but not the definition of independent
creditor. In Example (1), individual C owns five percent of the
stock of Corporation Y. C falls outside the safe harbor because of
its ownership of the Y stock. In Example (2), individual B holds an
option to acquire nine percent667 of the stock of X Corporation. B,
also, falls outside the safe harbor. The Examples do not state, however, whether A or B is an "independent creditor." Moreover,
neither standards nor examples are provided for ascertaining nonproportional non-independent creditor status. This unnecessarily
opaque framework should be clarified by further regulations, such
as a set of factors of predominant importance.
Preferred Stock
The complement to the hybrid instrument rules of Treasury
Regulation section 1.385-5 is Treasury Regulation section 1.385-10,
which classifies as an instrument "preferred stock" resembling hybrid debt. Preferred stock will be treated as an instrument if it
provides for fixed payments of principal or interest.6 8 The reclassified "instrument" will be subjected to the hybrid instrument analysis of Treasury Regulation section 1.385-5669 or the proportionality inquiry of section 1.385-6.7 °

A narrow safe harbor is carved out for preferred stock when
(1) it is labelled preferred stock and treated as such under applicable nontax law, (2) the excess, if any, of the preferred stock's redemption price over its issue price is a reasonable redemption pre666. 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,444 (1980) states: "Some comments ... stated that the rules
of proposed regulation § 1.385-9 should not apply to shareholders owning de minimis
amounts of stock because it appeared unlikely that such shareholders would maintain a
casual attitude towards their unwritten loans to the corporation. Other comments pointed
out that, taken literally, proposed regulation § 1.385-9 would not apply to unwritten loans
between brother-sister corporations wholly-owned by a common parent, an unwarranted result. Treasury agrees with both comments. Therefore, § 1.385-7 will apply to loans made by
persons other than independent creditors rather than simply to shareholder loans."
667. Arguably, B holds an option to acquire .9%.
668. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10(a).
669. See text accompanying notes 505-21 supra.
670. See text accompanying notes 572-610 and 612-14 supra.
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mium under Treasury Regulation section 1.305-5,71 (3)current

dividends are contingent, e7 (4) the right to receive dividends and
redemption payments may not be enforced under applicable nontax law because the issuing corporation is or would be rendered
insolvent or the issuing corporation's capital would be impaired by
such payments,7 8 (5) default in a dividend or redemption payment
does not entitle the holder to accelerate redemption payments, and
(6) the preferred stock has a term of ten years during which the
holder cannot compel redemption. 74
The standards used in the safe harbor rule of Treasury Regulation section 1.385-10 have no counterpart in the case law. Although a number of cases addressed "debenture preferred
stock,"' 7 5 few courts held that fixed rights alter the character of
that which the parties denominated "preferred stock." The Regulation is directed at a newer financing device, so-called "sinking
fund" preferred stocks. Nevertheless, the safe harbor standards go
671. The theoretical rationale for this requirement is unclear. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b)
provides that an unreasonable "redemption premium" will be treated as a dividend
equivalent under rules analogous to thdse used in taxing original issue discount. The greater
the redemption premium is, the greater the deemed dividend will be. Tress. Reg. § 1.385-10
makes a leap in equating greater redemption premium with debt characteristics. Under this
analysis (which apparently follows from the predominance approach of Treas. Reg. § 1.3855"discount) which resembles equity more than debt in many ways, is treated as an important debt feature. See note 628 supra (last paragraph). This anomaly aside, there is no
magic to the 10% premium safe harbor of Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b)(2) adopted in evaluating
the bona fides of preferred stock. See generally Note, Discounted Preferred Stock under
the New Section 305 Treasury Regulations: On Confusing Debt and Equity, 84 YAmB L.J.
324 (1974).
672. The dividends are contingent, for example, if they are payable only out of earned
surplus or unrealized appreciation or at the discretion of the board of directors, but not
payable out of capital or capital surplus. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10(c) (Examples (2), (5)
and (6)). See note 509 supra. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(7).
673. That is, the fair market value of the remaining assets of the issuing corporation
would be less than the sum of its liabilities and the liquidation value of its other classes of
preferred stock'that are senior or equal in rank. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10(b)(4).
674. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10(b). If the preferred stock provides for redemption over a
period of years, the term shall be the weighted average life of the issue. Treas. Reg. § 1.38510(b)(6). See Tress. Reg, § 1.385-10(c) (Example (3)). Practitioners, relying on an analogy
between preferred stock and "continuity of interest"-"security" issues, had generally assumed that five years was sufficient. Cf. Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67 ("Ordinarily, the
Service will treat 5 years of unrestricted rights of ownership as a sufficient period for the
purpose of satisfying, the continuity requirements of a reorganization.").
675. Compare Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R., 90 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1937) and
Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1940) with Crawford
Drug Stores v. United States, 220 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1955) and Ragland Inv. Co., 52 T.C.
867 (1969), afl'd per curiam, 435 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1970) and Zilkha & Sons, Inc., 52 T.C.
607 (1969).
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beyond necessity and existing precedent. A broader safe harbor
would be appropriate.
Preferred stock on which dividends and redemptions may be
paid only out of earned surplus or retained earnings, or in the discretion of the board of directors, 67 does not provide for fixed payments in the nature of either principal or interest. Consequently,
the Regulations do not apply to such preferred stock.
Subordination to other interests, however, is not considered a
contingency under the Regulations. Thus, forms of subordination,
such as payment limitations on dividends and redemptions based
on insolvency or impairment of capital, do not alter the fixed nature of payments."' 7
Comments, Criticisms, and Comparisons
The Regulations under section 385 are a welcome improvement over debt-equity case law. The emphasis on objective economic standards of fair market value, reasonable rate of interest,
and payment history results in a workable and equitable weighing
of factors to differentiate debt from equity.
The regulatory flaws are primarily those of scope. Instead of
distinguishing between debt and equity in every area of potential
abuse, the Regulations defer to section 1232 in the areas of bifurcation, debt-for-property, and unwritten obligations. 8 This deference creates confusion and complexity, and unnecessarily continues the case by case approach of existing law.
The Regulations also fail to address the difficult, but preeminent, definitional problems of "proportionality" and "independent
creditor" status. 7 ' The effect of eschewing regulatory definitions
and thereby deferring to existing case law and future Revenue Procedures is to create uncertainty in application and judicial
acceptance.
Another problem with the Regulations is that they provide
that existing case law is to apply to interests and, presumably, to
definitions not addressed by the Regulations, "without reference to
676. This applies even if the failure to make such payment prevents the corporation
from paying dividends or making redemption payments in respect of more junior stock.
677. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,444 (1980).
678. See Tress. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(a), -6(d) and -7. See notes 523-44, 615-21, 648-67
supra.
679. See Tress. Reg. §§ 1.385-6(a), (b) and -7. See text accompanying notes 572-610

and 661-67 supra.
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the regulations."6 8 0 It is to be hoped that this catchphrase characterization of regulatory scope will have little effect. One judge has
already applied an analysis based on the Proposed Regulations to a
pre-existing fact pattern,"'1 and the likelihood is that most judges
will seek safety in the clear rules provided by the Treasury. The
exceptions, of course, will be in those cases in which the judge's
visceral reaction is otherwise. That is, courts will continue to be
result-oriented: When the desired result may be by use of the regulations, a regulatory analysis will be employed; in other cases, there
will be reliance on "existing case law."
An additional criticism of the Regulations is that they complicate the debt-equity inquiry by compelling application of judicial
factors to reach regulatory conclusions in any situation in which
fair market value is placed in issue. 8 2 Although this is a valid criticism, the use of the case law factors to reach a factual conclusion is
easier than using them to reach a conclusion of law. Unfortunately,
the complexity is unavoidable; it is, however, mitigated by a broad
rule of convenience. 83
The Regulations apply only upon the "issuance" of instruments and not upon their purchase.6 84 This normally will reflect
economic reality because a mere purchase will not usually' affect
the bona fides of a corporation's capital structure. The one exception is when a majority of stock and debt is sold at a time of
corporate financial stress. The purchased debt in such cases assumes the risk characteristics of equity, with the result that the
purchase allocation 8 5 would have no economic validity."' In these
situations, the rules of Treasury Regulation sections 1.385-3 and
-6(c), (d), and (f) should be made applicable.6 87
The Regulations also fail adequately to address several other
680. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(b).
681. Post Corp. v. United States, 80-2 U.S. T.C. 9696, at 85,292-93 (Ct. Cl. T.J.D.
1980) (report of Trial Judge Yock), aff'd, 81-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9197 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
682. Fair market value may be placed in issue in Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(a) (bifurcation), -5 (hybrid instruments), and -10 (preferred stock). See text accompanying notes 505521, 523-44, 668-77 supra.

683. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2).
684. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(b). The "second look" rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6
may subsequently apply if a proportional shareholder fails to act towards the debt as might
an independent creditor.

685. For example, to debt at "face."
686.

That is, because there is no adversity between the parties.

687. See Pike, Proposed Debt-EquityRegs: Potent New Standardsfor Characterizing
Purported Debt, 7 J. CORP. TAx 195, 199 (1980); Plumb, supra note 31, at 499-503.
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issues not served by existing law: guaranteed loans, advances continuing subsequent to insolvency, and accrual of interest subsequent to insolvency.
Guaranteed Loans
If a shareholder directly or indirectly guarantees a loan made
to its corporation, such as by pledging collateral,'" and existing
case law treats the loan as made to the shareholder, "then the
shareholder is treated as making a contribution to the capital of
the corporation." 89 This rule differs from its counterpart in the
Proposed Regulations, which provided that a loan would be treated
as made to the shareholder if, at the time of issuance, it was unreasonable to expect that the loan could be enforced against the corporation in accordance with its terms. 90° According to the Treasury, this definition expresses existing law; the "change" in the
final Regulations is not substantive, but merely avoids the "confusion" engendered by the proposal.6e9 This view of existing law has

been criticized as both too tough and too uncertain, as well as an
incorrect interpretation of the cases.
Existing case law evaluates a shareholder guarantee by reference to independent creditor standards: at the time the guarantee
was executed, would the lender have loaned that amount on those
terms to the corporation? 692 If the answer is no, the shareholder is
the primary obligor and his or her constructive loan to the corpora688. This appears to be contrary to existing case law. See D.K. Ludwig, 68 T.C. 979
(1979). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(c)(2).
689. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9. This section appears to be an interpretative regulation
under the authority of § 7805. Thus, it does not have legislative force. "[There is] no implication to be drawn from § 1.385-9 as to the tax treatment of international finance companies." 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,444 (1980). See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-9, which retroactively applies
the standards of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9 to losses incurred after December 31, 1975.
690. Proposed Tress. Reg. § 1.385-11(a), 45 Fed. Reg. at 18,972 (1980).
691. 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,444 (1980); see id. at 18,962 (1980).
692. See text accompanying notes 406-407 supra. In the Treasury's view, this is a simple exercise in comparisons: were the loans obtained directly by the corporation under similar terms, or, given the corporation's credit rating, would an independent creditor have
made a similar loan? Cf. Trees. Reg. § 1.385-5. Courts, however, have had a more difficult
time weighing the factors, such as rate of interest, debt-equity ratio, proportionality, remedies on default. See Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 794 (D.
Or. 1965), rev'd, 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Note, New Thin Incorporation
Threat: Repayment of Guaranteed Bank Loans Treated as Dividends, 23 J. TAx. 197
(1965).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

tion, because it is not on terms satisfactory to an independent
creditor, is classified as equity. 93 Payments by the corporation are
constructive distributions to the shareholders, which are deemed to
pass through them, as principal or interest payments, to the
lender.
Under the Treasury's view, a court might treat the entire debt
as an equity interest if, for example, the loan that is guaranteed
provides for interest that is two percent below "reasonable." The
court's only alternative would be to treat the debt as bona fide.
The bifurcation rules of Treasury Regulation section 1.385-3(a)
would be inapplicable; they have no counterpart in the case law.
The Hobson's choice presented by the Regulations is unnecessary. The only case cited by the Treasury is PlantationPatterns,
Inc. v. Commissioner,9 4 which apparently applied a back-to-back
analysis that is different from the approach adopted by the Regulations. It treated the shareholder guarantee as a loan by the
lender to the shareholder and by the shareholder to the corporation. The shareholder's constructive loan was then evaluated under
a traditional debt-equity analysis. This is the more equitable view,
and should be reconsidered by the Treasury. It would evaluate
shareholder guarantees-indirect loans-under the same standards
applicable to direct shareholder loans.0 95
In addition to considering "existing law" on the debt-equity
issue, the Regulations treat the "equity" as a contribution to capital because it is not evidenced by an instrument. However, existing
case law would no doubt treat the "equity" as preferred stock if it
is given preference under local law. This aspect of Treasury Regulation section 1.385-9 also should be reexamined.
Advances Continuing after Insolvency
The Regulations treat each newly-issued obligation separately.
Thus, new advances cannot taint prior years' advances. The only
effect of continuing advances that increase a corporation's debtequity ratio, then, will be possible classification of new loans as
preferred stock. Continuing advances, however, can also have the
693. See 1980 N.Y.S. Bar Report, supra note 283, at B-62 to B-72.
694. 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
695. Note that nonproportional shareholder guarantees may be characterized as capital contributions under Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9, even though direct loans on the same terms
are immune from recharacterization under other provisions of the § 385 Regulations.
-

'
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effect of creating "proportionality." ' As a consequence, failure to
pay a reasonable rate of interest or a default in the payment
of
69 7
principal may convert the entire debt into preferred stock.
Accrual of Interest after Insolvency
The Regulations do not address accrual of interest
problems; 98 they provide only that a creditor-shareholder must
pursue available remedies if there is nonpayment of interest or
principal. 9 9 Pursuit of those remedies,700 however, would allow a
parent corporation to avail itself of the accrual "double deduction"
during the period that remedies were being pursued. This result is
unacceptable. A specific proscription against the non-accrual of interest income should be added to the Regulations. 01
Reform
The Regulations resolve many of the multiple debt-equity
classification problems. They do so, however, at tremendous cost.
They add another layer of complexity to a legislative system that is
already too complex. Moreover, this complexity is added at a level
that affects a large number of taxpayers.
The alternative to the section 385 Regulations is not better
regulations, but no regulations. This alternative requires that there
be no need or opportunity for abuse. A simplification of such magnitude requires a legislative overhaul of striking proportions. The
path, however, has been defined by William Plumb's 1971 proposals and the recent ALI Subchapter C Study.70 2 Reform is overdue.
696. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(6) (Examples (13) and (14)), (k)(2) (Example (2)),
(k)(1) ("or the first day on which this section applied to the instrument").
697. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k) and (1). See text accompanying notes 635-43 supra. See
also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7. See text accompanying notes 648-67 supra.
698. See text accompanying notes 412-29 supra.
699. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k) and (1). See text accompanying notes 635-43 supra.

700. See text accompanying notes 412-29 supra.
701. The Regulations should require that in order to comply with the Regulations'
requirement that a proportional shareholder react to a default as would an independent
creditor, the proportional shareholder must accrue interest income for which an "affiliate" is
accruing an interest deduction.
702. See Plumb, supra note 283; ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-SUBCHAPTER C
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977).
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Related Issues
Deductions for worthless stock and bad debt losses are influenced by a number of factors, some of which have been explored.
Consideration of the effects of a consolidated return election has
been deferred to this point so that the specific benefits and burdens of an election can be explored. Selected administrative requirements for affiliated corporations in the worthlessness context
703
are also examined.

An Introduction to Consolidated Return Requirements
Relating to Worthlessness
The filing of consolidated returns will be beneficial if an affiliated member becomes worthless within the meaning of section
165(g). Deductions for worthless securities will be accelerated because partial deductions are allowed and deductions for bad debts
will remain subject to the rules discussed above.
One advantage to the filing of consolidated returns is that losses flow through to the affiliated group.7 " The basis of the parent's
subsidiary stock or stock in the loss affiliate held by other members must be reduced,7 5 however, to the extent that losses are
"availed of" by the group 708 in computing consolidated taxable income. As a result, a consolidated parent will receive the benefit of
annual ordinary loss deductions resulting from the gradual decline
in value of its investment in the subsidiary rather than awaiting
the complete worthlessness of its stock and a single ordinary loss
deduction under section 165(g)(3). °
703. See notes 719-32 & accompanying text infra.
704. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11 and -12.
705. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(a) and (b)(2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(b).
706. The losses are "availed of" by the group either currently or as carryback or carryover deductions.
707. This has interesting ramifications in the Corn Productsand securities' characterization areas. See text accompanying notes 52-76 supra.
If a parent has a $100 basis in its subsidiary stock, the parent and the subsidiary are
members of an affiliated group filing consolidated returns, and the subsidiary generates net
operating losses of $99, then the parent in effect receives an ordinary loss deduction of $99
on its stock investment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11.
Alternatively, if the subsidiary generates losses of only $80, and its assets depreciate in
value to $1, then the parent may deduct the $80 flow-through as an ordinary loss. Upon sale
of the subsidiary stock for $1, however, the parent apparently is entitled to capital loss
treatment only. I.R.Q. §§ 1221, 1222. This is so despite the fact that the stock depreciation
in both cases results from operating and § 1231 losses. The distinction in the latter situation
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Affiliate loss from "intercompany transactions" is deferred until the subsidiary is "disposed of."708a This deferral encompasses
losses from a partially or completely worthless intercompany bad
debt, or for a deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve for
intercompany bad debts,70 9 and is triggered by the complete worthlessness of stock within the meaning of section 165(g).710 Deductions for intercompany bad debts or a reserve will therefore be unaffected by the filing of consolidated returns because the
worthlessness of stock by definition precedes the worthlessness of
indebtedness.
The worthlessness of stock in an affiliated subsidiary would
produce the following results:711 (1) the parent's basis in its subsidiary's stock would be deductible as if the stock were disposed of on
the last day of the taxable year;712 (2) the parent could deduct its
intercompany indebtedness either in whole or in part; s (3) the
parent's basis in its subsidiary's stock would be reduced to zero;714
and (4) the parent's basis in the intercompany indebtedness would
be reduced by the amount deducted.71 5
is that the subsidiary's I.R.C. § 1231 (or I.R.C. § 1221(1)) losses went unrecognized; tax
depreciation was not consistent with economic depreciation. The consolidated return regulations treat the affiliated group as "integrally-related" for operating gain and loss; there
seems to be no warrant for differentiating bulk termination sales from similar integral tax
treatment. Cf. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) (gain or loss on sale of
business measured and characterized by individual components).
708. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-13 and -14(d).
709. Tress. Reg. § 1.1502-14(d). The same rule would apply whether the debt was held
to be bona fide indebtedness or preferred equity. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19(a)(2)(ii).
710. Tress. Reg. § 1.1502-19(b)(2)(iii). Other disposition events are described in Tress.
Reg.§§ 1.1502-14(d)(3) and 1.1502-19(b)(2).
711. In addition to the § 165(g) test of worthlessness, Tress. Reg. § 1.1502-19(b)(2)(iv)
and (v)provide two alternative objective worthlessness tests. There is a "disposition" if (1)
"the Commissioner is satisfied that 10 percent or less of the face amount of any obligation
for which the subsidiary is personally liable (primarily or secondarily) is recoverable at maturity by its creditors," or (2) "a member transfers an obligation for which the subsidiary is
personally liable (primarily or secondarily) to a nonmember for an amount which is 25 percent of the face amount of such obligation."
712. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.1502-11-32; I.R.C. § 165(g)(3).
If the parent's subsidiary stock basis is zero, or if it has an excess loss account, there
would be no I.R.C. § 165(g) loss deduction. A "disposition" would trigger recapture to the
extent of an excess loss account, normally as ordinary income. Tress. Reg. § 1.1502-19(a)
and (b). The general features of Tress. Reg. §§ 1.1502-19(a) and (b) were held valid in Covil
Insulation Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 364 (1975), and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 790 (1975).
713. Tress. Reg. § 1.1502-14(d)(3)(ii); § 166(a).
714. I.R.C. § 1016; Tress. Reg. §§ 1.1502-11-32.
715. I.R.C. § 1016.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

For tax years subsequent to the year of worthlessness, if the
subsidiary were to generate any net operating losses, these losses
would fhow through to the affiliated group. 16 The recognition of
loss would trigger a negative basis adjustment in the parent's subsidiary stock basis,7 17 and the parent would recognize income from
this excess loss account equal to the net operating loss flowthrough. The result is an annual tax wash. 1
Administrative Requirements
The preceding substantive discussion must be tempered by
knowledge of procedural requirements, or careful planning may be
compromised by procedural error. A review of all administrative
requirements for financially distressed corporations, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article.7

19

As such, only those provisions

that have unique and important consequences in the worthlessness
20
7
context are discussed.

Section 6511(a) states the general rule that a claim for refund
shall be filed within three years from the date the return was filed
or two years from the date the tax was paid, whichever expires
later. A seven-year statute of limitations applies, however, to refund claims relating to a deduction for wholly worthless securitieS72 1 or wholly worthless debts.7 2 2 The taxpayer in these circum-

stances can claim a refund within seven years of the date
prescribed by law for filing the return.7 21

The three-year statute of

limitations is also relaxed for net operating loss and capital loss
carrybacks.724 A claim for refund may be made on the return fied
for the applicable year.725
A strict three-year limitations period applies to the assessment
716. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11.
717. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32.
718. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19(b)(2)(iii). See Covil Insulation Co. v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 364, 377 (1975).
719. See generally Beghe, Tax Planningfor the FinanciallyTroubled Corporation,52
TAXES 795 (1974).
720. See I.R.C. §§ 6425(a) and (b), 6655 (estimated tax over and under payments).
721. I.R.C. § 165(g)(3).
722. I.R.C. § 166(a)(1).
723. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(1). See Treas. Reg. § 301.6511(d)-1(c) (the seven-year statute of
limitations does not apply to the deductibility of partially worthless debt losses).
724. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2). See also I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314.
725. I.R.C. § 6402; Tress. Reg. § 301.6402-3. See also I.R.C. §§ 6405, 6406 (claims for
-refunds exceeding $200,000).
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of deficiencies by the Service. Section 6501(a) provides that taxes
must be assessed within three years of the date on which the return was filed.
The interplay of sections 6501(a) and 6511(d)(1) is significant.
The Service can be foreclosed from assessing a deficiency arising
from other items of tax liability when a taxpayer claims a refund
for worthless securities or wholly worthless debts after the threeyear statute of limitations on assessment has run, but prior to the
expiration of the seven-year limitations period on refund of overpayments.7 26 This statutory distinction permits the taxpayer to file
prdtective returns in those cases in which an initial refund claim
has been disallowed and litigation on the propriety of a worthlesness deduction for that year is pending. Thus, if a refund claim for
year one is disallowed, the taxpayer may file suit and, in year six,
seven, eight or nine, may fie a refund claim for year two based on
the same deduction for worthless securities and wholly worthless
debts. This practice of filing protective returns would continue either until the last possible year of worthlessness or until the Service or the courts allowed the deduction for a prior year. In this
way, the taxpayer can insulate from attack by the Service other
potential items of tax liability and also avoid loss of a worthlessness deduction by failure to claim it in the proper year.72 7 Moreover, if the subsequent refund claims are disallowed, the taxpayer
will be able to consolidate its claims for trial, 2 8 permitting the trial
judge to be the final arbiter of the year of worthlessness.72 9
A taxpayer's quest for the earliest year of tax deduction7 30 is
726. See I.R.C. § 6514(b). However, the taxpayer may not recover a refund to the
extent that there was no overpayment of tax in the barred year. In Lewis v. Reynolds, 284

U.S. 281 (1932), the Supreme Court held that, although the Commissioner may not credit an
overpayment against a barred deficiency for a different taxable year, the Commissioner
might do so if the deficiency was for the year for which the taxpayer claims a refund. See

also Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); I.R.C. §§ 1311-1315. The doctrine of equitable recoupment cannot be used to assess a deficiency or reopen a closed year.
727. This assumes that the identifiable event did not occur in a year prior to year one.
728. This assumes refund suits in the same court.
729.

See Young v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1941): "[T]he taxpayer is

at times in a very difficult position in determining in what year to claim a loss. The only safe
practice, we think, is to claim a loss for the earliest year when it may possibly be allowed
and to renew the claim in subsequent years if there is any reasonable chance of its being
applicable to the income for those years." See generally I.R.C. §§ 7422(a), 6532(a).

730. Also, government money has been used at what, to date, have been favorable
rates of interest. I.R.C. § 6621. But see Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 9734, § 711 (amending § 6621).
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endangered by the possibility that a penalty may be imposed. Section 6653(a) states that "[i]f any part of any underpayment. . . is
due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations
(but without intent to defraud), there shall be added to the tax a
[penalty] equal to 5 percent of the [entire] underpayment. ' 73 1 This
has specific application to a grossly improper claim of worthlessness. It also applies, however, if a separate underpayment on the
return was due to negligence or fraud. In such circumstances, the
entire underpayment for the year, and not merely that part resulting from negligence or fraud, will be subject to the statutory penalty.73 2 Thus, a taxpayer would be well-advised to scrutinize closely
all items on his or her return to avoid the possibility of any underpayment due to negligence or fraud. Particular care is necessary
in the case of worthless securities and debt losses, because the
proper year for deduction is difficult to ascertain and the deduction is frequently substantial in amount.
Conclusion
Planning for tax contingencies begins even before a corporation is organized. A proper mix of common and preferred stock and
indebtedness,7 3 8 use of multiple entities 7 -4 and election of tax options7 35 should all be considered prior to formation. The beneficial
effect of these planning tools is often dependent upon substantiation. The execution of notes, the adoption of regular board of directors' and shareholders' minutes, and the institution of proper
accounting procedures set the stage for future deductions. Of
course, the efficacy of historical evidence may be destroyed by subsequent inconsistent actions. The converse, however, is also true.
Shortsighted planning may be overcome by remedial measures
which are properly documented. At no time can the taxpayer assume that an apparently negative result is a foregone conclusion.7 36
731. Section 6653(b) provides for a penalty of 50% of the amount of the underpayment in those cases in which fraud results in any underpayment. A penalty under § 6653
may be imposed in addition to that under § 6651. See also I.R.C. § 6653(a)(2).
732. Bianchi v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 324, 335 (1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.
1977).
733. See generally BrrKER & EUSTICE, note 70 supra, at 1 4.02 and ch. 10; I.R.C. 8
305.
734. See I.R.C. §8 165(g)(3), 1501-04.
735. See I.R.C. 88 1244, 1371-79, 1501.
736. See Wagner Electric Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1024 (1976), (adopting
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This Article focuses on several areas of tax planning, the foremost of which is the establishment and maintenance of the bona
fides of indebtedness. Failure to prove valid debt often results in
the disallowance of interest deductions, an inability to bail-out
earnings, and the deferral and recharacterization of debt and
worthless securities' losses, which otherwise might have been characterized as ordinary. The section 385 Regulations provide comprehensive new standards for making the distinction between debt
and equity. They are a marked improvement over existing case
law. Tax planning for obligations issued after December 31, 1981
can proceed with a large degree of certainty. Pre-1982 debt-equity
rules and areas not addressed by the section 385 Regulations, however, remain a muddle. Fortunately, their applicability has been
severely limited.
This Article also addresses the requirements for a worthlessness deduction. The test of worthlessness under Sterling Morton v.
Commissioner" measures the substance of insolvency, not the
form of nominal sales or half-hearted marketing efforts. If insolvency is established and proof exists of an inability to restore
value, a worthlessness event has occurred. The cases properly turn
on evidence of events that extinguish prospects for profitability.
Although the Morton test relies on factors that, at the time of
worthlessness, may be unknown and unknowable, a reasonable person standard for deductibility nevertheless emerges.
Some question exists, despite judicial adoption of a "wholly
worthless" requirement for "sustained," whether a loss may be
"sustained" in the parent-subsidiary context when the extent of
partial loss becomes fixed by the occurrence of one or more identifiable events. Similarly, the proper characterization of affiliate loss
in unclear. An argument can be made in support of ordinary gain
and loss treatment for affiliate securities when consolidated returns
are filed. Only one court, however, has passed on this issue. 7 s s The
Treasury should resolve these anomalies by promulgating regulations under section 1502 consistent with the concept of treating a
consolidated group the same as a single corporate entity with mulfindings of fact of trial judge), 75-1 U.S. T.C. 9471 (Ct. Cl. T.J.D. 1975), in which the
taxpayer, despite the most abysmal facts, succeeded in convincing the Court of Claims that
advances to a wholly-owned subsidiary were bona fide indebtedness.
737. 38 B.T.A. 1270 (1938), af'd, 112 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1940).
738. United States v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980). See note 76 &
accompanying text supra.
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tiple operating divisions. In the absence of Treasury action, the
courts should resolve these anomalies.

